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Donations and Differentiation: Three Essays on Non-profit Strategy 
 
ABSTRACT 
Given increased competition with for-profit firms, the issue of the comparative advantage of non-
profit organizations is renewed. While non-profits may want to differentiate themselves when faced 
with additional non-profit competition, it is unclear whether they would want to differentiate 
themselves or converge towards for-profit competitors. This paper addresses this issue by 
considering the different financing models, human resource systems, and objectives of non-profit 
organizations, as compared to for-profits, in the mixed industry of microfinance. 
 
In my first essay, I utilize an analytical model, where firms can choose profit status, sources of 
financing, and the borrowers they target with a given interest rate and loan size.  I find that non-
profit and for-profit organizations will segment the market, partly due to differences in profit status 
and partly due to differences in the sources of financing. I find support for the hypotheses using a 
large-scale panel dataset of microfinance organizations in Latin America. 
 
The second essay focuses on a particular element of the business model considered in the first essay: 
deposit-taking.  I show that non-profits that begin taking deposits only benefit financially if they also 
begin making larger loans. This suggests that changes in non-profits' activities may require a change 
iv  
in positioning to improve financial performance. More broadly, it supports the literature on the 
importance of fit between product market strategy and business model, which suggests extra 
managerial attention be paid to whether and how to adopt activities that change the business model.  
 
The third essay considers another key distinguishing element between the non-profit and for-profit 
business model: the incentive and reward systems for employees.  I merge the panel dataset with a 
cross-sectional survey on the dimensions along which the firms incentivize employees, and develop 
a proxy for the level of bonus pay.  The results suggest that more mission-oriented firms reward 
employees on more dimensions, but with lower average salary and a smaller amount of bonus pay.  
This suggests that incentive pay may be used as a signal in more mission-oriented firms to clarify the 
expectations of employee behavior, whereas it is used to directly motivate and incentivize employees 
in less mission-oriented firms. 
 
The three essays of my dissertation combine to examine the characteristics that distinguish non-
profit organizations, even in industries in which they co-exist with for-profits.  The results shed light 
on these increasingly common mixed industries, as well as provide insight into business model 
competition and the fit between elements that make up a business model.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Competition between Endogenous Business Model Forms:  
Profit Status in the Mixed Microfinance Industry 
 
ABSTRACT 
The competitive dynamics between organizations that have distinct business models as a consequence of their 
different objectives has only recently become an area for theoretical and empirical analysis.  Using the setting 
of microfinance where non-profits and for-profits directly compete in the same industry, this paper develops 
a formal analytical model investigating the objectives that organizations pursue in order to understand the 
resulting differences in business models. I test the predictions of the model with a firm-level panel dataset, 
covering 2003 through 2012 in Latin America.  I find support for the model’s predictions of differentiation in 
the wealth of borrowers served by the firm’s profit status, as well as differentiation by its sources of financing.  
In addition, allowing for the endogenous choice of sources of financing leads to the hypothesis that non-
profits may focus on even lower income borrowers when they face more for-profit competitors; this 
hypothesis is supported by correlational analysis in the data.  Further, generalizing the theory to allow more 
socially oriented firms to choose their profit status may help to resolve the conflicting results in the literature 
regarding how non-profits behave with increasing commercialization. 
 
Keywords: non-profit strategy; competition; microfinance 
 
1 Introduction
Of central concern to the eld of strategic management is how organizations obtain a competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991). One subset of this literature looks at the types of strategic choices for
a rm that together form a business model, and how and when dierent business models support
competitive advantage in the market (Johnson et al., 2008) and thus lead to superior performance
(Zott & Amit, 2007). The business model is a concept which has been discussed since the 1950's
(Osterwalder et al., 2005), but in the last fteen years has become widely used in the academic
literature, as well as in the business press.
Despite the long history and increasing popularity of this concept, there is a call in the strategy
literature for more empirical research of its usefulness and application (Wirtz et al., 2015). How-
ever, this research area is often plagued by issues of measurement and unobserved heterogeneity
as business models are dicult to dene, both theoretically and empirically (Osterwalder et al.,
2005). In this paper, I use prot status as an organizational choice that determines the business
models available to an organization by limiting its sources of nancing. The decision to incorporate
as a for-prot rm or not has important implications for the strategy that the rm should follow,
and is reected in dierences in organizational and product market characteristics.
The context in which I consider the issue of business models and prot status is a mixed indus-
try, micronance, where for-prots and non-prots overlap. For-prots and non-prots overlap in
an increasing number of industries (Ben Ner, 2002; Dees & Anderson, 2003), and the study of these
mixed industries can illuminate understanding of business model competition (Casadesus-Masanell
& Ricart, 2007).
Micronance institutions vary in their approach according to their legal structure: for-prot
institutions consist of commercial banks and non-bank nancial institutions and non-prots consist
of NGOs and credit unions.1 On one end of the spectrum, the micronance operations of for-prot
1 There are a few cases where these denitions do not hold exactly, but 95% of banks are for-prots, 83% of
NBFIs are for-prots, all NGOs are non-prots, and over 99% of credit unions are non-prots in my data.
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commercial banks are large and have stream-lined processes such that their micronance lending
resembles their traditional, commercial banking. However, their focus on wealthy and corporate
clients, due to their overall protability goals, means that, for them, it can be dicult to target
poor clients and less appealing to open branches in rural areas (CGAP, 2005). On the other end are
non-prot NGOs that are more likely to be located in rural areas, use group lending,2 and have less
formalized processes. Thus, in one direction, segmentation of the borrowers targeted determines
the lending strategy, and in the other direction, rms target borrowers that they are relatively more
equipped to lend to.
Prot status has important implications, the most relevant here being the source and nature of
external nancing. In my analytical model, I assume that non-prots and for-prots get nanced
through dierent sources. For-prots can be nanced through a mix of debt and equity, whereas
non-prots can be nanced through debt and donations. Despite the fact that \even for-prot
organizations are allowed to take donations," it is likely that traditional donors \are familiar with
lending to non-prots, so if they give $100; 000, they expect it to be $100; 000 of program ser-
vices, not taxes" (Source 1). Similarly, if the for-prot organization has shareholders, \it's hard
to convince [foundations and donors to donate] when they will feel like they are lining sharehold-
ers pockets" (Source 3). In addition, due to the legal denition of non-prots as satisfying the
non-distribution constraint, which states that the non-prot is \barred from distributing its net
earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, ocers, directors,
or trustees," non-prots cannot have shareholder equity (Hansmann, 1980). Thus, reecting these
dierences in sources of nancing, I assume the for-prots cannot access donations, whereas non-
prots cannot use shareholder equity but do have access to donations.
While donors may have particular concerns about the use of funds as indicated by their un-
willingness to give money to for-prots, equity holders have their own objectives, particularly in
the expectation of nancial returns. The key distinction between donors and investors is that
2 Group lending is a lending approach where a certain amount of money is dispersed to a group, rather than
to an individual. The idea is that the group has better knowledge about which people are reliable and likely to
generate higher return, and peer pressure can be used to induce repayment. Group lending is quite frequently used
in micronance in Bangladesh and India, but is less common in Latin America.
3
investors \need to be repaid".3 Thus even though the investors may be social impact investors,
and not traditional investors, in that they do \look at us from a mission perspective", they are
still investors, \so they have a duciary responsibility, meaning they don't want to take on an
unwarranted amount of risk" (Source 1). In order to meet this nancial responsibility objective,
my interviewee suggests that \there is an incentive to obtain larger funds quicker... [and] to obtain
larger loan size[s]" (Source 1). This is consistent with the result shown in my model that larger
loans are associated with higher protability. Thus, while the assumption that donors do not care
about return whereas investors do is a simplication of reality, it sheds light on the eect that the
diering incentives of dierent sources of nancing may have on rm behavior. To the extent that
the empirical analysis supports these dierences, it suggests that, despite the simplication, I still
capture an important mechanism at work.
My analytical model shows that non-prot and for-prot organizations will segment the market,
partly due to dierences in prot status and partly due to dierences in the sources of nancing.
Because the prot-maximizing objective is inappropriate for a non-prot organization, I consider
the alternative possible rm objective of maximizing the number of borrowers the rm reaches. For
this client-maximizing type of rm, there is a choice between non-prot and for-prot status. Even
among rms with the same objective function, the choice of prot status leads to dierences in
nancing, not only in the possibility of accepting donations but also in the likelihood of accepting
deposits. These choices in nancing lead to endogenous dierences in the borrowers served.
Using a self-reported, large-scale survey of micronance organizations, I nd support for the
conclusions of my model regarding segmentation by prot status. In addition, segmentation occurs
according to whether or not the rm accepts deposits. This suggests that the sources of nancing
used and the rm's prot status interact in an important way to form a business model that is better
equipped to serve certain borrower wealth levels. Finally, segmentation is higher when non-prots
compete more with for-prot organizations, suggesting that competition between business models
importantly aects rm behavior and on average leads to dierentiation rather than imitation.
3 There are clearly other dierences between donors and investors. In the analytical model, I assume donors
would like lower income borrowers to be targeted, although donors may have additional and alternative objectives.
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My assumptions and decisions on which variables to focus on come from four semi-structured
interviews, as well as additional institutional knowledge provided by the academic literature and
mainstream media. My interviews were with two micronance CEOs (Sources 3 and 4), one man-
ager at a micronance network (Source 2), and one manager at an impact investment fund (Source
1), all based in Latin America. These provided me with a range of stakeholder perspectives to
guide my model building. The key elements in this model are the existence of rms with dierent
objective functions that have choices available to them, including their prot status and sources of
nancing.4 These choices, along with the rm's objective, determine the type of borrower the rm
lends to and how the rm will respond to competition.
The rest of this section will review the major literatures that I draw from. Section 2 presents
the formal model to provide the basis and intuition leading to the testable hypotheses. Section 3
describes the data and presents the empirical analyses and Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Business Model Literature
This paper examines the distinct business models followed by non-prot and for-prot rms, and
considers the mechanisms by which and the circumstances in which these business models support
competitive advantage. While there is no widely accepted denition of what a business model is
(Zott et al., 2011), I use the denition from Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010), which is in-
spired from Magretta (2002) and others: \the particular set of choices an organization makes about
policies, assets and governance - and their associated consequences { are the organization's business
model, because they determine the logic of the rm, the way it operates and how it creates value for
its stakeholders" (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010). Thus, the business model framework is an
appropriate one with which to consider the eects of dierences by prot status as it incorporates
many of the aforementioned dierences, including in sources of nancing and borrower targeting.
Analyses of the interaction of dierent business models in the same industry is a recent endeavor,
4 These choices in turn determine the cost of regulation to the rm.
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with some theoretical work analyzing the eect on a focal rm of co-existing with another rm that
employs a dierent business model (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2007; Casadesus-Masanell &
Zhu, 2013). However, evaluation of the development of new business models or innovations in
business models is an area where signicant research has been undertaken, that area being called
business model design (Zott & Amit, 2007; Zott et al., 2011). The literature on business model
innovation considers how business models may evolve to respond to changing technology (Ches-
brough & Rosenbloom, 2002), how business model innovation can be used to improve corporate
social responsibility eorts (Johnson & Suskewicz, 2009; Schaltegger et al., 2012), and how business
model innovation is linked to rm performance (Zott & Amit, 2007; 2008).
Most relevant to this paper is the burgeoning literature on the need and opportunity of using
business model innovation to better serve borrowers at the \bottom of the pyramid", or borrowers
with low levels of income and wealth (Alter, 2006; Dees, 1998; Yunus et al., 2010; Glassl, 2012;
Eyring et al., 2011). The idea behind this literature is that business model innovation is necessary
in order to serve very poor borrowers as the classic approach to business may not be applicable
or feasible (Schaltegger et al., 2012; Glassl, 2012). However, the literature on business models
for rms serving social and nancial goals, or social enterprises, is not well established, as even
the denition of social enterprise cannot be agreed upon (Zahra et al., 2009; Brouard & Larivet,
2011; Mair, 2011). Thus, this paper uses fundamental dierences between business models, with
variations in rm prot status, as an alternative approach for exploring the relationship between
business models, particularly for low income and wealth customers.
1.2 Literature on Dierences between Non-Prots and For-Prots
Non-prots are classically thought to have a comparative advantage in serving privately unprotable
customers, as their non-distribution constraint makes them trustworthy recipients of donations (Os-
ter, 1995). On the other hand, this reliance on donations limits the potential scale that non-prots
can obtain (Froelich, 1999). Further, the cost of obtaining this type of external funding dierenti-
ates non-prots from their for-prot peers (Kistruck et al., 2013).
The extent of this comparative advantage is increasingly relevant with an increasingly diverse
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set of rms operating in the for-prot sector, due to for-prot rms allocating more resources to
corporate social responsibility eorts or even making these social initiatives part of their core orga-
nizational mission, as is the case in hybrid organizations. For example, some states have added a
new legal structure, the B-corporation, which allows rms to have a corporate charter that explic-
itly focuses on both shareholder return and a social mission, and better accommodates this growing
number of hybrid organizations (Battilana et al., 2012). In addition, donations are becoming in-
creasingly costly to obtain as competition on the donor side has increased (Scott, 2003). As a result
of both of these factors, overlaps in markets between for-prots and non-prots are more frequent
and substantial (Ben Ner, 2002). Understanding how markets with signicant overlaps operate, in-
cluding the role of donations and non-prot business models, is, therefore, of increasing importance.
While the non-distribution constraint is a key distinguishing factor between non-prots and
for-prots that, in turn, inuences the way these two types of organizations are nanced, there is
also substantial variation in behavior among non-prots (Brooks, 2005; Kistruck et al., 2013). In
particular, the extent to which a non-prot relies on donations also inuences its response to for-
prot competition, as a higher reliance on donations indicates its need to meet donors' requirements
(Crittenden, 2000; Crittenden et al., 1998). After non-prots received much negative attention in
the media for high CEO salaries and low levels of organizational eciency (Frumkin & Keating,
2001), a movement to quantify their eciency, as well as donors' interest in their eciency, intensi-
ed (Thornton, 2006; Bennett & Savani, 2003). In addition, due to their reliance on short-term and
contingent donations (Oster, 1995; Kelly, 1991), non-prots have more diculty in responding to
external pressures, or to economic shocks, and thus additional external funding is needed in these
circumstances (Galaskiewicz et al., 2006; James, 1983). Thus, the prior literature on the non-prot
sector has suggested that donations inuence those rms' behavior; I extend this idea to dierences
both between and within for-prots and non-prots.
Further, within the non-prot literature, this paper provides a contribution by considering how
nancing choices, within the spectrum of characteristics of non-prots, may have lasting eects on
their ability to respond to competitive pressures (Hodge & Piccolo, 2005; Verbruggen et al., 2011).
As new organizational forms continue to emerge and hybrid organizations with social objectives are
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more common (Battilana & Lee, 2014), the question of whether there is still a place for traditional
non-prots is increasingly relevant for non-prot managers and policy makers. However, business
law does not divide the organizations based on their objective functions but by their prot status
(Boyd et al., 2009; Billis, 2010). Thus, in order to understand whether convergence between entities
with dierent prot status is taking place, I rst have to document the dierence between the two
business models as a function of their nancing and objectives and then consider how this dierence
is changing with increasing commercialization of non-prots (Hermes et al., 2011).
When there is a need for the services of charitable organizations (Drayton, 2005), but there
is increased entry by for-prot competitors (Ryan, 1999; Kaul & Luo, 2015), the issue of the
comparative advantage of non-prot organizations becomes of increasing importance. While non-
prots may want to dierentiate themselves when faced with additional non-prot competition
(Barman, 2002), it is unclear whether they would want to dierentiate themselves or converge
towards the characteristics of their for-prot competition. This paper addresses this issue by
considering how the dierent nancing models and objectives of non-prot organizations, as well as
for-prots, in a mixed industry, aect decisions regarding which borrowers to serve and the sources
of nancing to pursue.
1.3 Micronance Literature
The origin of the modern micronance industry is attributed to Professor Mohamed Yunus who
started Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in 1975 (Bruck, 2006). By the early 1990s, micronance was
starting to be seen as not just a space for NGOs, as indicated by the fact that BancoSol-NGO and
Los Andes-NGO had spun o their micronance lending into regulated, commercial rms (Batti-
lana & Dorado, 2010).
Recently, countries are facing increasing pressure to regulate the industry as there is concern
that too much prot is being made from the very poor (Rosenberg, 2007; Ashta & Hudon, 2012).
However, regulations in this industry are often poorly written and may be counter-productive and
hinder development, as regulated micronance institutions (MFIs) are more likely to serve a higher-
income population and a smaller proportion of women (Cull et al., 2011). Similarly, implementing
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interest rate caps leads existing rms to focus on higher-income population (Campion et al., 2010).
Thus regulation, which diers according to the MFI's prot status, is an important characteristic
that inuences rm behavior in this industry.
Traditionally, the strategy of micronance institutions was to make enterprise loans with no
physical collateral (Nourse, 2001), instead using group lending to ensure repayment (Wenner, 1995).
The common example of these early loans was that there are trucks with produce and goods that
come in to the town on Wednesday and market vendors need to buy the goods to sell over the
weekend. If the vendor can take out a loan to get more produce, then he can sell more and repay
the loan in a week (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Generally, the length of such loans is quite short,
usually within months or up to a year and repayment rates are quite high (Morduch, 1999).5
The \best practices" literature in micronance discusses rms' lending strategy, such as the
optimal interest rate, group versus individual lending, optimal loan size, and commercialization of
the organization (Brau & Woller, 2004). Firms vary in whether they target the marginally poor
(near the poverty line) versus the very poor (Navajas et al., 2000). More generally, the prior liter-
ature suggests that there exists important variance in the borrowers targeted and in organizational
practices by MFIs. Such dierences support the micronance context as an appropriate place to
consider the eects of dierent business models.
There has been substantial interest in the commercialization of the industry as a whole, and
the extent to which this commercialization has changed the goals of micronance institutions. On
one hand, Hermes et al., (2011) nd, not surprisingly, that outreach and cost eciency are nega-
tively related.6 This implies that rms that are more ecient have a narrower outreach, meaning
they focus less on the underserved population. However, Mersland and Strom (2010) perform a
5 Thus, in addition to loan size and interest rate, the rm also decides the length of the loan (or repayment
time). This dimension is not explicitly factored into my model. However, shorter repayment times are associated
with smaller loans and smaller loan sizes are used to reach very low income borrowers. This is consistent with the
relationship between loan size and borrower wealth that I nd in my model. As a result, incorporating dierent
repayment times would only strengthen this relationship and not change the substance of the model.
6 The authors use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to calculate the ecient cost frontier. Cost eciency is then
dened by how close the organization is to this frontier.
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large-scale data analysis of 379 MFIs from 1998 to 2008 to examine the extent to which mission
drift, measured by average loan size, may occur as a result of increasing pressure for rms to be
self-sustainable; the authors do not nd evidence of such mission drift, as in fact they nd that the
more cost eective the MFI is, the smaller the average loan.
Thus it is unclear from the existing literature whether pursuing eciency and nancial sus-
tainability is at odds with reaching the more underserved population. My paper extends this
existing work by focusing on the commercialization of the industry, and examining how the less
commercially-oriented segment, according to diering objective functions, may or may not want
to pursue for-prot status and wealthier borrowers depending on external conditions and relative
cost dierences. This approach can explain why dierent samples have led to conicting empirical
ndings in the prior literature.
Popular debate burgeoned regarding whether micronance rms should be allowed to achieve
signicant prots following the nancial success of the initial public oering (IPO) of Compartamos,
an MFI in Mexico (Ashta & Hudon, 2012), and evidence that MFIs were charging higher interest
rates to the poor, at times even achieving a higher return than commercial banks (Rosenberg et al.,
2010). While this pursuit of prot associated with the for-prot status thus has potential issues,
Bogan (2012) found that the use of grants, more often associated with non-prot MFIs, leads to
lower nancial performance.7 Thus, it is suggested that non-prots may have less incentive to cut
costs. Ly and Mason (2011) provide a similar explanation: competition by NGOs for these scarce
donations wastes resource and delays implementation of eciency enhancing programs for rms
that rely on grants. Rather than focusing on purported non-prot ineciency, my analytical model
assumes that for-prot and non-prot organizations make nancing and product market choices
fully aware of these costs and optimize based on their dierent objectives.8 As a result, dierences
in rm nancial performance are a consequence of dierent rm objectives that lead to targeting
7 Grants can be thought of as a type of donation as they are given without expectation of return and providers
of grants are generally motivated by achieving some social objective.
8 I also allow donations to be costly, and this parameter can be interpreted as the cost of eort to compete for
donations.
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of borrowers with varying levels of wealth, and thus varying levels of protability.
2 Model
I build a model of the objective functions, prot status, and funding and lending choices of rms in
the micronance industry in order to develop intuition regarding the behavior of and competition
between rms with dierent business models. The general idea is that rms can have one of two
possible objectives: maximizing prot or maximizing the number of borrowers served. Then, rms
have two possible choices in terms of prot status, and additional choices regarding their business
model such as how to nance their operations and the wealth of the borrowers to serve.
2.1 Model Set-Up
Let there be N potential borrowers in the low-income market, denoted n = 1; :::; N .9 Borrowers
are heterogeneous in terms of their initial wealth. Let wn be the measure of how wealthy the n
th
borrower is, where wn 2 [0; 1] is distributed according to a uniform distribution and higher values
of w mean the borrower is wealthier.10
Loans can be made to borrowers; they may vary in interest rate, rn, and size of the loan, Vn.
Assuming successful repayment, borrowers get increasing utility from the size of the loan and de-
creasing utility from the interest rate. Let pn(wn; Vn; rn) be the probability that the loan is fully
repaid, where this probability is increasing in wn and decreasing in Vn and rn, so wealthier bor-
rowers are more likely to repay and smaller loans or those with lower interest rates are more likely
to be repaid.11 This repayment probability is similar to that used in McIntosh and Wydick (2005),
9 See Table 1.1 for a list of all of the symbols used in the model, as well as their denition and operationalization.
10 This is analogous to the initial level of productive assets, ki, that McIntosh and Wydick (2005) describe.
Wealthier borrowers have wn > 1 and are served by commercial banks. Thus, wn 2 [0; 1] can be thought of as the
segment of low-income population unserved by the traditional banking industry.
11 This is similar to the use of a probability of high or low return in McIntosh & Wydick (2005). I make the
assumption here that repayment is the key dimension as opposed to the success of the project being funded, as part of
the reason that wealthier borrowers may be more desirable borrowers is that they could use existing wealth to repay
the loan. In other words, these loans are often not project-specic and so the outside wealth and general repayment
ability is actually what is relevant for the micronance institution.
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although I assume that the risk of default depends on the total amount to be paid back, the loan
size multiplied by one plus the interest rate, rather than just on the loan size.
Let R be the rate of return that a borrower makes if he is able to repay the loan, and B be
the rate of return that the borrower makes if he is not able to repay the loan fully, or the borrower
goes \bankrupt".12 I assume that the borrower does not get to keep any of the loaned amount or
of the project return if he is not able to fully repay the loan. Then the borrower's expected surplus
is:
Sn(rn; Vn) = pn(R   (1 + rn))Vn (1)
This equation says that, if the loan is fully repaid with probability pn, then the borrower will earn
a return on the investment minus whatever he has to pay back in terms of interest, multiplied by
the size of the loan.
Turning to the MFI rms, let there be J total rms, denoted j = 1; :::; J . Firms will have
distinct objective functions. First, prot-maximizing rms will maximize the prot generated by
the rm. Second, client-maximizing rms will maximize the number of borrowers served by the
organization.13 Besides dierences in their objective functions, rms vary in their organizational
status as either for-prot or non-prot. Their organizational status will, in turn, aect the nanc-
ing of the organization, where non-prots will have access to a limited amount of donation money
whereas for-prots will not have any such access. On the other hand, for-prots will have access to
equity, giving them a cheaper source of funding relative to debt. In addition, rms can choose to
supplement their external nancing by accepting deposits. Both the selection of for-prot status
and the decision to accept deposits will increase the regulatory costs faced by the rm.
12 As mentioned above, these can be thought of as returns in the good and bad states of the world, for instance.
I assume that they are both xed and exogenous. Another realistic assumption would be to allow them to increase
with the wealth of the borrower, suggesting that wealthier borrowers have access to better nancial opportunities.
This would increase the dierences between borrower types, but allowing wealthier borrowers to repay with higher
probability, as I do in my model, leads to similar model results.
13 These are the same classications used by McIntosh and Wydick (2005). Using the same classication allows
me to focus on the eects on results of my dierent assumptions.
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The rms will all have the same general form of the prot expression from providing a loan
to a given borrower n, conditional on the organizational type, including the prot status, denoted
t 2 f0; 1g, where one indicates a for-prot and zero a non-prot, and whether or not the rm
accepts deposits, d 2 f0; 1g:
d;tn (rn; Vn) = pn(1 + rn)Vn + (1  pn)BVn   (1 + c)Vn   F (d; t) (2)
where rn and Vn are the interest rate and the size of the loan, respectively, made to borrower n,
and c is the marginal cost of capital. F (d; t) is the per-borrower administrative cost for a rm of
prot type t and deposit type d.14 Thus, if the loan is fully repaid, the rm receives the value of
the loan back plus the interest paid on that loan, whereas if the loan is delinquent, the rm gets
simply whatever lower return has been earned until default. Regardless of whether the loan is fully
repaid or delinquent, the rm will incur the cost of capital and the xed, administrative cost from
making the loan. The per-borrower administrative cost is assumed to also encompass the cost of
complying with regulation, and thus I model it as:
F (d; t) = f0 + f1d+ f2t+ f3(d  t) (3)
where f1 reects the higher regulatory cost for a rm if it accepts deposits (or d = 1), f2 reects
the higher regulatory cost for a for-prot rm (or when t = 1), and f3 is the interaction of those
two indicators. I assume f1 > 0, f2 > 0, and f3 < 0. In other words, I assume for-prots face
higher regulatory scrutiny in general. In addition, deposit-taking is associated with higher regu-
latory costs, but the additional regulatory costs from deposit-taking are lower for a for-prot rm
than for a non-prot institution.
The marginal cost of raising the funds will depend on the source of the funding, from some
14 Notice that a marginal cost rate is incurred based on the loan amount for each loan that is made and that a
xed, administrative cost is incurred for each loan. The administrative cost is distinct from a xed cost of entering the
market, which would be incurred at the rm level as opposed to the individual borrower level. These administrative
costs capture loan-level costs, such as paperwork for making a loan and travel costs to reach the borrower and collect
repayments. The important part of this cost structure is that for-prots face higher xed costs that encourage larger
loans. This type of eect would likely persist even if the xed cost were incurred only at the rm-level, although the
magnitude of the loan size eect would be weaker.
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combination of donations (or giving) (G), debt (B), equity (E), and deposits (D), where G;B;E
and D represent the respective share (not amount) of total funding from each of these sources. This
marginal cost is meant to capture both the interest (or return) paid on the type of funding and the
costs of acquiring these funds. In particular, I do not require the marginal cost of donations to be
zero, as acquiring donations is thought to be particularly, and increasingly, costly.15 For for-prots,
donations will not be available whereas for non-prots, equity will not be available. The marginal
cost of capital can be broken down into its components:
c = c1G(j) + c2B + c3E + c4D(j) (4)
where j is the average wealth of borrowers served by rm j, or j =
PNj
n=1 wn
Nj
, where n 2 [1; Nj ]
represents the set of borrowers being served by rm j, and Nj is the number of borrowers in that
set.16 The share from donations, G, is assumed to decrease in the average wealth of borrowers
served whereas the share from deposits, D, is assumed to increase in the average wealth of bor-
rowers served. The cost expression is thus a weighted average, where each ci reects the marginal
cost of that source of funding and is multiplied by the share of funding that comes from that source.
Using this prot expression, I then specify each organization's maximization problem. Given
that non-prots cannot distribute any earned prot to owners, I assume that all prot-maximizing
rms are for-prots, but that client-maximizing rms may choose between for-prot and non-prot
status. Firms will choose the loan specications, (Vn; rn), to oer to each borrower n at wealth
level wn to maximize their objective. In other words, this approach assumes that there is perfect
price discrimination for each wealth level (or, as is equivalent in this set-up, for each borrower) as
the rm can make each borrower a distinct, take-it-or-leave-it loan oer based on his wealth.17
15 This more general specication allows for future analysis where I could allow the cost of obtaining donations to
vary over time (or across rms for reasons other than the borrowers' wealth), which reects the realistic scenario of
the recently increasing costs to obtain donations.
16 Note that in calculating this mean, if the rm is a monopoly serving borrowers from wd;t to 1, then the mean
will simply be:
1+wd;t
2
. However, if the rm is a duopoly and splits the market for some wealth segments, then the
mean value for each rm will be calculated using both the wealth levels served and the proportion of borrowers served
by each rm at each wealth level.
17 While this is a simplication, the focus of the model is which borrowers to target and sources of nancing to
pursue. In reality, non-prots are thought to pay more attention to overcoming information asymmetry given that
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A prot-maximizing for-prot rm, denoted j, will thus choose (Vn; rn) to solve:
max
NjX
n=1
d;t=1n (Vn; rn) subject to (5)
S(rjn; V
j
n )  S(r jn ; V  jn ) 8n 2 Nj ; j 6= j (Borrower Incentive Compatibility Constraint) (6)
S(rjn; V
j
n )  0 8n 2 Nj (Borrower Individual Rationality Constraint) (7)
D(j) +B + E = 1 (For-Prot MFI Budget Constraint) (8)
NjX
n=1
d;t=1n (Vn; rn)  0 (For-Prot MFI Existence Constraint) (9)
Thus, the prot-maximizing rm maximizes prot subject to the borrower surplus from this loan
oer being (weakly) greater than the borrower surplus from accepting any other rm's oer with
these loan characteristics (r jn ; V  jn ), (equation 6), as well as generating an expected surplus for
the borrower (equation 7). The rm's maximization is also subject to the rm being fully funded
through shares of deposits, debt, and equity (equation 8). Since I assume that prot-maximizing
rms must be for-prots, such rms will not have access to donations but will have access to eq-
uity. Thus, the budget constraint ensures that the rm obtains sucient funding. In addition, it
has to earn a positive net prot for it to decide to continue operating in the market (equation 9).
Notice that the rm chooses the size of the loan and interest rates to charge to each borrower n to
maximize the sum of per-borrower prots for the rm of type d; t = 1.
The client-maximizing rm will choose the size of the loan and an interest rate to maximize
the total number of borrowers who actually accept a loan oer by the rm, or Nj . Thus, a client-
maximizing for-prot rm will choose (Vn; rn) to solve:
max Nj subject to (10)
they rely on personal relationships with borrowers to determine loan size or a similar mechanism with group loans.
To the extent that this allows them to reach even lower income borrowers, where traditional methods of verifying
ability to repay a loan like credit bureaus are less available, this will encourage even more segmentation of loan size
between for-prots and non-prots and thus is consistent with the ndings of my model.
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S(rjn; V
j
n )  S(r jn ; V  jn ) 8n 2 Nj ; j 6= j (Borrower Incentive Compatibility Constraint) (11)
S(rjn; V
j
n )  0 8n 2 Nj (Borrower Individual Rationality Constraint) (12)
D(j) +B + E = 1 (For-Prot MFI Budget Constraint) (13)
NjX
n=1
d;t=1n (Vn; rn)  0 (For-Prot MFI Existence Constraint) (14)
Thus, I see that the constraints mirror those of a for-prot prot-maximizing rm, but the objective
function reects the goal of the client-maximizing rm to reach as many borrowers as possible. In
particular, equations 11 and 12 match equations 6 and 7 because these are borrower constraints.
Equations 13 and 14 match equations 8 and 9 as these are MFI nancing constraints that are
specic to the for-prot organization.
On the other hand, a client-maximizing non-prot rm will choose the same parameters to solve
the same function as a client-maximizing for-prot rm, except for that the budget constraint will
be as follows:
D(j) +G(j) +B = 1 (Non-Prot MFI Budget Constraint) (15)
and the rm existence constraint will incorporate donations, essentially allowing the rm to operate
at a net loss:
NjX
n=1
d;t=0n +G(j)
NjX
n=1
Vn  0 (Non-Prot MFI Existence Constraint) (16)
where G(j)
PNj
n=1 Vn represents the total amount of donations brought in, as it is the share of
funding from donations multiplied by the total amount of loans. The constraints mirror those
of the for-prot rm, except for that the non-prot client-maximizing rm has donations in its
budget constraint as opposed to equity, reecting the nancing dierences that go along with the
prot status choice. In addition, it can operate at a net loss equivalent to the amount of donations
brought in. However, I assume that the non-prot client-maximizing rm still sets the loan size to
maximize the per borrower prot. In other words, I do not allow the rm to set arbitrarily small
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loan sizes to very low income borrowers in order to increase donations.18
While the objective function and relative costs of nancing inuence the choice of prot status
and sources of funding, the sources of funding also inuence rm behavior. In order to capture
this, I endogenize deposits and donations to capture real-world constraints that these sources of
nancing impose. The assumption that equity is only available to for-prots whereas donations are
only available to non-prots imposes a rst-order constraint. However, these sources of nancing
also may require dierent administrative costs, as well as depend on the type of borrowers that the
rm targets. I endogenize donations and deposits to capture these characteristics.
I assume that donors want to incentivize non-prot organizations to serve particularly low-
income borrowers in order to encourage expansion of the lending market. For purposes of exposition,
I will assume a simple form of the donation function. Recall that wn is the wealth of the n
th
borrower. Then, the donation function, G, should be generally decreasing in the average of wn of
the borrowers that a rm serves, or j . Thus, I impose a functional form
19 given by:
G(j) = M   j (17)
where M > 0 and  > 0. This operationalization, while simple, captures both the capped nature
of donations20 and the fact that donations will encourage lending to low income borrowers.
Depositors value the stability of knowing that their deposits will be well-taken care of, and thus
appreciate formalized, large institutions to guarantee access to and availability of their deposits at
a date in the future.21 Also, to the extent that existing borrowers may choose to begin depositing,
18 Alternatively, this behavior could be avoided if I instead endogenized the giving function with a weighted average
borrower, where the wealth of the borrowers targeted is weighted by the size of the loan made to that borrower.
19 I choose this continuous approach rather than a threshold value to discourage knife-edge behavior.
20 Because this donation function is for the share rather than the level of donation, it means that the total share
of the nancing from donations for a given organization is capped, which reects realistic donor behavior to ensure
the organization is maintaining some self-suciency by funding some of its own loans. However, similar results occur
if instead the level of donations is capped.
21 This is particularly true in the micronance context as these institutions generally do not have deposit insurance.
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deposits will be higher for organizations with larger loan sizes, as these wealthier borrowers will have
more money to deposit.22 Thus, I assume that deposits will be higher for organizations targeting
wealthier borrowers.23 I operationalize this endogenous deposit function in a linear and separable
function for simplicity:
D(j) = 1 + 2j (18)
where 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. In other words, this function captures that the share of funding from
deposits increases with the average loan size.
Using this basic set-up, I analyze how prot-maximizing and client-maximizing rms choose
prot status and nancing, as well as the borrower segment they target, based on the cost structure
and competitive landscape of the economy.
2.2 Monopoly Analysis
While my hypotheses are based on a competitive setting, I rst explicitly solve the monopoly case
to serve as a benchmark and to generate intuition regarding the decision processes of organizations
in this industry. I examine the scenarios and maximization problems analytically, and provide
numerical examples under certain parametric conditions to illustrate the analysis.
I solve the maximization problem for each possible objective function-prot status combination
to nd the borrowers targeted and sources of nancing utilized. First, I examine prot-maximizing
rms, and use the following to analyze their behavior:
Lemma 1: Prot-maximizing rms will make larger average loan sizes to wealthier borrowers.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 1:
22 Even if it is not the same set of borrowers who become depositors, this relationship is plausible if the micronance
organization is located in a wealthier area and thus has easier access to wealthier depositors, who make larger deposits.
23 There is also the possibility that depositors value organizations under higher regulatory scrutiny, with the idea
being that their deposits are more secure. This would increase dierences between for-prot and non-prot nancing
choices and thus my choice to exclude this dimension is a conservative modeling choice, as I solely rely on average
borrower wealth to endogenize dierences in the amount of deposits between for-prots and non-prots as opposed
to parameterizing the dierence.
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The approach of the proof is to nd the optimal loan size for a prot-maximizing rm, and
show that it is increasing in wn. Because the rm is prot-maximizing, it would not want to
leave any excess surplus for the borrower, so the individual rationality constraint will hold with
equality under the assumption of perfect information and price-taking consumers (and thus perfect
price discrimination), or: S(rjn; V
j
n ) = 0. Plugging in for S, I see that this is equivalent to:
pn(R   (1 + rn))Vn = 0, and thus the rm will set R = 1 + rn. I can plug this into the
prot expression to get:
d;t=1n = pnRVn + (1  pn)BVn   (1 + cd;t=1)Vn   F (d; t = 1) (19)
I assume a linear and separable function for the repayment probability given by: pn(wn; Vn; rn) =
  vVn(1 + rn) + wwn, where v > 0 and w > 0 and the values of , v, and w are exogenously
determined parameters, while pn is endogenous to the wealth of the borrower and loan terms
that the rm chooses. Plugging in the optimal interest rate, this repayment probability becomes:
pn =   vVnR + wwn. Plugging this in to the prot expression, I get:
d;t=1n = (  vVnR + wwn)RVn + (1  (  vVnR + wwn))BVn (20)
 (1 + cd;t=1)Vn   F (d; t = 1)
Taking a partial derivative with respect to Vn, and setting it equal to 0, I can solve for the optimal
loan size:
V n =
cd;t=1   B + (p+ wwn)(B   R) + 1
2vR(B   R) (21)
Thus, I see that Lemma 1, stating that larger loans are made to wealthier borrowers, holds because:
@V n
@wn
=
w
2Rv
> 0 (22)
Lemma 2: Prot is increasing in the wealth of the borrower served for prot-maximizing rms.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2:
I take the derivative of the prot function using this optimized loan size to show that prot is
also increasing in wn (and thus also in Vn). First, recall the expression I have for the prot function
is given by:
d;t=1n = pnRVn + (1  pn)BVn   (1 + cd;t=1)Vn   F (d; t = 1) (23)
I have assumed a functional form for pn =   vV n R + wwn, and I can use the value of Vn that
I solved for above, and plug these both in to the prot expression. First, I will plug the value of
Vn into the expression for pn and simplify:
pn =   vR(cd;t=1   B + (p+ wwn)(B   R) + 1
2vR(B   R) ) + wwn (24)
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pn =
(B   R)(p+ wwn)  cd;t=1 + B   1
2(B   R) (25)
Next, I plug this expression, as well as the optimized value of Vn, into the prot function:
d;t=1n = BV

n +
(B   R)(p+ wwn)  ct=1 + B   1
2(B   R) (R   B)V

n (26)
 (1 + cd;t=1)V n   F (d; t = 1)
This expression can be simplied and then the partial derivative taken with respect to wn to nd
that:
@n
@wn
=  w(cd;t=1   B+ Bwwn   B   R   Rwwn + 1)
2Rv
(27)
Re-writing and grouping terms, I then see that the marginal prot is increasing in the wealth of
the borrower if the following condition from the numerator holds:
@n
@wn
= w(B(1  p) + wwn(R   B) + R   (1 + cd;t=1)) > 0 (28)
If the rm is to make a positive prot, I know that:
d;t=1n = pn(1 + rn)Vn + (1  pn)BVn   (1 + cd;t=1)Vn   F (d; t = 1) > 0 (29)
If I factor out Vn, I see that this expression becomes:
d;t=1n = Vn(pn(1 + rn) + (1  pn)B   (1 + cd;t=1))  F (d; t = 1) > 0 (30)
For the borrower to have a non-negative surplus, it must be that R  1 + rn, and utilizing that
F (d; t = 1) is non-negative, as well as that R  B > 0 by assumption, I get that the derivative of
prot with respect to wealth is positive as:
w(B(1 p)+wwn(R B)+R (1+cd;t=1)) > w(B(1 p)+(1+rn) (1+cd;t=1)) > 0 (31)
where the last inequality comes from the assumption that the rm makes a positive prot. Thus, as
long as the rm is making a positive prot, the prot expression is increasing in borrower wealth,
showing Lemma 2.
Using this analysis of the optimal loan size and the increasing prot from wealthier borrowers,
I generate the following with respect to the prot-maximizing rm behavior:
Proposition 1: In a monopoly, for-prot prot-maximizing rms will lend to all borrowers
with w > wd;t=1, where n jw=wd;t=1= 0.
The value of wd;t=1 is: wd;t=1 =
1+cd;t=1 B p(R B)+2Rv
r
F (d;t=1)(R B)
Rv
w(R B) .
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Proof. Proof of Proposition 1:
The proof can be simplied as the objectives of the rm and of the sources of nancing are
perfectly aligned. In other words, if the rm decides to accept deposits, then deposits are increasing
in the average loan size. However, as I showed above, the more protable borrowers are also the
wealthier borrowers who are given larger loans, and thus the for-prot prot-maximizing rm will
want to start lending to the wealthiest borrowers and continue down to lower wealth borrowers
until the marginal borrower earns the rm no prot. Thus, I will simplify the analysis by leaving
the cost as a general marginal cost c, and then the value of this c can be found afterwards by
comparing whether lowering the marginal cost by using deposits is worth the increase in xed cost.
To prove Proposition 1, I just need to nd where the zero-prot point is, as the above lemmas
have shown that prot is increasing in wealth and thus the rm will choose to lend to all borrowers
above this point. In other words, for-prot prot-maximizing rms will lend to all borrowers with
w > wd;t=1, where n jw=wd;t=1= 0.
The value of wd;t=1 can then be found by taking the optimized prot expression, setting it to zero,
and then solving for wn:
d;t=1n = BV

n +
(B   R)(p+ wwn)  cd;t=1 + B   1
2(B   R) (R   B)V

n (32)
 (1 + cd;t=1)Vn   F (d; t = 1) = 0
wd;t=1 =
1 + cd;t=1   B   p(R   B) + 2Rv
q
F (d;t=1)(R B)
Rv
w(R   B) (33)
In addition, I examine the nancing choices, to nd that:
Corollary 1: wd=0;t=1 < wd=1;t=1 is a necessary but not sucient condition for a for-prot
prot-maximizing rm to choose to not accept deposits.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 1:
In the proof of Proposition 1, I did not make any assumptions about the choice of nancing for
the for-prot organization. Whether or not to accept deposits, which could potentially inuence
which borrowers the rm targets, would in fact not change the for-prot's behavior, as argued
above due to alignment of rm and depositor interests. In order to examine whether protability
is higher or not when accepting deposits, I rst need to calculate the total costs, C, of making a
loan under each scenario:24
Cn(d; t = 1) = (1 + cd;t=1)Vn + F (d; t = 1) (34)
24 Note that because I assume linear costs, I can examine the cost of making an individual loan as opposed to
summing over all borrowers and the result will be the same.
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where F (d; t = 1) is given by:
F (d; t = 1) = (f1 + f3)d+ f2 (35)
and cd;t=1 is given by:
cd;t=1 = c2B + c3E + c4D(j) (36)
Also, recall that I endogenize the share of funding from deposits in the following way:
D(j) = 1 + 2j (37)
Note that because deposits are to some extent limited, the organization will only be solely nanced
by deposits if they are suciently available that no debt or equity is needed.
Because debt and equity are unbounded and have constant marginal costs, the rm will only
be funded by either debt or equity, unless c2 = c3. To simplify analysis, I will assume c3 < c2 and
thus the rm is solely nanced by equity or by equity and deposits. The total cost with equity only
is simply the marginal cost of equity times the total amount of funding raised plus the xed cost:
Cn(d = 0; t = 1) = (1 + c3)Vn + f2 (38)
If the organization accepts deposits, it is necessary (but not sucient) that c4 < c3, because equity
is assumed to not be capped, and accepting deposits increases the xed costs, so it must be that the
marginal cost of deposits is lower than the marginal cost of equity. Because of the lower marginal
cost of deposits, if the organization decides to accept deposits, then it will use all available deposits
and the rest of nancing will come from equity. In other words, the share of funding from deposits
will be given by the deposits function above, D(j) = 1 + 2j and the share of funding from
equity will be the remaining share of funds that need to be raised:
E = 1 D(j) = 1  (1 + 2j) (39)
Thus, I can calculate the marginal cost of capital through a weighted average:
cn(d = 1; t = 1) = c3(1  (1 + 2j)) + c4(1 + 2j) (40)
which can be simplied and then added to the xed cost expression to get the total cost:
Cn(d = 1; t = 1) = [c3   (c3   c4)(1 + 2j)]Vn + f1 + f2 + f3 (41)
In terms of nancing choices, the organization will choose to accept deposits when the total
prot with deposits is greater than the total prot without deposits:Z 1
wd=1;t=1
n(d = 1; t = 1)dw >
Z 1
wd=0;t=1
n(d = 0; t = 1)dw (42)
Notice that the total prot must be compared as opposed to just comparing costs from making a sin-
gle loan as the wealth cut-os will be dierent under deposit-taking. In particular, it must be that
the non-deposit-taking rm lends to more borrowers for non-deposit-taking to be an optimal choice.
The proof is relatively straight forward using contradiction. Suppose that deposit-taking rms
lend to additional borrowers. Then this means that at wd=0;t=1, deposit-taking rms are still making
a positive prot. However, prot is increasing in wealth and deposit-taking rms have a higher
22
slope of the marginal prot equation due to their lower marginal cost. I can see this analytically
by taking the partial derivative of @n@wn with respect to c:
@2n
@wn@c
=   w
2Rv
< 0 (43)
Thus, not taking deposits cannot be optimal if deposit-taking rms reach more borrowers. The
intuition is that deposit-taking is relatively better for making larger loans due to the lower marginal
cost, and thus prots from higher income borrowers will be higher under deposit-taking. For non
deposit-taking to be optimal, it must be that these higher prots at higher wealth levels under
deposit taking are oset by lower prots from lower income borrowers. Thus, it must be that the
non-deposit-taking rm still has a positive prot at the zero-prot point for the deposit-taking rm.
Diagram 1.1 illustrates this scenario. The solid line represents the deposit-taking marginal
prot-line and the dotted line represents the non deposit-taking marginal prot line. The deposit-
taking line is steeper due to the lower marginal cost. Thus, the higher marginal cost of the non-
deposit-taking rm is associated with a smaller positive slope of the marginal prot line with respect
to wealth. Non deposit-taking is potentially the optimal solution if wd=0;t=1 < wd=1;t=1 as then
the prot from not accepting deposits is A+C as compared to A+B from not accepting deposits.
If wd=1;t=1 < wd=0;t=1, then deposit-taking is always optimal as prot will be A + B + C + D as
compared to A+ C from not taking deposits.
INSERT Diagram 1.1
I then develop similar propositions for the other two rm types. First, I consider which bor-
rowers for-prot client-maximizing rms will choose to serve in equilibrium:
Proposition 2: In a monopoly, for-prot25 client-maximizing rms will lend to all borrowers
with w > w0d;t=1, where
R 1
w0(d;t=1) n(d; t = 1)dw = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 repeats the monopoly analysis for for-prot client-maximizing rms. The intuition
for for-prot client-maximizing rms is relatively straightforward. Because I assume that there
exists some protable borrowers, and because the rm has access to an unbounded supply of equity,
then the rm will choose to lend to the same clients as prot-maximizing rms, but then continue to
lend to lower income clients until the rm existence constraint binds, or:
R 1
w0d;t=1 n(d; t = 1)dw = 0.
25 This maximization problem as stated is somewhat problematic in that I am assuming that for-prots are
nanced by equity, but equity-holders would likely require some positive prot. The model can be generalized to
require some minimum level of prot, although for-prots are thought to have better access to capital even outside
of share-holders and thus the model as stated would still be applicable in this case.
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This constraint must hold or else the rm has additional borrowers it could subsidize, and similarly,
it will lend to the most protable borrowers possible as this maximizes the number of borrowers
reached until this constraint binds.
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, I nd the following corollary:
Corollary 2: For-prot client-maximizing rms will serve more borrowers in a monopoly sit-
uation than for-prot prot-maximizing rms.
In other words, this corollary tells us that the market will be more broadly served in a monopoly
by a client-maximizing rm than by a prot-maximizing rm. This is not a surprising condition as
I have allowed client-maximizing rms to have the same nancing advantages as prot-maximizing
rms when they take on the for-prot status, and thus they will be able to serve all of the protable
borrowers that prot-maximizing rms serve as well as additional unprotable borrowers until the
net prot is zero.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 2:
Corollary 2 utilizes a simple proof by contradiction. Suppose the for-prot prot-maximizing
rm is reaching strictly more borrowers than the for-prot client-maximizing rm. Then the client-
maximizing rm could imitate the prot-maximizing rm in terms of borrowers targeted and sources
of nancing and increase the number of borrowers reached. This is a contradiction as it implies
that the client-maximizing rm had not been maximizing its objective function.
The set-up regarding when the for-prot client-maximizing rm accepts deposits is the same as
for the prot-maximizing rm in Corollary 1, the dierence simply being the wealth cut-o used
to determine the average loan size, which is needed to determine the share of deposits that can
be raised. However, because the rm will subsidize borrowers until net prot is zero, the benet
of having the lower xed cost and atter marginal prot line of non-deposit-taking is relatively
larger as it allows the rm to lend to the unprotable borrowers more cheaply. Thus, I generate
the following result:
Corollary 3: wd=0;t=1 < wd=1;t=1 is a necessary and sucient condition for a client-maximizing
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rm to choose to not accept deposits, where wd;t=1 is dened by: n jw=wd;t=1= 0.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 3:
This condition relies on the linearity of prot with respect to wealth. In other words, due to
this linearity, I nd that the client-maximizing rm will be able to serve twice as many borrowers as
where the zero-prot point is, or (1 w0d;t=1) = 1=2  (1 wd;t=1), whereR 1w0d;t=1 n(d; t = 1)dw = 0
and n jw=wd;t=1= 0. Thus, since the goal of the client-maximizing rm is simply to maximize the
number of borrowers reached, the rm will choose to not accept deposits if w0d=0;t=1 < w0d=1;t=1,
or equivalently, wd=0;t=1 < wd=1;t=1.
The comparison between Corollaries 1 and 3 can be seen in Diagram 1.2. In this diagram,
I see that while the necessary condition for the prot-maximizing rm to not accept deposits,
wd=0;t=1 < wd=1;t=1 is satised, the prot-maximizing rm would choose to accept deposits in this
case as A+B > A+C. On the other hand, the same condition is both necessary and sucient for
the client-maximizing for-prot rm to not accept deposits, as w0d=0;t=1 < w0d=1;t=1. Thus, in this
scenario, the client-maximizing rm would not accept deposits whereas the prot-maximizing rm
would.
INSERT Diagram 1.2
The important implication of Corollary 3 is that client-maximizing rms are more likely to
not accept deposits. In addition, while the analysis of prot-maximizing and for-prot client-
maximizing rms suggests that deposit-taking rms will have a higher average loan sizes, the fact
that prot-maximizing rms also will be more likely to accept deposits increases the dierences in
targeting between deposit-taking and non-deposit-taking rms. Thus, dierences in nancing aect
the borrowers targeted, but dierent objective functions also inuence both borrower targeting and
the choice of nancing and strengthens this relationship.
Finally, I consider the optimal borrower targeting behavior of the non-prot client-maximizing
rm. Because donations are a low-cost source of nancing, and are higher for rms targeting rela-
tively lower income borrowers, it is possible that the non-prot will actually not target the highest
income borrowers. In other words, non-prot client-maximizing rms will lend to borrowers be-
tween wH and wL, where wH and wL are found by solving the following problem: max [wH  wL]
subject to the constraint that
R wH
wL
n(d; t = 0)dw G(j)
PNj
n=1 Vn = 0 and wH  1 and wL  0.26
26 For simplicity, I assume that the borrowers served have to be on a continuous interval, meaning the organization
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The non-prot is thus maximizing the total number of borrowers it reaches by maximizing the
length of the interval of borrowers served, captured by the distance between wH and wL. The rm
existence constraint allows the rm to operate at a net negative prot equivalent to the amount
of donations it receives. This is an important distinction from the for-prot condition as, under
certain parameter values, it will be the case that wH < 1, and thus, non-prot organizations may
target dierent borrowers than for-prot organizations, even if they have the same objective func-
tion, due to the incentives provided by donors, generating the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Non-prot client-maximizing rms in a monopoly may not lend to the wealth-
iest borrowers.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3:
This proof utilizes a proof by contradiction. Assume that the non-prot client-maximizing rm
does lend to the wealthiest borrowers, and then show that in fact there exists dierent targeting
behavior that would allow the rm to reach additional borrowers. Importantly, this proposition
does not say that this always holds, but rather than under certain parameters it will hold, and it
is sucient to nd one such counter-example. It is important that I endogenize the cost function
before solving because the nature of the endogenized cost will determine which segment of the
population the organization serves. Thus, the organization is trying to reach the most borrowers
subject to the constraints holding, or:
max wH   wL where (44)Z wH
wL
n(d; t = 0) +G(j)
NjX
n=1
Vn = 0 (45)
First, I can write out the prot function:
n(d; t = 0) = (  vVnR + wwn)RVn + (1  (  vVnR + wwn))BVn (46)
 (1 + cd;t=0)Vn   F (d; t = 0)
where the cost function will be dened through the weighted average cost of debt plus donations.27
The share of debt used will be one less the share of donations:
B = 1 G(j) = 1  (M   j) (47)
cannot target segmented, or disjoint, wealth levels of the population. While this assumption does prevent certain
possible scenarios, it still allows for meaningful analysis to occur regarding the implications of sources of nancing
for borrower targeting.
27 I consider the case where the rm does not accept deposits for simplicity. This is optimal if the marginal cost
benet is not large enough or the increase in xed cost is suciently high.
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cd=0;t=0 = c2(1  (M   j)) + c1(M   j) (48)
Thus, I can plug this into the prot expression as the marginal cost to get the constraint on my
maximization problem:
Z wH
wL
n(d; t = 0)dw + (M   j)
NjX
n=1
Vn = 0 (49)
and the optimal values are found by maximizing wH   wL subject to this constraint.
To prove the proposition, I simply need to show that conditions exist where the organization
may not want to target the highest income population. First, assume that the organization targets
the highest income population. Then, the analysis will follow in a similar fashion as for the for-
prot client-maximizing case except that the source of nancing will be from donations and so the
amount of funding outside of debt will be distinct. Since I assume that the organization is targeting
the highest income population, I can treat the cost function as a constant and simply plug in the
realized cost after optimizing. Then, the organization will lend to borrowers with w > wd;t=0,
where the cut-o is dened by
R 1
wd;t=0 n(d; t = 0)dw +G(j)Vj = 0.
However, consider if the organization instead lends to the very lowest income borrowers, or those
with wealth such that w < xd;t=0, where the cut-o is dened by
R xd;t=0
0 n(d; t = 0)dw+G(j)Vj =
0. Then, I need to show that it is possible that:
xd;t=0   0 > 1  wd;t=0 (50)
Computing these outcomes, I nd that this is possible if  and c1   c2 are suciently large. Thus,
one way to interpret this result is that if the donors care enough about lending to low income
borrowers, and donations are signicantly cheaper relative to debt, as well as suciently available,
then it is possible that the non-prot will not want to serve the most protable, wealthiest segment
of the population.
Diagram 1.3 illustrates a version of the decision process that goes along with the choice regarding
whether or not to target the highest income borrowers. I show the process assuming that donations
have the same marginal cost as debt. Thus, the key dierence examined is that targeting lower
income borrowers will lead to a higher donation amount, which will allow the rm to operate at
more of a loss. Thus, the rm will chose to target wH through wL as opposed to wd;t=0 to 1 if:
wH   wL > 1  wd;t=0 (51)
where this analysis can be simplied by noticing that the increase in donations from targeting a
lower wealth segment will have to lead to more borrowers than 2  (1   wH), due to the loss in
borrowers due to losing prot at the highest income level. Thus, the total donation amount will
have to change by more than 2A as the additional borrowers will come from an even less protable
segment and thus require additional subsidization, as seen in the diagram.
INSERT Diagram 1.3
Analysis of the non-prot is a bit more complicated than the for-prot client-maximizing institu-
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tion because the incentives of the donors are not necessarily aligned with those of the organization.
In other words, non-prots have access to donations that inuence the borrowers the organization
lends to, as donors prefer loans made to lower income borrowers. Recall that donations are capped
and decreasing in the average wealth of the borrower served. Thus, I nd that there is comple-
mentarity between the sources of nancing and the types of borrowers targeted. In particular,
the proposition above shows that the approach of assuming that the organization necessarily serves
the wealthiest of borrowers and then continues down to lower wealth borrowers may no longer hold.
In order to examine a deposit-taking condition comparable to that found in Corollaries 1 and
3, I consider when the non-prot client-maximizing rm targets the highest income segment of the
population. Because the non-prot not only will subsidize borrowers until net prot is zero but
also will utilize additional donations to subsidize even more unprotable borrowers, the atter non
deposit-taking line is even more useful for these borrowers than for the for-prot client-maximizing
rm. As a result, I get the following corollary for the non-prot analysis:
Corollary 4: zd=0;t=0 < zd=1;t=0 is not a necessary condition for a non-prot rm to choose
to not accept deposits, where zd;t=0 is dened through n(d; t = 0) jw=zd;t=0= 0.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 4:
I use a proof by contradiction. Assume that zd=0;t=0 < zd=1;t=0 is a necessary condition
for a non-prot rm to choose to not accept deposits, then show that in fact it is possible that
zd=0;t=0  zd=1;t=0 but the rm can actually lend to additional borrowers by not accepting de-
posits. Let zd=0;t=0 = zd=1;t=0. Because of the linearity of prot with respect to wealth, the
client-maximizing rm will be able to serve twice as many borrowers as where the zero-prot point
is, or (1  wd;t=0) = 1=2  (1  zd;t=0), whereR 1wd;t=0 n(d; t = 0)dw = 0 and n jz=wd;t=0= 0. Thus,
without any donations, the rm would reach the same number of borrowers with deposit-taking
and non-deposit taking, or since: zd=0;t=0 = zd=1;t=0 , then 1=2  zd=0;t=0 = 1=2  zd=1;t=0, and
equivalently wd=0;t=0 = wd=1;t=0. However, any amount of donations received will allow the non
deposit-taking rm to reach additional borrowers relative to the deposit-taking rm as the higher
slope of the deposit-taking marginal prot line means that if zd=0;t=0 < zd=1;t=0, then for any
w < zd=0;t=0 = zd=1;t=0, the deposit-taking rm will have a more negative marginal prot and thus
require additional subsidy. Thus, if G(j) > 0, the rm will strictly prefer to not accept deposits,
despite the fact that zd=0;t=0 < zd=1;t=0 does not hold.
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Diagram 1.4 illustrates this scenario. In this diagram, I see that both a for-prot prot-
maximizing and a for-prot client-maximizing rm would accept deposits as the zero-prot point
for the deposit line is at a lower wealth level than that for the non-deposit line. However, the anal-
ysis diers for the non-prot rm due to donations. In particular, because the non-deposit-taking
line is atter, it means that the loss the rm faces when lending to very low income borrowers is
less,28 and thus donations can go farther in expanding outreach to these borrowers. In other words,
despite the fact that if there were no donations, a deposit-taking rm would lend to additional
borrowers due to its lower zero-prot point, it is possible that donations going farther with lower
income borrowers when the rm does not accept deposits more than makes up for this dierence.
For instance, even if the same size donation is received by the deposit-taking and non-deposit taking
rm, i.e. if A+ B +D = B + C, the non-deposit taking rm may actually reach more borrowers,
as seen in the diagram.29
INSERT Diagram 1.4
The implication of Corollary 4 is that non-prot client-maximizing rms are even more likely
to not accept deposits that for-prot client-maximizing rms. Thus, while the analysis of for-prot
and non-prot rms suggests that deposit-taking rms will have a higher average loan sizes, the fact
that non-prot rms also will be less likely to accept deposits increases dierences in targeting be-
tween deposit-taking and non-deposit-taking rms. Similarly, the dierences in targeting between
deposit-taking and non-deposit taking rms, as well as the dierence in likelihood of accepting
them by prot-status, will make dierences in targeting between for-prot and non-prots even
larger.
2.3 Numerical Monopoly Analysis
I assume that w follows a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. In addition, let the following
parameter conditions hold:
 R = 1:50
 B = 1
  = 0:5
28 This stems from the lower xed cost when not taking deposits.
29 This analysis does not even allow the non-deposit-taking rm to decide to not target the very highest income
borrowers, which is more appealing under non deposit-taking and would increase the benet of not taking deposits
in this case.
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 w = 0:5
 v = 0:0005
 c3 = 0:25
Then, consider three dierent values of the xed cost. Under F = 10, I nd in Table 1.2 that
the for-prot client-maximizing rm will lend to the entire population, from w = 0 up to w = 1,
whereas the for-prot prot-maximizing rm will lend to borrowers with wealth such that w > 0:49.
If I double the xed cost to F = 20, I nd that the client-maximizing rm lends to borrowers with
w > 0:33 and prot-maximizing rms lend to borrowers with wealth such that w > 0:69. Finally,
at F = 10, the client-maximizing rm will lend to borrowers with w > 0:69 and prot-maximizing
rms with w > 0:85. Thus, I nd support of Corollary 2 that the client-maximizing rm will serve
additional borrowers as compared to the prot-maximizing rm.
INSERT Table 1.2
Next, I introduce the possibility of deposits that have marginal cost of 0:20. In addition, because
of the endogenous nature of deposit-taking, I need to specify the following parameters for the share
of deposit-taking, given by D(j) = 1 + 2j :
 1 = :5
 2 = :5
In addition, recall that deposits increase the xed costs faced by the organization. Suppose
the additional xed cost is either 5 or 10. If F = 10, and the additional cost is 5, then I see in
Table 1.3 that the for-prot prot-maximizing rm lends to borrowers with w > 0:43 and if the
additional cost is 10, this number changes to w > 0:52. If F = 20, and the additional cost is 5,
then the for-prot prot-maximizing rm lends to borrowers with w > 0:59 and if the additional
cost is 10, this number changes to w > 0:67. Finally, if F = 20, and the additional cost is 5, then
the for-prot prot-maximizing rm lends to borrowers with w > 0:94 and if the additional cost is
10, it is not protable for the rm to enter the market.
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INSERT Table 1.3
Thus, I see that when F = 20, the zero prot point is higher under non-deposit-taking, and
thus both prot-maximizing and client-maximizing rms will choose to accept deposits. This is
reected in the higher prot and additional borrowers reached under deposit-taking. However,
when F = 10 and the additional xed cost from accepting deposits is 10 as well as when F = 30,
the zero-prot point from not taking deposits is less than that from taking deposits. Based on
Corollaries 1 and 3, this means that the client-maximizing rm will not want to accept deposits
whereas the prot-maximizing rm may not want to, and actual prot levels need to be calculated
to determine the decision. In this case, both prot-maximizing and client-maximizing rms will
not want to accept deposits when F = 30, but prot-maximizing rms will want to accept deposits
when F = 10.30 Thus, I conrm the results from Corollaries 1 and 3 that prot-maximizing rms
are more likely to accept deposits than client-maximizing rms.
For non-prot organizations, I need to specify additional conditions regarding the cost of fund-
ing:
 c1 = 0
 c2 = 0:30
Also, recall that donations were endogenous, and the share of donations were given by the following
function: G = M   j , where I specify that:
 M = 0:15
  = 0:15
Non-prots have a lower xed cost as specied in the model, and thus I examine the possible xed
levels of F = 5; 15; or 25. In addition, I again consider the possibility of deposits that follow the
endogenous function specied before and have marginal cost of 0:20. Recall that deposits increase
the xed costs faced by the organization, and increase them even more for non-prots than for
30 In this case, the client-maximizing rm can actually reach all borrowers in both cases, so it is technically
indierent between deposit-taking and non-deposit taking.
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for-prots. Suppose the additional xed cost is either 15 or 20. I nd that the non-prot rm
can lend to all borrowers under either deposit-taking or non deposit-taking if F = 5 or F = 15.
However, if F = 25, and the organization targets the highest income population, then the non-
deposit-taking rm lends to borrowers with w > 0:74. However, the deposit-taking rm, under
the lower additional xed cost scenario, still lends to all borrowers and lends to borrowers with
w > 0:24 under the higher xed cost scenario. Thus, the intuition is slightly dierent for non-prots
rms, as donations means that the benet from deposit-taking is not worthwhile to pursue until
xed costs become suciently high that the donations are less eective in subsidizing additional
low income borrowers. Thus, donations and deposits are in some sense substitutes, as the level of
xed costs leads the organization to pursue deposits exactly when donations are less eective.31
INSERT Table 1.4
2.4 Duopoly Analysis
I next provide analysis for the duopoly case. While this continues to be a simplication of reality,
it helps to provide insight into how the targeting and nancing choices of organizations dier de-
pending on the identity and approach of peer or competitor institutions. In other words, I compare
the outcome when a non-prot co-exists with another non-prot versus with a for-prot institution.
In addition, because the market has fairly low penetration, considering two rms as opposed to a
larger number captures realistic competition between two rms competing in a given neighborhood
or village. The results for the oligopoly and competitive situations will generalize from this analysis
to generate hypotheses in the next section.
The approach I take is to assume that the market contains either two for-prot prot-maximizing
rms, two non-prot client-maximizing rms, or one of each, to determine the resulting behavior
under dierent parameter values.32 I assume at borrower levels where the two rms overlap, they
31 Note that this is a conservative analysis of the relationship because I do not consider the realistic scenario of
non deposit-taking rms not targeting the highest borrower wealth levels.
32 In further analysis, I also allow for for-prot client-maximizing rms.
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still retain some price-setting behavior, although no longer perfectly price discriminate, as in the
monopoly case. In particular, I assume that they can charge an interest rate of 0 +
1
J and
equally split demand with the other J   1 rms that co-exist at the wealth level.33 In other words,
this operationalization can be thought of as allowing some mark-up over a market rate, which is
decreasing in the number of rms.34 This means that the marginal prot for rm j of serving
borrower n at a wealth level wn where J rms
35 are competing at this wealth level is given by:
d;tn (rn; Vn; J) = pn(1 + 0 +
1
J
)Vn + (1  pn)BVn   (1 + c)Vn   F (d; t) (52)
where the prot status is denoted t 2 f0; 1g and whether or not the rm accepts deposits is
d 2 f0; 1g. Then, rms can still set the loan size to maximize this marginal prot expression and
choose the sources of nancing and wealth of borrowers to target.
As opposed to McIntosh and Wydick (2005), who assume Bertrand competition between MFIs,36
My approach can be thought of as a variant of the monopolistic competition model found in the
banking literature, which has been discussed as the appropriate model of competition in this in-
dustry since Chandler (1938). The idea of these models is there is geographic dierentiation along
a circle, a la Salop (1979), such that banks have a local monopoly but prot is limited by the
existence of dierentiated, competing rms. This captures competition in micronance where sig-
nicant prot remains even when rms co-exist better than the stark result of a single competitor
leading to zero prot as occurs in the Bertrand model.37 In addition, it allows for meaningful
33 While overly simplistic, this analysis still helps gain insight into the dierentiation by rm type, which is the key
of this paper. To the extent that price competition is more pronounced, it would make overlapping with competitors
even less appealing and thus my ndings of diversication are conservative.
34 For instance, perhaps 0 is the relatively stable rate charged by commercial banks.
35 Notice that this approach also simplies the nature of competition in that the interest rate competition is not
aected by the type of the competitor. However, competition with a for-prot as opposed to a non-prot will dier in
which borrowers the competitor is serving. Again, this simplication would likely understate eects of dierentiation
by prot status, as for-prots are thought to compete more aggressively on price.
36 Because of the strict assumption of Bertrand competition, moving from the monopoly to the duopoly case
means that the interest rate set on the loan will be set such that the higher-cost MFI earns no prot.
37 Note that with stricter competition assumptions, I would nd less overlap in borrowers served. Thus, this is a
conservative assumption and I still nd dierences in borrower targeting.
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dierentiation among micronance institutions, which seems appropriate as MFI-borrower rela-
tionships in this industry persist rather than being anonymous, spot interactions.38 The closing to
the seminal work by Chandler (1938) is very much applicable to the localized competition among
micronance banks:
The markets for time and savings deposits, for bank loans to customers, and for miscel-
laneous banking services do not meet the tests of pure competition. Banks sell highly
dierentiated, and not homogeneous, \products." For a variety of reasons individual
customers tend to deal with the same bank over a period of time. Therefore, the bank
has some degree of control over the price of its product. These markets also fail to
meet the tests of pure competition in that there are so few banks \competing" for the
same business - especially for the business of those customers whose opportunities are
conned to local banks - that each bank is likely to take into consideration both its
direct and its indirect eects on market price, and therefore to refrain from engaging in
price competition designed to lure customers from other local banks. (Chandler, 1938)
As these conditions hold true in the micronance industry,39 I assume that there is a Salop circle
for each level of wealth, so there is monopolistic competition at a given wealth level, and rms will
still decide at which wealth levels to oer loans. Thus, I introduce competition but still allow for
targeting of heterogeneous borrowers to be an important element of rm choice.
Given this set-up, the approach is to consider what the decision looks like for a given wealth of
borrower, and then use this analysis to determine at which levels of wealth the rm will want to
locate. Because of analytical complexity, I utilize a numerical analysis to develop the intuition of
the duopoly case, after setting it up below.
38 Further analysis should consider the repeated nature of lending in this industry as another important mechanism
inuencing rm behavior. However, the assumption of local monopolies implies borrowers stay with one lender and
so this repeated behavior is captured to some extent in the current modeling approach.
39 Many of the specic elements above have been referred to in either industry publications or mentioned in my
interview work. For instance, one lending manager said, \Client retention can motivate an interest rate strategy" and
discussed that while \market is a key factor" in determining interest rate, that other factors such as client retention
and subsidizing through donations were still relevant (Source 1). In other words, competition did not completely
determine the interest rate charged and the rm still retained some ability to set price.
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2.4.1 Two For-Prot Prot-Maximizing Firms
First, I consider the case of two for-prot prot maximizing rms. Because my previous analysis
examined the cut-o points above which rms want to lend, I want to ensure that this approach is
still applicable. In other words, I want to check that when two rms co-exist, prot is still higher
for wealthier borrowers. Thus, I provide the following:
Lemma 3: The duopoly prot when two for-prot prot-maximizing rms co-exist at a given
wealth level is increasing in the wealth of the borrowers served.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 3:
The prot expression for a non-deposit taking for-prot prot-maximizing rm to lend to a
borrower of wealth level wn is given by:
d;tn (rn; Vn; J) = pn(1 + 0 +
1
J
)Vn + (1  pn)BVn   (1 + c3)Vn   (f0 + f2) (53)
Recall I have the default probability given by:
pn(wn; Vn; rn) =   vVn(1 + rn) + wwn (54)
where I can plug in the mark-up amount to get:
pn(wn; J) =   vVn(1 + 0 + 1
J
) + wwn (55)
which means the prot expression will be:
d;tn (wn; J) = pn(wn; J)(1 + 0 +
1
J
)Vn + (1  pn(wn; J))BVn  (56)
(1 + c)Vn   F (d; t)
However, note that this 0 +
1
J is a constant with respect to the optimal loan size, and thus the
proof from Lemmas 1 and 2 apply, as the interest rate was simply B, also a constant, in those
proofs, and the prot expressions are otherwise identical. Thus, the loan size and prot will both
be increasing in the wealth of the borrower served.
While the prior lemma shows that if rms choose the same sources of nancing, then they will
see higher prot from lending to wealthier borrowers, I next examine the borrower targeting should
the rms decide to pursue dierent sources of nancing:
Proposition 5: If a deposit taking and a non-deposit taking for-prot prot-maximizing rm
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co-exist in a market, then the non deposit-taking rm will target lower income borrowers.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 5:
Suppose Firm 1 decides to accept deposits and Firm 2 does not. I will use a proof by contra-
diction. Note that both rms will choose to lend to all borrowers above the relevant zero-prot
threshold as prot is increasing in the wealth of the borrower as shown above. Assume that Firm 1
lends to weakly more borrowers than Firm 2, meaning that I assume that the deposit-taking rm
targets a lower average income borrower. In other words, let Firm 1 lend to borrowers with wealth
such that w > w1 and Firm 2 lend to borrowers with wealth such that w > w2, where w1  w2.
The marginal prot line for Firm 1 is increasing faster than that for Firm 2 as the only dierence
between the two at wealth levels where the co-exist will come from the dierence in the marginal
cost, or:
@d=1;tn (wn; J)
@wn
  @
d=0;t
n (wn; J)
@wn
=  (1 + c(d = 1; FP ))  ( (1 + c(d = 0; FP ))) = (57)
c(d = 0; FP )  c(d = 1; FP ) > 0
since I assume that c4 < c3 and thus the marginal cost of the deposit-taking rm is below that of
the non-deposit-taking rm. Thus, because Firm 1 has a marginal prot line that intersects at a
lower wealth level and increases faster with wealth, it lies strictly above the marginal prot line
of Firm 2. However, this is a contradiction as Firm 2 would then be better o accepting deposits
and pursuing a symmetric equilibrium with Firm 1. Thus, the only way that rms will diverge in
nancing is if the non-deposit taking rm can protably reach additional low income borrowers,
making the average wealth of the borrower lower.
This dierence in the source of nancing then can drive dierences in the borrowers served.
In particular, since I assume that deposits lower the marginal cost but raise the xed cost of
capital, then Proposition 5 shows that these nancing dierences could co-exist if Firm 2 can prof-
itably serve poorer borrowers than Firm 1.40 Thus, Firm 1 lends to borrowers with wealth such
that w > wd=1;t=1, and Firm 2 lends to borrowers with wealth such that w > wd=0;t=1, where
wd=0;t=1 < wd=1;t=1, as mentioned above.
Using the interest rate from the mark-up function described earlier, I then plug this into the
prot function and nd the cut-o value above which the non-deposit-taking institutions will serve.
Then, I compare Firm 2's prot in this scenario versus the prot in the symmetric deposit-taking
40 The intuition is that because the rms are otherwise identical, it must be that they serve dierent borrowers
for dierent sources of nancing to persist in my model. Firm 1 will earn more prot on wealthier borrowers due to
lower marginal cost, and thus it must be that Firm 2 can protably reach lower income borrowers for those nancing
dierences to persist. In many ways, the intuition is the same as for Corollary 1, as seen in Diagram 1.1.
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duopoly and Firm 1's prot to that of the symmetric non deposit-taking duopoly to determine
under what circumstances there will be dierences within for-prots in terms of borrowers targeted
due to dierences in nancing. Notice that in the case of mixed sources of nancing there will be
a segment of borrowers over which the non-deposit taking rm acts as a monopoly and a segment
over which it acts as a duopoly, and thus prot needs to be summed over these two segments. In
other words, there will be a deposit-taking for-prot co-existing with a non-deposit-taking for-prot
if the following two conditions hold:
Z 1
wd=1;t=1
n(J = 2; d = 1; t = 1) <
Z wd=1;t=1
wd=0;t=1
n(J = 1; d = 0; t = 1)+
Z 1
wd=1;t=1
n(J = 2; d = 0; t = 1)
(58)
Z 1
wd=0;t=1
n(J = 2; d = 0; t = 1) <
Z 1
wd=1;t=1
n(J = 2; d = 1; t = 1) (59)
In other words, the rst condition ensures that Firm 2 would want to not accept deposits given that
Firm 1 is accepting deposits and the second equation ensures that Firm 1 would want to accept
deposits given that Firm 2 is not accepting deposits. Thus, I can plug in the optimized interest
rates and values of the thresholds to evaluate when these conditions hold. Given the analytical
complexity, I withhold analysis of the conditions and examine possible scenarios in the numerical
analysis.
2.4.2 Two Non-Prot Client-Maximizing Firms
Next, I consider that two non-prot client-maximizing rms co-exist. Note that just because both
organizations want to maximize the number of clients served, this does not mean that they will not
compete over borrowers.41 If the two rms co-exist, then they will lend to all borrowers above a
threshold, where the threshold is dened by where the net prot is exactly oset by the amount of
donations received.
41 This is a conservative estimate of competition, as potentially there is also direct competition if the total amount
of donations is capped at the country or even industry level as opposed to at the rm level. However, because
donations are based on the type of borrowers served, pursuing donations can still increase competition through the
borrowers targeted.
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Recall that the prot expression is given by:
d;tn (rn; Vn; J) = pn(1 + 0 +
1
J
)Vn + (1  pn)BVn   (1 + c)Vn   F (d; t) (60)
Notice that dierentiation can occur, with the two non-prots expanding total outreach as compared
to the monopoly non-prot, even though I do not assume any direct utility for the rms to collude.42
Then, I can consider under what circumstances I will get dierences in nancing, and this result will
be comparable to the for-prot case. In particular, if a non-prot decides to take deposits, they will
have a higher average loan size as the steeper marginal cost curve means they are more equipped
to make larger loans to wealthier borrowers.43 In order to solve this, I would compare the number
of borrowers reached if they decide to serve the same borrowers versus the number of borrowers
reached if they dierentiate, where the deposit-taking rm will lend to a higher income segment
of borrowers, on average, then the non deposit-taking rm. Thus, I assume that the non-deposit
taking rm serves wL;d=0 to wH;d=0 and the deposit-taking rm serves wL;d=1 to wH;d=1, where
wL;d=0  wL;d=1 and wH;d=0  wH;d=1, because the rms would only pursue dierent sources of
nancing if they are serving dierent borrowers. The thresholds can be dened as:
Z wL;d=1
wL;d=0
n(J = 1; d = 0) +
Z wH;d=0
wL;d=1
n(J = 2; d = 0) +G(j)
NjX
n=1
Vn = 0 (61)
Z wH;d=0
wL;d=1
n(J = 2; d = 1) +
Z wH;d=1
wH;d=0
n(J = 1; d = 1) +G(j)
NjX
n=1
Vn = 0 (62)
This scenario will occur if both of these rms are serving more borrowers than they would if
they were to deviate:
wH;d=1   wL;d=1  wH   wL (63)
wH;d=0   wL;d=0  w0H   w0L (64)
42 In other words, an alternative approach to model non-prot behavior is that they care about the total number
of borrowers reached by all rms rather than just focusing on their own outreach. This approach would make
dierentiation even more likely, and thus ndings of dierentiation in my model are relatively conservative.
43 Note that because donations are assumed to be costless to pursue, both organizations will obtain some amount
of donations, and thus this is not treated like deposit-taking, where I consider the binary choice of whether or not to
pursue deposits.
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where wH and wL denote the duopoly borrower cut-os when both rms accept deposits and wH0
and wL0 denote the borrower cut-os when both rms do not accept deposits. In other words, the
rst condition is ensuring that one rm would want to not accept deposits given that the other
is accepting deposits and the second equation ensures that the deposit-taking rm would want to
accept deposits given that the other is not accepting deposits. Thus, I can plug in the optimized
interest rates and values of the thresholds to evaluate when these conditions would hold. Given the
analytical complexity, I will withhold analysis of the conditions and examine possible scenarios in
the numerical analysis.
2.4.3 One For-Prot Prot-Maximizing Firm, One Non-Prot Client-Maximizing
Firm
Finally, I consider perhaps the most realistic case which is the co-existence of a non-prot rm with
a for-prot prot-maximizing rm. This scenario captures the increasing commercial competition
that NGOs are facing in many countries. Consider a wealth level at which both rms co-exist.
Despite the fact that the rms have dierent objectives, the analysis will still be comparable to
the two cases analyzed above when they co-exist at a given wealth level. While I still assume that
for-prots will lend to borrowers with wealth above wd;t=1, I cannot assume that non-prots will
necessarily target the highest income borrowers. Thus, suppose that non-prots lend to borrowers
between wd;L and wd;H , where wd;L  wd;t=1, and wd;H  1.44 I can solve for wd;t=1 by then
examining where the prot function in the duopoly case is equal to zero, and thus will get the same
cut-o point as when two for-prot rms co-existed. Then wd;L and wd;H can be found by solving:
max wd;H   wd;L subject to the constraint that
R wd;H
wd;L
n(d; t = 0)dw +G(j)
PNj
n=1 Vn = 0, where
the prot function will be split up as a monopoly between wd;L and wd;t=1 and a duopoly above
that. Importantly, I will consider when wd;H < 1, or under what circumstances non-prots choose
not to lend to the highest income borrowers.
44 While I am simplifying analysis, if I assume that rms have the choice of prot status, then wd;L < wd;t=1 is a
benign assumption because if the opposite were to be true, then the organization could lend to additional borrowers
by instead converting to the for-prot status, which would contradict that the rm was client-maximizing.
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I could then consider under what circumstances I will get dierences in nancing. First, the
for-prot will want to accept deposits if the prot from accepting deposits is greater than the prot
of not accepting deposits conditional on the non-prot's behavior. The amount of overlap will
potentially dier from the duopoly with two for-prots, so this will be a matter of comparing the
following: Z wd;H
wd=1;t=1
n(J = 2; d = 1; t = 1) +
Z 1
wd;H
n(J = 1; d = 1; t = 1) > (65)
Z wd;H
wd=1;t=1
n(J = 2; d = 0; t = 1) +
Z 1
wd;H
n(J = 1; d = 0; t = 1)
Because there is potentially less overlap at the highest income borrowers, the incentive to accept
deposits will be higher for the for-prots rm as compared to when it was competing with another
for-prot rm.
A non-prot will want to accept deposits when the for-prot accepts deposits when the number
of borrowers reached by doing so is higher, or:
wd=1;H   wd=1;L > wd=0;H   wd=0;L (66)
where these thresholds are dened as:
Z wd=1;t=1
wd=1;L
n(J = 1; d = 1; t = 0) +
Z wd=1;H
wd=1;t=1
n(J = 2; d = 1; t = 0) +G(j)
NjX
n=1
Vn = 0 (67)
Z wd=1;t=1
wd=0;L
n(J = 1; d = 0; t = 0) +
Z wd=0;H
wd=1;t=1
n(J = 2; d = 0; t = 0) +G(j)
NjX
n=1
Vn = 0 (68)
Comparing these values, I can show that when a for-prot accepts deposits and a non-prot does
not, dierences in wealth segments targeted will be larger than when both types of organizations
pursue the same sources of nancing. In other words, I want to show that the cut-os are such
that the non-prot will lend to relatively lower income borrowers when it does not accept deposits,
or that: wd=1;t=1 > wd=0;t=1.
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2.5 Numerical Duopoly Analysis
I present a numerical example to show under the specied parameter values, which borrowers the
prot-maximizing for-prots and client-maximizing non-prots target.
I follow the same numerical assumptions as before, where R = 1:50, B = 1,  = 0:5, w = 0:5,
and v = 0:0005. In addition, I assume rn = 0:3 + 0:2=J , so that the mark-up is 0:5 in a monopoly,
matching the analysis done previously as this is the same at the repayment return, R, and 0:4 in
a duopoly. Then, I again consider dierent values of the xed costs to understand rm behavior in
dierent scenarios. In addition, I consider whether or not the rms will pursue deposits. Thus, I
gather insight into when borrowers accept deposits and the types of borrowers targeted depending
on whether they are competing with for-prot or non-prot organizations.
For instance, if I consider two for-prot prot-maximizing rms, then whether or not deposit-
taking will be pursued depends on the relative gain in marginal cost versus the loss in xed cost, as
seen in Table 1.5. I nd that under F = 10; 20; and 30, the prot-maximizing rms want to accept
deposits regardless of whether it adds an additional xed cost of 5 or 10. Notice that this is true
despite the fact that the prot-maximizing monopolist would prefer to not accepts deposits when
F = 30. This suggests that the gains to deposit-taking are actually higher for a prot-maximizing
rm in a duopoly because the protability benet to having lower costs of nancing is more im-
portant when rms are more limited in the interest rates they can charge.
INSERT Table 1.5
I follow a similar parametrization for non-prot organizations. In Table 1.6, I see that the
non-prot organization would want to accept deposits if F = 15 or F = 20, but would not want
to accept deposits in the low-cost scenario, where F = 5. The intuition behind this result is that
when the xed cost is fairly low for non-deposit taking, the eect of adding 15 or 20 to that cost
makes it relatively more costly for the organization to reach additional borrowers, despite the lower
xed cost. However, when the xed cost is higher to begin with for non deposit-taking, adding 15
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or 20 has less of a relative eect.
INSERT Table 1.6
In addition, I nd support for my results regarding dierentiation. For instance, in the F = 30
case, where taking deposits adds 5 in xed cost, I see in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 that the for-prot prot-
maximizing monopoly would rather not accept deposits, to earn prot of 0:86 > 0:16. However,
in the duopoly case, if I assume two for-prot prot-maximizing rms target the same borrowers,
then they will choose to accept deposits, earning a small positive prot. Thus, I see that one rm
will have the incentive to not take deposits and lend as a monopolist down to the zero-prot cut-o
point, earning slightly less than the 0:86 prot earned as a monopolist, given that the rm will
still have to co-exist with the deposit-taking rm among the very wealthy borrowers. I nd that
dierentiation will occur in this case, in terms of the sources of nancing pursues, and the non
deposit-taking rm will lend to lower income borrowers than the deposit-taking rm.
2.6 Hypotheses Development
The rst hypothesis explores the nding of my model regarding the dierent borrowers that for-
prot and non-prot organizations may choose to target. First, to the extent that prot-maximizing
and client-maximizing rms co-exist, I expect that the client-maximizing rms will target a lower
income segment of the population. Proposition 3 suggests that non-prot organizations may target
a lower income segment of the population even as a monopoly. If the non-prot rm coexists with
a prot-maximizing organization, then competition over wealthier borrowers will mean that the
non-prot is even more inclined to serve a dierent, lower-income segment. In addition, even if I
consider the case of two client-maximizing rms co-existing, due to the eects of the endogenous
sources of nancing, they may choose dierent prot-statuses and pursue dierent sources of nanc-
ing. Thus, both of these eects will go in the same direction and lead to the following hypothesis
regarding segmentation:
Hypothesis 1: For-prot and non-prot rms will be dierentiated in the wealth of borrowers
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served, with non-prot rms lending to lower-income borrowers than for-prot rms.
The second hypothesis considers how cross-country variance in the percentage of loans made by
for-prot organizations will relate to non-prot loan size and nancing choices. Higher prevalence of
for-prot institutions could result from dierences in either borrower or rm characteristics. More
specically, it could be that: 1) a higher percentage of borrowers are protable which leads to more
for-prot entry, or 2) cost advantages favor the for-prot form, such as relatively cheaper equity,
a small xed cost barrier to for-prot entry, or relatively costly or less available donations. These
factors will lead to not only the endogenous entry of prot-maximizing for-prot rms but also
client-maximizing rms will be more likely to choose the for-prot status. This might make one
think that because the environment is relatively more accommodating to for-prots that there will
be convergence on borrowers and approaches pursued. However, because client-maximizing rms
are allowed to also choose the for-prot status, the rms that actually choose the non-prot status
will, in fact, have smaller loan sizes and will be less likely to pursue deposits.45 Thus, I generate
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A higher prevalence of for-prot rms will be associated with smaller loans
and a lower incidence of deposit-taking by non-prot organizations.
Next, I further explore the role of alternative nancing sources. My model endogenizes the
amount of deposits in such a way that larger loan sizes are rewarded with additional deposits,
potentially o-setting the xed costs that taking deposits required. As a result, I expect that rms
that accept deposits will be dierentiated in average loan size, with those accepting deposits mak-
ing on average larger loans, as is suggested in Corollaries 1, 3, and 4. However, because for-prots
may already be serving the highest income borrowers, this eect will be stronger in non-prot or-
ganizations. In addition, to the extent that non-prots are switching from donations, which reward
serving lower income borrowers, to deposits, which reward serving higher income borrowers, this
45 Note that this also suggests that not allowing deposit-taking for non-prots should be associated with a higher
prevalence of for-prot organizations. This is a result I plan to pursue in future analysis as I can exploit country-level
regulatory changes regarding non-prot deposit-taking.
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will strengthen the nding of dierentiation between non-prot deposit-taking and non deposit-
taking institutions:
Hypothesis 3: Firms that accept deposits will have larger average loan sizes than those that
do not accept deposits, and this eect will be stronger in non-prot organizations.
2.7 Extensions
There are a number of limitations of the current model set-up that could be worthwhile extensions
of the model. I will discuss a few of the possible extensions below that are most relevant to pursue.
Market Penetration, Transportation Costs, and Oligopolies:
The most signicant simplication of my analysis is in the assumption of the nature and form
of competition. I see three major dimensions which could be generalized and extended from my
current analysis and are relevant given details of the micronance market. First, I do not include
the possibility of transportation costs, which are potentially important given that they form one of
the major cost components of making and receiving micronance loans. In addition, it is a dimen-
sion where I might nd additional dierentiation between for-prot and non-prot organizations,
as non-prots are more likely to send loan ocers out to rural villages, facing higher transportation
costs, whereas for-prot organizations tend to locate in more urban areas where transportation
costs are lower. Thus, this is another dimension along which dierences between rms by prot
status may endogenously show up.
Next, I assume that the market is such that if two rms target the same wealth of borrowers,
they necessarily split demand. However, market penetration rates are fairly low in this growing
industry. In other words, it seems plausible that targeting the same wealth of borrowers is not
a sucient condition for direct competition and there could be useful analysis by weakening this
assumption. While the intuition of the model would remain the same, modeling the way in which
the industry grows with varying market penetration rates could generate useful analysis, as this
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\out-of-equilibrium" state is not short-lived.
Finally, to make the results tractable, I limit analysis to a monopoly and duopoly. While this
generates understanding regarding how the dierent rm types interact, it is clearly incomplete
and extending this to the more general oligopoly setting merits further consideration. While I have
not solved out these extensions, I present below a potential set-up to address these three issues:
Assume that rms position themselves along a Hotelling line, where the line represents the
borrowers' wealth. In order words, rms dierentiate themselves in how close they locate to a
wealth segment. Then, the rms face transportation costs to reach the borrowers. Thus, rms can
still choose which borrowers to target, but they position themselves to serve certain borrowers at
a lower cost. In addition, I assume that there is only a certain percentage of the population which
is served, capturing the fact that market penetration is relatively low as micronance is a growing
industry. For example, suppose there is some probability 1    that the rm will make an oer
to a borrower that is not being made an oer by any other rm, even if the rms are lending to
borrowers at the same wealth level. Thus,  can be thought of as the market penetration. This
analysis would allow multiple rms to compete in an environment with transportation costs and
potentially low market penetration.
Entry:
In the current analysis, I assume a duopoly and then my hypotheses are generalized from this
case by considering how additional rms would aect rm behavior. However, I do not directly
account for the fact that this entry, both in terms of the number of rms and the composition,
will be endogenous both to institutional factors and the current rm composition and behavior.
This is an important place for further investigation as I could imagine a scenario where non-prot
organizations behave dierently in order to deter for-prot entry. In the empirical work, I use
country-year xed eects to control for some of these eects. In addition, to the extent that rms
want to deter entry, I would expect that this would lessen dierentiation by prot-status and thus
would only weaken the results of my model, suggesting that empirical support of dierentiation
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by prot status is robust to this eect. Similarly, if the institutional characteristics make lending
to wealthier borrowers relatively more protable, this could induce for-prot entry but would also
imply that non-prots want to lend to wealthier borrowers, thus counter-acting my Hypothesis 2.
Again, I expect empirical support of Hypothesis 2 to thus be robust to this eect.
Welfare Analysis:
While I have indirectly considered welfare analysis by looking at the number of borrowers
reached, I have not directly focused my analysis on the total or social welfare implications of the
dierent combinations of rms and conditions. This would require specifying a utility function for
borrowers. I have avoided this approach as making utility comparisons across people is challenging.
However, I could easily consider total surplus analysis, and this would be a relatively straightforward
endeavor, using the prot and borrower surplus functions that I specied in the model. While this
paper focuses on the strategic actions of the rms, welfare analysis would be useful to generate policy
implications as well as provide connections with the literature on micronance from development
economics.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
In order to test the above propositions, I utilize MIX Market Data, which is publicly available an-
nual data that micronance rms le voluntarily.46 The rms that voluntarily chose to le tend to
be larger and more nancially transparent rms, and while this is a subsample of rms, it captures
a large percentage of the industry activity (Cull et al., 2011; Bogan, 2012). The current sample
used in this paper covers institutions from 2003 through 2012. I focus on just the region of Latin
America, as region inuences the development of microcredit (Ahlin et al., 2011). My entire sample
has 3,186 observations, covering 522 rms in 25 countries. Firms are in the sample for an average
of 4.23 years and countries have on average just under 16 rms in a given year. Commercialization
46 This data can be accessed through the MIX Market portal, by selecting to download the Basic MIX MFI Data
Set: http://www.mixmarket.org/proles-reports.
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in the industry is captured by the increasing share of loans being made by for-prot institutions, as
can be seen in Figure 1.1, where both for-prot and non-prot rms are growing in terms of total
loan amount, but for-prots are growing at a higher rate.
INSERT Figure 1.1
3.2 Variables
For-Prot Indicator is a variable taken directly from the MIX dataset which is dened as one if
the organization is a for-prot as of its latest ling.47
Deposits Indicator is an indicator which is dened as one if an organization takes a positive
amount of deposits in a given year, using the Deposits variable in MIX. Because taking deposits is
viewed in my model as a choice where the xed cost of pursuing this source of nancing is relevant,
I utilize this dummy variable approach rather than using the amount of deposits as a continuous
variable.
Average Loan Balance per Borrower is the average balance of loans for a given borrower as
provided to MIX Market in US Dollars. It is used in prior literature as a proxy for the wealth of
the borrower served, and my model shows in Lemma 1 that this is an appropriate interpretation of
the variable.
Percent For-Prot is a continuous variable which is dened as the ratio of the gross loan portfo-
lio of all for-prot MFIs in a given country and year over the total gross loan portfolio of all MFIs
in that country and year. It captures the extent to which loans made by peer rms in the country
and year are made by for-prots.
47 Unfortunately, I do not capture whether that organization was founded as a for-prot or whether it underwent a
status change, but this would be a place where follow-up analysis with additional data would be useful, as suggested
by Battilana & Dorado (2010).
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1.7, I provide basic summary statistics of the variables in my sample, broken down by
prot status. I see a number of relationships that are consistent with what I would expect based
on my model, although I should be careful in the interpretation as organizational types exist in
higher numbers in dierent countries, where micronance conditions also dier. First, I see that
non-prot organizations have a smaller average loan balance, which supports the notion that they
are more likely to target a lower-income and more underserved population. In addition, for-prot
organizations tend to have larger amounts of deposits and more equity, which is consistent with
the nancing dierences between the organizations. For-prots also tend to be much larger when
considering the number of active borrowers.
INSERT Table 1.7
In Table 1.8, I provide the correlation table, by prot status, for the key variables of interest
with the percent of the total loans made by for-prots in a given country and year. If I look at
how the average loan balance correlates with the other variables, I see that for both for-prot and
non-prot organization, average loan size is negatively related to the yield on gross portfolio, sup-
porting the idea that smaller loans are considered relatively riskier or higher cost and thus have a
higher interest rate. In addition, there is a positive relationship between average loan size and the
deposits indicator, consistent with the endogenous form of the deposits function that I specify in my
model. Finally, I see that non-prot organizations' average loan size is negatively related to the per-
centage of loans made by for-prot rms in the same country-year, whereas it is positively related
for for-prot organizations. This provides preliminary support for Hypothesis 2, suggesting that
there is increased segmentation by prot-status when there is a higher prevalence of for-prot rms.
INSERT Table 1.8
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3.4 Analysis
To examine Hypothesis 1, I run a regression of the average loan balance per borrower on prot
status in Table 1.9. Models 1 through 3 are examining whether Hypothesis 1 holds, where for-
prot and non-prot organizations segment the market in terms of the wealth of the borrowers
served. Model 1 has year xed eects, Model 2 has year and country xed eects, and Model 3 has
xed eects for country*year. I nd in all three models that the for-prot indicator has a positive
and signicant coecient, indicating that for-prot institutions have a higher average loan balance
than non-prot institutions, and thus suggesting that for-prots tend to target wealthier borrowers.
INSERT Table 1.9
To examine Hypothesis 2, I add the variable capturing the percentage of loans made by for-prot
institutions in a given country-year, along with the interaction of this variable with the for-prot
indicator. In Table 1.10, Models 1 and 2 have year and year and country xed eects, respec-
tively.48 I nd that the coecient of the variable capturing the share of loans made by for-prots
is negative and signicant, and the coecient of this variable interacted with the for-prot status
is positive and signicant. The magnitude of the interaction variable is greater than that of the
share variable alone. This result implies that non-prot organizations have even smaller loan sizes
when there is a higher share of for-prot organizations, whereas for-prot rms have weakly larger
loan sizes. Thus, I nd support for the rst part of the hypothesis that dierentiation increases be-
tween for-prot and non-prot rms as the share of loans made by for-prot organizations increases.
INSERT Table 1.10
To examine the second part of the hypothesis, I then repeat this analysis with the deposits
indicator as the dependent variable. In Table 1.10, Models 3 and 4 have year and year and country
xed eects, respectively. In Model 4, I nd that the coecient of the variable capturing the share
48 Note that I do not run this analysis with the country*year xed eects as the main variable of interest is at the
country-year level.
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of loans made by for-prots is negative and signicant, and the coecient of this variable inter-
acted with the for-prot status is positive and signicant. Again, the magnitude of the interaction
variable is greater than that of the share variable alone. In Model 3, the rst coecient is negative
and insignicant while the second is positive and signicant, and of a greater magnitude. This
result provides some support for non-prot organizations being even less likely to accept deposits
when there is a higher share of for-prot organizations.
Finally, to examine Hypothesis 3, I again look at the average loan balance per borrower, broken
out by prot status, whether or not the rm takes deposits, and an interaction of the two. In Table
1.11, Models 1 through 3 look at the eect of these variables on the average loan balance, utilizing
year xed eects, year and country xed eects, and year*country xed eects, respectively. I nd
that deposit-taking institutions have larger average loan sizes than non deposit-taking institutions
due to the positive coecient on the deposits indicator. However, this eect is moderated for
for-prot institutions in Models 2 and 3, indicating that for-prots deposit-taking institutions have
larger loan sizes than for-prot non deposit-taking institutions, but the relative dierence is smaller
than when comparing non-prot deposit-taking and non deposit-taking institutions. Thus, I nd
support for Hypothesis 3.
INSERT Table 1.11
4 Conclusion
The existing literature is mixed regarding whether or not for-prot and non-prot organizations
have dierent objectives (e.g. Duggan, 2000; Horwitz & Nichols, 2009). In my analytical model
of the micronance industry, I allow dierences between for-prot and non-prot organizations to
come not only from dierent objectives but also from the impact and demands of dierent sources
of nancing. As a result, dierences by prot status may occur even when organizations have
the same objective. This may help to explain some of the conicting literature, and importantly
incorporates the ndings that sources of nancing are relevant in determining non-prot behavior
(Froelich, 1999; Weisbrod, 2004). Correlational analysis from a frequently used dataset of micro-
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nance organizations supports the hypotheses generated from the model and suggest that sources of
nancing and prot status are important dimensions to consider regarding how rms will behave
in dierent markets.
As non-prots face increasing competition from for-prot rms, there is a question of where
the non-prot form ought to t in. A former CEO of a micronance network suggested that the
non-prot business model is still useful, and should not be completely disregarded, but rather
transitioned into a dierent role in the industry. When thinking about the general industry devel-
opment, NGOs used donations to test the feasibility of expanding lending to underserved borrowers
in the early stages of micronance. In fact, they did such a good job that commercial entrants
saw the potential protability and entered the industry and borrower segment (Karlan, 2014). In
general, these for-prot entrants have better structure and nancial support to grow, and thus
non-prots perhaps ought to consider continuing to expand in other ways that are consistent with
the comparative advantages of the non-prot business model.
Many non-prots are acquiring additional donations to experiment with providing health ser-
vices. This is a result of the fact that their business models are better designed to do more
exploratory, unprotable work as compared to more commercially funded organizations, and also
because donors are more willing to fund these projects than continuing to fund traditional mi-
crocredit NGOs, where they are increasingly focusing on providing only startup costs (Armendriz
de Aghion & Morduch, 2004). Thus, even if the non-prot business model is in fact less able to
serve the more developed and proven areas of micronance, the business model can continue to
have a competitive advantage in exploring new areas of service provision to underserved clients, as
dictated by the providers of their unique source of nancing.
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Table 1.1: Description of Model Variables 
Symbol Description Operationalization Numerical  
ܰ The number of potential borrowers in the 
market. 
݊ ൌ 1,… ,ܰ  
ݓ௡ The measure of wealth of the ݊௧௛ borrower. ݓ௡ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ  
ݎ௡ The interest rate of the loan to the ݊௧௛ 
borrower. 
  
௡ܸ The size of the loan to the ݊௧௛ borrower.   
݌௡ The probability of the ݊௧௛ borrower 
repaying his loan. 
݌௡ ൌ ߩ଴ െ ߩଵ ௡ܸሺ1 ൅ ݎ௡ሻ ൅ ߩଶݓ௡, 
where ߩଵ ൐ 0, ߩଶ ൐ 0 
ߩ଴ ൌ .5 ߩଶ ൌ .0005 ߩଶ ൌ .5
ߚோ The rate of return in the good state, when 
the borrower can repay the loan. 
ߚோ ൒ 1 ൅ ݎ௡ ߚோ ൌ 1.5 
ߚ஻ The rate of return in the bad state, when the 
borrower cannot repay the loan. 
ߚ஻ ൑ 1 ൅ ݎ௡ ߚ஻ ൌ 1 
ܵ௡ The borrower’s expected surplus. ܵ௡ ൌ ݌௡൫ߚோ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௡ሻ൯ ௡ܸ  
ܬ The number of firms.   
ݐ The type of the firm, where 	
ݐ ൌ 1 indicates a for-profit. 
ݐ ൌ ሼ0,1ሽ  
݀ An indicator which evaluates to 1 if the firm 
accepts deposits. 
݀ ൌ ሼ0,1ሽ  
 
ߨ௡ௗ,௧ The marginal profit for a firm of type ݐ and deposit-taking captured by ݀ lending 
to borrower ݊. 
 
ߨ௡ௗ,௧ ൌ ݌௡ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௡ሻ ௡ܸ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌௡ሻߚ஻ ௡ܸെ ሺ1 ൅ ܿሻ ௡ܸ െ ܨ 
 
ܨ The fixed cost of making a loan. ܨ ൌ ௢݂ ൅ ଵ݂݀ ൅ ଶ݂ݐ ൅ ଷ݂݀ ∗ ݐ ଴݂ ൌ 5, 15,25 
ଵ݂ ൌ 15, 20 
ଶ݂ ൌ 5 
ଷ݂ ൌ െ10
ܩ The share of financing from giving, for non-
profit firms. 
ܩ ൌ ܯ െ ߛߤ௝ ܯ ൌ .15 ߛ ൌ .15
ܤ The share of financing from equity.   
ܧ The share of financing from equity, for for-
profit firms. 
  
ܦ The share of financing from deposits. ܦ ൌ ߜଵ ൅ ߜଶߤ௝ ߜଵ ൌ .5 ߜଶ ൌ .5
ܿ The marginal cost of making a loan. ܿ ൌ ܿଵܩ ൅ ܿଶܤ ൅ ܿଷܧ ൅ ܿସܦ ܿଵ ൌ 0  ܿଶ ൌ .3  ܿଷ ൌ .25  ܿସ ൌ .2
ߤ௝ The average wealth of the borrowers served 
by firm ݆. ߤ௝ ൌ෍ ݓ௡
ேೕ
௡ୀଵ
 
 
ሾ1, ௝ܰሿ The set of borrowers served by firm ݆.   
௝ܰ∗ The number of borrowers served by firm ݆.   
௝ܸ The total value of loans made by firm ݆. ௝ܸ ൌ ෍ ௡ܸ
ேೕ
௡ୀଵ
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Table 1.2: Monopoly For-Profit Non-Deposit Taking 
 Profit-Maximizing Client-Maximizing 
 Lower Bound Profit Lower Bound Num. Borrowers 
F= 10 0.49 7.15 0.00 1.00 
F=20 0.69 4.23 0.33 0.67 
F=30 0.85 0.86 0.69 0.31 
In the table above, I assume that the marginal cost of equity is 0.25.  I then examine three scenarios 
of low, middle, and high fixed costs, at 10, 20, and 30, respectively.  The firm will lend to all 
borrowers with wealth levels above the lower bound. 
 
Table 1.3: Monopoly For-Profit Deposit Taking 
 Profit-Maximizing Client-Maximizing 
 Lower Bound Profit Lower Bound Num. Borrowers 
F= 10,    +5 0.43 11.35 0.00 1.00 
+10 0.52 8.31 0.00 1.00 
F=20,     +5 0.59 6.21 0.15 0.85 
               +10 0.67  4.49 0.32 0.68 
F=30,      +5 0.94 0.16 0.87 0.13 
               +10 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
In the table above, I assume that the marginal cost of equity is 0.25 and the marginal cost of deposits 
is 0.20.  I then examine three scenarios of low, middle, and high fixed costs, at 10, 20, and 30, 
respectively.  In addition, I examine whether accepting deposits has a small or large change to fixed 
costs, at an additional cost of 5 or 10.  The share of deposits received is endogenized based on the 
average loan size.  The firm will lend to all borrowers with wealth levels above the lower bound. 
 
Table 1.4: Monopoly Non-Profit Client-Maximizing 
 No deposits Deposits 
 Lower Bound # Borrowers Lower Bound Num. Borrowers 
F= 5,  +15 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
           +20 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
F=15, +15 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
           +20 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
F=25, +15 0.74 0.26 0.00 1.00 
           +20 0.74 0.26 0.24 0.76 
In the table above, I assume that the marginal cost of debt for non-profits is 0.30 and the marginal 
cost of deposits is 0.20.  Donations are assumed to have no marginal cost.  I then examine three 
scenarios of low, middle, and high fixed costs, at 5, 15, and 25, respectively.  In addition, I examine 
whether accepting deposits has a small or large change to fixed costs, at an additional cost of 15 or 
20.  The share of donations and the share of deposits received are endogenized based on the average 
loan size.  I examine the firm outcome if it lends to all borrowers with wealth levels above the lower 
bound, although this is not necessarily the optimizing choice for the non-profit. 
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Table 1.5: Duopoly Profit-Maximizing For-Profit 
 Neither takes deposits Both take deposits 
 Lower Bound Profit Lower Bound Profit 
F= 10,  +5 0.78 0.52 0.67 1.49 
            +10 0.78 0.53 0.76 0.83 
F=20,   +5 0.99 0.01 0.84 0.37 
            +10 0.99 0.01 0.92 0.10 
F=30,  +5 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.003 
            +10 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
In the table above, I assume that the marginal cost of equity is 0.25 and the marginal 
cost of deposits is 0.20.  Interest rates charged are assumed to follow the form: 1.3 + 
.2/J, where J is the number of firms.  I then examine three scenarios of low, middle, and 
high fixed costs, at 10, 20, and 30, respectively.  In addition, I examine whether 
accepting deposits has a small or large change to fixed costs, at an additional cost of 5 or 
10.  The share of deposits received is endogenized based on the average loan size.  The 
firm will lend to all borrowers with wealth levels above the lower bound. 
 
 
Table 1.6: Duopoly Client-Maximizing Non-Profit 
 Neither takes deposits Both take Deposits 
 Lower Bound # Borrowers Lower Bound # Borrowers 
F= 5, +15 0.00 0.50 0.15 0.43 
         +20 0.00 0.50 0.47 0.27 
F=15, +15 1.00 0.00 0.74 0.13 
           +20 1.00 0.00 0.97 0.02 
F=25, +15 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
           +20 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
In the table above, I assume that the marginal cost of debt for non-profits is 0.30 and the 
marginal cost of deposits is 0.20.  Donations are assumed to have no marginal cost.  I then 
examine three scenarios of low, middle, and high fixed costs, at 5, 15, and 25, respectively.  In 
addition, I examine whether accepting deposits has a small or large change to fixed costs, at an 
additional cost of 15 or 25.  The share of donations and the share of deposits received are 
endogenized based on the average loan size.  Interest rates charged are assumed to follow the 
form: 1.3 + .2/J, where J is the number of firms.  I examine the firm outcome if it lends to all 
borrowers with wealth levels above the lower bound, although this is not necessarily the 
optimizing choice for the non-profit. 
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Table 1.7: Summary Statistics by Profit Status 
Variable 
Non-
Profit 
For-
Profit 
------------- ------------ -------- 
Key Variables 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower 1227.99 1395.18 
Yield on Gross Portfolio Real 0.26 0.37 
Gross Loan Portfolio (millions) 25.20 91.00 
Deposits Indicator 0.32 0.45 
Financing Variables 
Assets (millions) 32.50 115.00 
Equity (millions) 6.55 17.70 
Deposits (millions) 16.70 57.50 
Debt to Equity 3.45 9.86 
Deposits to Assets 0.18 0.21 
Performance Variables 
Return on Assets 0.00 0.01 
Financial Expenses over Assets 0.05 0.06 
Operating Expenses over Gross Loan Portfolio 0.32 0.36 
Cost per Borrower 214.97 289.39 
Borrowers per Staff Member 124.92 141.81 
Portfolio at Risk - 30 Days 0.08 0.07 
Administrative Expenses over Assets 0.09 0.10 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 1.13 1.15 
Total Expenses over Assets 0.29 0.34 
Size Variables 
Personnel 129.62 533.47 
Number of Active Borrowers (thousands) 17.55 71.76 
Number of Depositors (thousands) 22.62 69.95 
Offices 12.85 34.06 
Other Variables 
Percent of Female Borrowers 0.63 0.63 
Average Salary over GNI 3.54 4.15 
------------- ------------ -------- 
Observations 2007 1179 
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Table 1.8: Correlation Table by Profit Status 
Non-Profit Organizations: n = 2007 
Avg. Loan  Yield  Portfolio Deps. Indicator 
------------- ----------- --------- -------- --------- 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower 1 
Yield on Gross Portfolio Real -0.4316* 1 
Gross Loan Portfolio (millions) 0.2907* -0.1398* 1 
Deposits Indicator 0.3446* -0.2767* 0.2713* 1 
% For-Profit -0.1452* 0.1261* -0.0135 -0.0296 
For-Profit Organizations: n = 1179 
Avg. Loan Yield  Portfolio Deps. Indicator 
------------- ----------- --------- -------- --------- 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower 1 
Yield on Gross Portfolio Real -0.4252* 1 
Gross Loan Portfolio (millions) 0.3081* -0.1738* 1 
Deposits Indicator 0.2460* -0.2187* 0.2495* 1 
% For-Profit 0.0953* 0.0172 0.0654* 0.1629* 
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Table 1.9: Segmentation of Average Loan Balance by Profit Status 
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- 
For-Profit Indicator 139.53*** 519.37*** 538.69*** 
(54.00) (56.75) (57.33) 
Constant 674.58*** -198.41 71.58 
(117.52) (171.28) (674.96) 
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- 
Fixed-Effects Year Year, Country Year#Country 
Observations 3186 3186 3186 
R-squared 0.047 0.203 0.245 
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 1.10: Relationship between For-Profit Share and Loan Balance, Deposit-Taking 
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------- 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Loan 
Balance Loan Balance 
Deposits 
Indicator 
Deposits 
Indicator 
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------- 
For-Profit Indicator -501.06*** -824.17*** -0.17*** -0.42***
(169.97) (184.04) (0.05) (0.06)
% For-Profit -791.36*** -1997.13*** -0.06 -0.55***
(122.77) (243.05) (0.04) (0.08)
For-Profit*%For-
Profit 1065.28*** 2046.83*** 0.43*** 0.84***
(242.26) (264.00) (0.08) (0.09)
Constant 1113.65*** 1275.72*** 0.14*** 0.18**
(134.83) (250.11) (0.04) (0.08)
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------- 
Year Year, Country Year Year, Country 
Observations 3186 3186 3186 3186
R-squared 0.059 0.223 0.042 0.183
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 1.11: Segmentation of Average Loan Balance by Deposit-Taking 
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------- 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------- 
For-Profit Indicator 82.24 520.82*** 539.67*** 
(66.99) (68.28) (69.19) 
Deposits Indicator 954.67*** 1021.59*** 1011.94*** 
(68.01) (67.20) (69.00) 
For-Profit*Deposits -132.44 -305.04*** -295.67*** 
(106.67) (104.09) (105.85) 
Constant 568.39*** -48.3 71.33 
(113.01) (164.58) (644.76) 
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------- 
Fixed-Effects Year Year, Country Year#Country 
Observations 3186 3186 3186 
R-squared 0.128 0.275 0.312 
--------------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
65 
 
Chapter 2 
 
The Effect of Synergies and Competition on Organizational Choices 
in Non-Profits: Evidence from Latin American Microfinance 
 
ABSTRACT 
Whether non-profit organizations should use business tools traditionally associated with the for-profit sector 
has been a widely debated issue.  The push to encourage non-profits to adopt commercial tools has been 
particularly strong in microfinance, given the co-existence of non-profit institutions with firms that are more 
commercially oriented, such as for-profit banks and specialized microfinance banks.  One such commercial 
tool is the use of commercial funding, including deposits, which is arguably increasingly useful given declining 
donations.  I find that non-profits frequently do not benefit from the adoption of deposit-taking, and in fact 
many suffer declines in their financial performance after such adoption.  However, those non-profits that 
make larger loans, thereby more closely mirroring the loan-making behavior of for-profit organizations, 
improve their financial performance after the adoption of deposit-taking.  This result suggests that 
complementarities between commercial financing and borrower targeting are important, and such synergies 
are relevant when considering non-profit adoption of for-profit business tools.  The extent of financial 
benefit is moderated by the amount of for-profit competition in the country, suggesting competitive concerns 
constrain whether these complementarities are worth pursuing. 
 
Keywords: non-profit strategy; competition; microfinance 
 
1 Introduction
\What was being said back then was that when you talk about nancial services to poor people,
there is room for a range of institutions. The reality is that the non-prot will be limited in its
scale. It's going to be pulled into commercializing, and potential regulation, and having a new set
of stake-holders, which are beyond simply the clients and donors. Just by adding those additional
stake-holders, the way you make decisions has to change." (Source 2: CEO of a Micronance
Institution in Latin America)
The literature examining process and product adoption often focuses on determinants of the
rate of technology diusion in nascent industries, such as in disk drives (Suarez & Utterback, 1995;
Utterback, 1996). However, more recent literature has taken a closer look at the decision of whether
or not to adopt based on organizational (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002) or environmental character-
istics (Kapoor & Furr, 2015), motivated largely by the complementary assets framework (Teece,
1986). For example, this lens has been used to examine how dierences in capabilities between
diversifying rms and start-ups inuence performance in a new industry (Ganco & Agarwal, 2009;
Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Khessina & Carroll, 2008; Klepper, 2002).
This paper picks up on that stream of literature by considering the choice of entities (such as
non-prot micronance rms) as to whether to make an adoption (e.g., of commercial tools) where
the adoption's advantages are not overwhelmingly clear, even if the new practice or product seems
to have some apparent benets. Therefore, evaluating the t between the organization and the
new product or process is important in analyzing and predicting both whether (and when) the
tool is adopted and the eects of adoption (Zott & Amit, 2008). Further, this evaluative approach
can be applied beyond choices regarding technology adoption to adoption of other practices and
procedures (Qian et al., 2013).
I utilize the co-existence of for-prot and non-prot organizations in micronance, as well as the
fairly recent developments that have encouraged some of these organizations to adopt commercial
tools, in Latin America to explore the question of t between the organization and the adoption
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of a business practice. The adoption I focus on is the use of commercial funding, particularly of
deposits. Both donors and other stakeholders have frequently encouraged that adoption to oset
the eects of declining donations. Through examining the heterogeneous eects of this adoption
based on the particular characteristics of the organization, my paper also addresses the debate
about why heterogeneity continues to exist in business practices (Christmann, 2000).
The static dierences between non-prots and for-prots support the notion that there is a pre-
ferred or appropriate t between product market strategy and business model. However, there are
also substantial variations in strategy among non-prot entities (e.g., Beard & Dess, 1981; Brooks,
2005; and many others). In this paper, I will, therefore, also look within the non-prot sector to
understand variation in ability to adopt (or interest in adopting) commercial nancing.
I nd heterogeneity in the eects of this change in the source of nancing on nancial perfor-
mance based on whether or not the rm had a contemporaneous change in targeted borrowers.
This suggests that complementarities between adoption and product strategy are important in the
non-prot sector. However, the positive eects of complementarities are moderated by the amount
of competition, particularly competition with for-prot entities. These results are important in
understanding the future of an increasing number of industries where distinct business models now
co-exist, as for-prots and non-prots overlap in more industries (Ben-Ner, 2002; Dees & Anderson,
2003), and in enhancing our understanding of business model competition (Casadesus-Masanell &
Ricart, 2007).
The micronance industry provides a good setting to study the dierent business models of
non-prots as compared to for-prots, as well as changes in these models. Firms in this industry
traditionally served marginalized populations using an alternative model to that of the commer-
cial banking sector (Mersland & Strom, 2010). Further, this industry was largely populated by
non-prot organizations in its nascent stages, but has since had entry by for-prot rms and con-
version of some non-prot to for-prot organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Hermes et al.,
2011). And, a few well-publicized conversions of non-prot to for-prot organizations, in the 1990s,
led to the life cycle theory of micronance, whereby non-prot organizations would become more
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commercial as they age (de Sousa-Shields, 2004; Helms, 2006). While there is some support for
this hypothesis (Farrington & Abrams, 2002), there is substantial heterogeneity in the extent to
which this transition has occurred. Bogan (2012) nds that it is not the age of the micronance
institution (MFI), but rather the sources of its funding and its size that better predict nancial
performance.1
One of my paper's contributions arises from its analysis of the interplay between the use of com-
mercial sources of funding and the appropriate business model. The eect of commercial funding
may dier by prot status and by the characteristics of the targeted borrowers. Bogan (2012) and
Ly and Mason (2011) suggest that non-prots in the micronance industry are less protable and
eective insofar as they spend energy competing for scarce donations. However, my paper suggests
that non-prots may be limited in the extent to which they can compete like for-prots, both in
that adopting commercial funding may require them to make a product market change and because
their nancial success is still limited by for-prot competition.
The eect of deposit-taking for non-prot institutions may be contingent on making simulta-
neous changes in the business model and in other organizational changes. In particular, I look at
changes in a rm's average loan size, as loan size is a common proxy for the wealth of the borrower
served (e.g., Mersland & Strom, 2010; Cull et al., 2011). I nd that non-prot micronance insti-
tutions that scaled up their loan size over this period beneted from beginning to accept deposits
in terms of improved operating self-sustainability and return on assets. In contrast, those that ac-
cepted deposits but did not signicantly increase their average loan size experienced deterioration in
these nancial measures. Further, while non-prots may have goals beyond nancial performance,
I nd that those deposit-taking non-prots that did not upscale their targeted borrowers did not
perform better in terms of other objectives (such as the number of borrowers reached) than did
comparable non-deposit taking non-prots.
1 Financial performance here is dened by operational self-suciency, a measure capturing the extent to which
the rm can continue to nance its loan operations from its revenue. I also use this measure and further describe it
in Section 3.
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The rest of this section will provide the context for my analysis by examining the interaction
between non-prots and for-prots, particularly in the micronance industry. Section 2 develops my
hypotheses regarding the eects of the adoption of deposit accepting, motivated by the literature
and industry context. Section 3 describes the data and presents the empirical analyses and Section
4 concludes, describing limitations and suggesting future research.
1.1 Context of Non-prots and Micronance
Non-prot rms are increasingly using business tools associated with the for-prot sector, such
as more detailed business planning and analytics, and performance-based human resource systems
(Eisenberg, 1997; Erus & Weisbrod, 2003). This movement has come as a result of increasingly
tight donor funds, which force non-prot organizations to operate with increasing nancial returns
or under stricter nancial constraints (Rhyne & Otero, 2006).2 However, the adoption of such
analytical and nance-focused systems is not trivial in non-prot organizations. There are many
instances where generating higher returns may be at odds with the mission of the organization
(McIntosh & Wydick, 2005). Further, at least in the short run, such investments in the adminis-
tration of the organization would divert resources from the population in need, which can aect
future donations (Bowman, 2006).
The distinct approaches and tools used by for-prot and non-prot organizations have been ex-
amined in the healthcare and education sectors, largely in the U.S. There are numerous conicting
ndings from the healthcare setting, including regarding whether non-prot organizations operate
with a distinct objective, such as to maximize their own output (Horwitz & Nichols, 2009), or to
maximize management perquisites (Chang & Jacobson, 2010). However, Duggan (2000) concludes
that health care non-prots do not respond dierently than for-prots to incentives provided by
government programs, and thus he does not nd evidence which supports dierences in objectives
by prot status. On the other hand, for-prots have been found to respond better to increasing de-
mand in terms of a better ability to increase capacity (Hansmann, 1987). My paper explores some
of the issues brought up in this literature by exploring the eects of changing sources of nancing
2 This decline in donations is partly due to increasing competition with other non-prot organizations, as well as
a decline in the amount of total available donations due to other external economic factors.
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in determining outcomes, and addresses the hypothesis that as competition increases, dierences
by ownership type should decline (Sloan, 2000).
The business models of micronance organizations are distinct in that for-prots tend to have
substantial administrative overhead, reecting formal processes and pressure from external stake-
holders and regulators, and focus on making larger loans to wealthier borrowers in more urban
areas, where such formal processes attract clients and are cost eective. In addition, these organi-
zations generally have more debt relative to equity capital and are, therefore, more highly leveraged.
On the other hand, non-prots have less formalized systems and focus on group lending,3 female
borrowers, and rural areas. Thus they make smaller loans and depend more on interpersonal con-
nections.
Initially, deposit-taking was quite rare in Latin American micronance as microlending was the
key focus (Kiviat, 2009). However, the taking of deposits is a key element of commercial banking
since deposits are the \principal source of an individual bank's power to lend and invest" (Hodg-
man, 1961). Deposit-taking by MFI entities is becoming increasingly common and encouraged as
commercial banks enter into micronance and existing MFIs explore commercial sources of nance
(Farrington & Abrams, 2002). Such deposit-taking by non-prots represents a shift in the non-
prot MFI business model.
The ability in terms of the rms' existing infrastructure to take deposits is quite dierent
between these business models. In particular, \NGOs lack the governance, legal status, and in-
stitutional capacity to intermediate voluntary deposits from the public" (CGAP, 2005). Thus,
deposit-taking provides an appropriate activity to examine whether non-prots can, or would want
to, eectively utilize a business practice associated with the commercial, formalized for-prot busi-
ness model.
3 Group lending is where money is dispersed to a group, rather than to an individual. Peer pressure is used to
induce loan repayment and the group's knowledge of each other is used to determine the allocation of the group's
loan to individual members within the group.
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My sample period includes the years of the global nancial crisis. During the crisis years, the
ability of an organization to self-nance growth became increasingly important as the availability
of donations (to non-prots) and equity was declining.4 Industry reports describe how rms that
relied on deposits during the nancial crisis generally fared better because deposits in this period
provided a relatively available way to support the organization, even amid declining external -
nancing and worsening loan performance (Lutzenkirchen et al., 2012).5 As explained below, the
nancial crisis may have shifted the relative attractiveness of initiating deposit-taking, and thus
my sample includes a particularly interesting and relevant time period.
Accepting deposits importantly changes a rm's business model in a number of ways. First, it
changes the relationship and exibility of the organization to choose its borrowers. For example,
in one of my interviews, the CEO of a micronance institution in Latin America that recently
began accepting deposits said, \when you're an NGO and you're a non-prot, you can choose who
your clients are. Once you take deposits, your clients choose you and you become reliant on them,
because you are using their deposits to fund lending. So they are dictating what you can and can-
not do" (Source 2). This partly reects that a depositor expects - although may not get - special
attention to his borrowing needs. This important change in the nature of a stakeholder relation-
ship indicates a disruption in the business model, as there are dierent constraints on the nature
and process of doing business. Second, accepting deposits generally means becoming more closely
regulated. For instance, this same CEO said, \as a deposit-taking institution, I have to [keep]
sucient capital. [Accepting deposits] generally goes along with accepting the same regulation as
for-prots" (Source 2).6 These eects should be particularly strong for non-prot institutions, as
they are less likely to have satised regulatory requirements prior to accepting deposits and more
likely to have relied on social and relational lending prior to the change.
4 See Table 1 in Bogan (2012) for a description of the dierent sources of funding commonly used by MFIs.
5 Because there was much unmet demand for deposits at this time, by available I mean easy to access or expand
this source of MFI funding.
6 By capital, the CEO is referring to the sum of debt and equity, or the amount of reserves available with which
to pay back depositors.
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While in the early years of micronance there were only weak ties with global and country level
macroeconomic conditions (Krauss & Walter, 2009; Gonzalez, 2007), by the time the global nan-
cial crisis of 2007-2008 hit, ties with broader nancial conditions appeared more relevant (Di Bella,
2011). Thus, micronance in Latin America was aected by the nancial crisis both through the
decrease in donations (Wagner & Winkler, 2013) and the increase in default rates among borrowers
(Chen et al., 2010). However, micronance institutions, in terms of both deposits and loans, had
important elements of stability during this crisis, as was also seen in a previous crisis (Patten &
Johnston, 2001). In particular, low income depositors provided a stable source of funding during
the period (Lutzenkirchen et al., 2012). While banks, including commercial banks in the US, faced
major lending (including to sub-prime mortgage borrowers) and interbank obligation diculties,
as well as problems with their reputation and legitimacy (Chatterji et al., 2015), these challenges
should be less of an issue in micronance.
The relatively stable performance of deposits as a source of funding during the crisis, as com-
pared to donations, means that I expect deposit-taking to have had an even greater relative benet
for non-prots in my sample period. Hence, a nding that some entities initiating deposit-taking
in the period had reduced performance would be particularly striking.
2 Hypotheses Development
Following the logic of Le Breton-Miller & Miller (2015), I view the adoption of deposit taking as
the choice of a potentially valuable new practice for the MFI entity, but one that is not without
trade-os for it. I view this choice on three levels. First, there are costs associated with the changes
required by the organization to accept deposits as well as the benet of additional nancing. In
particular, organizations that begin accepting deposits may face additional regulation and will have
to add administrative and organizational support for the new form of revenue. The Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor states that \mobilizing deposits...requires strong accountable governance,
sound asset management, and an enabling legal and regulatory environment" (CGAP, 2005). Thus,
I expect that deposit-taking will be associated with an increase in administrative costs. On the
other hand, interest rates paid out on deposits were quite low and potential depositors were widely
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available (Lutzenkirchen et al., 2012). Thus deposit-taking should also be associated with a lower
interest expense percentage:
Hypotheses 1a: Adopting deposits increases administrative costs and lowers the interest expense
percentage paid on liabilities.
While this eect will exist for all institutions, initiating deposit-taking requires non-prots to
make relatively greater changes to their organizational structure than do for-prot organizations.
As a result, this increase in administrative costs will be higher in non-prot organizations. How-
ever, because non-prots have relatively more limited access to external funding (Kistruck et al.,
2013), the benets of taking deposits in terms of lowering the costs paid on liabilities (and possi-
bly increasing the feasible growth rate of the entity) will also be greater for non-prot organizations:
Hypotheses 1b: Both eects will be larger in non-prot MFIs relative to for-prot organizations.
The eects of deposit-taking will dier depending on other characteristics of the organizations.
On one hand, a lack of t between deposit-taking and the current activity system and capabilities
of the MFI may result in worse performance (Rivkin, 2000; Siggelkow, 2002). On the other hand,
the adoption of deposit-taking could lead to positive performance benets due to business model
innovation (Gavetti et al., 2005; Gambardella & McGahan, 2010). Because many of the depositors
will also become borrowers (and vice versa), I focus on the relationship between beginning to accept
deposits and transitioning to a dierent borrower segment.
As implied by the CGAP quote above, deposit-taking institutions will have higher xed costs
but lower marginal costs of lending, as they now have access to a large source of nancing (deposits)
but have overall higher administrative costs. As a result, I expect that organizations that make
larger loans, to wealthier borrowers, will have better nancial performance eects from accepting
deposits due to this cost structure. The additional costs that are undertaken as a result of deposit-
taking will lead to higher nancial returns if the organization uses these funds to scale up its typical
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loan size:7
Hypothesis 2a: The eect of deposit-taking on nancial performance will be more positive in
MFIs that begin making larger loans as compared to those that do not.
In addition to the synergy due to changes in the cost structure, stakeholders may nd that or-
ganizations that scale up loan size as well as initiate deposit taking are more consistent as they are
adopting congruent business model and product market strategy changes and are providing a clear
message regarding how the organization is changing. I expect this eect to occur in both for-prots
and non-prots. However the eect should be more pronounced in non-prot organizations as the
changes required in the organizational structure are greater. In addition, a more cohesive change
may be more important for non-prot organizations as the importance of external stakeholders,
particularly existing and potential donors, is higher (Ridder & McCandless, 2010). In particular,
when a non-prot begins taking deposits it may be seen (by donors and other stakeholders) as a
partial shift away from its mission; it is important that the organization commits to a change as
opposed to getting stuck in the middle between two battling organizational logics (Battilana &
Dorado, 2010). Thus, I expect the following to hold:
Hypothesis 2b: The complementarity between the adoption of deposit-taking and an increase in
average loan size will be stronger in non-prot than in for-prot organizations.
However, I also expect that this result might be moderated by the external conditions of the
market. In particular, two opposing forces inuence the eect of this complementarity in non-
prot organizations. On one hand, to the extent that the for-prot micronance business model is
considered legitimate (Suchman, 1995; Abrahamson 1991), non-prot organizations that scale up
7 The logic underlying changes in lending behavior, as well as in nancial performance, after accepting deposits
can be explained further as follows. MFI entities (particularly non-prots) may view their mission as bringing as
many people into the nancial system as is consistent with nancial viability for the entity. This \mission" will
be associated with relatively low average loan sizes. Access to a new, lower incremental cost source of funding will
permit higher average loan size and continuing to serve the \mission." However, unless the average loan sizes rises
signicantly, the higher administrative costs cannot be covered. And the adoption of deposit-taking by such an entity
would be a failure absent sucient increase in loan size to oset such costs. (Of course, certain geographies may not
permit the requisite increase in average loan size due to poverty, competition, etc.)
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to larger loan sizes and begin accepting deposits may benet from such legitimacy, or from being
seen as operating with increased \eciency". On the other hand, non-prots pursuing similar bor-
rowers and oering similar products to those of for-prot rms may sacrice their dierentiation
(Deephouse, 1999). Thus, these opposing forces can be considered to moderate the benets from
increasing loan size and beginning to accept deposits by non-prot organizations:
Hypothesis 3: The positive benets to moving to larger loan sizes and deposit-taking for non-
prot MFIs will be moderated by competition with for-prot MFIs.
Alternative Hypothesis 3: The positive benets to moving to larger loan sizes and deposit-
taking for non-prot MFIs will be magnied by the legitimacy of for-prot MFIs.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
In order to test the above propositions, I use two sources of data. The rst is the nancial and
organizational information on micronance institutions at the rm-year level. This comes from the
MIX Market Data, which is a publicly available annual dataset that incorporates information that
micronance rms le voluntarily.8 Due to this self-selection, the rms in this sample tend to be
the larger and more nancially transparent MFI rms. However, because most micronance loans
are made by the top rms in each country, I still capture a large percentage of the industry activity
(Cull et al., 2011; Bogan, 2012).
The current sample used in this paper runs from 2003 through 2012. It also uses only data
from Latin America, as there are substantial regional dierences in the development of micronance
(Ahlin et al., 2011). Latin America was chosen as micronance tends to be the farthest developed
and the introduction of deposit-taking in that region largely occurred in my sample years, thus
allowing me to capture the eects of this organizational decision.
8 This data can be accessed through the MIX Market portal, by selecting to download the Basic MIX MFI Data
Set: http://www.mixmarket.org/proles-reports.
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Table 2.4 contains a breakdown of the number of rms by country. The full sample contains 522
rms, but rms are in the sample for a wide variety of years as can be seen in Table 2.5. Because
the focus of my paper is on the performance over time of deposit-taking compared to non-deposit-
taking institutions, I purposefully selected those rms with at least 8 years of MIX data, resulting
in a sample of 213 rms. I supplement the publicly available MIX Market Data with purchased
data which breaks down the type of deposits. This is important as compulsory deposits dier from
other deposits, in that they are used as collateral for loans as opposed to a source of nancing
for the rms. Finally, I supplement this data with country data from the World Bank's World
Development Indicators (WDI) to provide context about country conditions.9
INSERT Table 2.4
INSERT Table 2.5
3.1.1 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables I focus on are rm-year level performance measures, as I want to exam-
ine the eect of deposit-taking on rm performance. I focus on three variables provided by MIX
Market: operational self-suciency, return on assets, and prot margin. These variables have been
used in prior studies of micronance using MIX Market data and thus I examine each of them to
foster comparisons with the prior literature.
Operational Self-Suciency is dened as Financial Revenue over the sum of Financial Expense,
Impairment Loss, and Operating Expense.10 This is an important measure for micronance insti-
tutions as it captures the extent to which the organizations can fund their own operations (and
growth) from the revenues on their loans. While non-prots may also rely on donations for growth,
9 This data is publicly available and can be downloaded from the World Bank's website:
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
10 A value greater than one implies the rm can grow or add to its capital over time (or, for for-prots, pay
dividends) whereas a value less than one implies the rm is making losses.
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the decline in donations means that even those more mission-oriented organizations are increasingly
focused on this measure. In fact, donations are frequently ear-marked solely for start-up costs or
new innovations (Armendriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2004) and thus the majority of the gross loan
portfolio is expected to be self-sustaining. This variable is commonly used to analyze the nancial
performance of organizations in this industry (e.g., Bogan, 2012).
Return on Assets is dened as the net operating income, less taxes, over assets. Net operating
income is dened as Financial Revenue less the sum of Financial Expense, Impairment Loss, and
Operating Expense. This variable was used in Cull et al., (2011) and captures the extent that the
rm is able to generate net revenue from its assets.
Prot Margin is dened as the net operating income over nancial revenue. While somewhat
less used in the micronance literature, prot margin captures to what extent the organization
earns prot from its revenue-generating activities. Even though non-prot organizations do not
distribute their \prot", this measure still captures the ability of the rm to generate funds for its
maintenance and expansion.
3.1.2 Independent Variables
In the initial set of analyses, I look at the eects of initiating deposit-taking and thus the key
variable to capture is when a rm begins accepting deposits. However, I am also interested in how
this interacts with product market strategy. Finally, I am interested in how the product market
strategy relates to competition with for-prot peers in the country. Thus I dene the following
variables of interest:
After Deposits is an indicator variable which evaluates to one for years after the organization
rst takes deposits. Since I use models with xed eects at the rm level, this variable will capture
the eects of initiating taking deposits by a given rm.11 Table 2.6 shows the number of for-prots
11 There are only a couple of instances where a rm seems to stop taking deposits. The results are robust to not
including these rms. Further investigation would be necessary to verify whether these rms did indeed stop taking
deposits, and if so, to understand what happened in these instances.
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and non-prots that added deposit-taking during the sample period. It shows a sizeable sample
of organizations in each of the groups. In particular, there are 59 non-prots that added deposit-
taking and 79 that did not.
INSERT Table 2.6
Small to Big - After Deposits is the interaction of the After Deposits variable with an indicator
which is dened as one for organizations that began the sample period with an average loan size
that is less than $1; 000 and ended it with an average loan size that is more than $1; 000. For
instance, a rm will have a value of one for this variable if its average loan size was less than $1; 000
in 2003 and more than $1; 000 by 2012, although only for those years after when the rm began
accepting deposits.12 Since average loan balance is a common proxy for the wealth of the borrowers
being targeted (Cull et al., 2011), this variable captures organizations that are likely to be scaling
up to reach more prosperous borrowers.
Table 2.7 shows the number of for-prots and non-prots that are classied as going through
this scaling up process, and thus I again have a sizeable sample of organizations in each category,
with 37 non-prots that scale up. In addition, 18 of these 37 also added deposit-taking, as seen
in Table 2.8, and thus there are organizations in each desired category. More generally, Table 2.7
shows that a higher proportion of for-prots than non-prots scaled their average loan size up to
above $1000 (39% versus 27% in Table 2.7), added deposit-taking (65% versus 43% in Table 2.6),
and scaled up loans of those adding deposits (39% versus 30:5% in Table 2.8).
INSERT Table 2.7
INSERT Table 2.8
12 This dollar threshold was suggested by my industry contacts as a useful cut-o point. However, I investigated
the robustness of the results to use of alternative criteria, including cut-os based on the level and percentage changes
in the loan size over the period, and changes in loan size relative to the industry average. The results do not change
substantially using these alternatives.
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Percent For-Prot is a continuous variable which is dened as the ratio of the gross loan portfo-
lio of all for-prot MFIs in a given country and year over the total gross loan portfolio of all MFIs
in that country and year, where these loan amounts are dened from MIX Market. It captures the
extent to which peer rms in the country and year are for-prots.
Penetration is a continuous variable which is the ratio of the total number of borrowers of
all MFIs in a given country and year over the poor population in the country, where the poor
population is dened as those living below $3:10 a day.13 I checked the robustness of this measure
with that provided in the online data appendix by the authors of the Martinez and Krauss (2015)
paper, and originally developed by Krauss et al., (2012).14
3.1.3 Firm Controls
I include a number of controls at the rm level. First, while I use the decision to begin accepting
deposits as the key variable of interest, I also add controls for the extent to which the rm utilizes
deposits and the \type" (compulsory or not) of deposits being used. Specically, I employ the
following variables: Deposits to Assets, the ratio of total deposits to total assets, and Compulsory
Deposits Only, which evaluates to one for rms that only accept compulsory deposits, as such
deposits provide collateral as opposed to a primary source of MFI funding. I expect that rms
that only accept compulsory deposits will have dierent outcomes, given that the organizational
requirements and reasons for taking deposits are dierent for these rms.
In addition, I want to control for the size of the organization and the average loan size, as
there may be scale eects with regards to both of these measures. Number of Borrowers captures
the total number of borrowers that a rm makes loans to in a given year. This variable captures
the eect of organizational scale. Average Loan Balance is the average loan balance carried by a
borrower in the rm and year. Because larger loans are often thought to be more cost ecient
(in terms of loan administrative costs), this variable is a key control in evaluating the eects of
13 The data on the number of borrowers comes from MIX Market and the data on the poor population in the
country comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
14 The data can be accessed and downloaded by the public: http://www.cmf.uzh.ch/penetrationdata.html.
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deposit-taking.
3.1.4 Country Controls
In terms of the country controls, I rst want to control for characteristics that capture the state
of micronance in the country. Sum of Gross Loan Portfolio is the total gross loan portfolio of
all MFIs in a given country and year, measured in US Dollars. I also include as controls the two
measures of competition mentioned above, Percent of Loans made by For-prots and Borrowers as
a percentage of the poor population.
In addition, I want to control for demographic and macroeconomic conditions which can in-
uence the performance of micronance institutions in a given country and year. Unemployment,
Urban, and Female percent of the population capture demographic characteristics of the popula-
tion: the percentage of the population that is unemployed, the percentage that lives in urban
environments, and the percentage that is female. Ination rate, GDP growth, and Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) capture the changing health of the country in a macroeconomic sense. These
variables are dened as the annual ination rate, the annual growth rate of GDP, and the net inow
of foreign direct investment in US dollars.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2.1 shows that, over the sample of ten years, the industry as a whole is growing in terms of
the total loan amount across all rms. In addition, the increased commercialization in the industry
is also reected in my data, as captured by the increasing share of loans being made by for-prot
institutions.
INSERT Figure 2.1
In addition, Figure 2.2 shows the growth of deposit-taking by both for-prot and non-prots
organizations.
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INSERT Figure 2.2
In Table 2.2, I provide basic summary statistics of a subsample of the variables in my full sam-
ple, breaking out the sample by prot status, in order to illustrate the dierent models generally
pursued by for-prots and non-prots. In addition, I provide the T-test values for dierences in the
pooled sample as well as the T-statistics from a regression of the variable on the non-prot dummy,
with country-year xed eects. In other words, the T-test examines if the means provided are dif-
ferent whereas the T-statistic considers whether non-prots and for-prots have dierent values for
these variables within a given country and year. I nd that a number of relationships are consistent
with what I would expect. First, non-prots are signicantly smaller, in terms of assets, gross loan
portfolio, number of active borrowers, and personnel. In addition, non-prots make smaller loans
and target a higher percentage of female borrowers.15 Non-prots also utilize dierent approaches
to nancing, as they tend to be less leveraged and have lower values of operational self-suciency.
INSERT Table 2.2
In Tables 2.3A and 2.3B, I then breakdown the same variables by whether or not the organiza-
tions take deposits, separately for non-prots and for-prots. Many of the same relationships hold
between deposit-taking and non-deposit-taking institutions as held between for-prots and non-
prots. In other words, deposit-taking institutions more closely resemble for-prot organizations,
in that they are larger, make larger loans, target a lower percentage of female borrowers and are
more leveraged. This is consistent with the notion that deposit-taking tends to better t with the
for-prot business model.
INSERT Table 2.3A
INSERT Table 2.3B
15 The dierence in targeting of female borrowers is only statistically signicant when I control for country-year
eects.
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3.3 Analysis
In Tables 2.10A and 2.10B, I explore the eects of deposit-taking on operating and nancial ex-
penses for for-prot and non-prot rms, respectively. Using rm xed eects, I run the ratio of
operating expenses to loan portfolio, Model 1, and nancial expenses to assets, Model 2, on controls
for deposit-taking.
In Model 1, non-prots have an increase in operating expenses when they begin accepting
deposits, as captured by the positive and signicant coecient on After Deposits, supporting Hy-
pothesis 1a for non-prot organizations. I do not nd such a signicant operating expense eect of
deposit-taking for for-prot organizations in Table 2.10A. However, since the coecient magnitude
of that variable is larger than for non-prot organizations, I do not nd convincing evidence in
support of Hypothesis 1b. In addition, non-prots have lower nancial expenses as captured by
the negative and signicant coecient on Deposits to Assets. Since the eect on nancial expenses
is one of lowering the marginal cost of raising external funding, it makes sense that this eect
should be on Deposits to Assets as it will lower the cost more depending on the extent to which
deposits are used as a source of funding. Again in Table 2.10A, there is no signicant eect but
the magnitude is of the same size for for-prots, again indicating the Hypothesis 1a is supported
for non-prot organizations but Hypothesis 1b cannot be conclusively supported.
INSERT Table 2.10A
INSERT Table 2.10B
In Tables 2.11A and 2.11B, I look at the eect of deposit-taking in for-prot and non-prot
organizations, respectively, by running the regression of the three performance variables, Opera-
tional Self-Suciency, Return on Assets, and Prot Margin in Models 1, 2, and 3 on the indicator
for whether or not the organization takes deposits, as well as the amount of deposits to assets.
I nd that on average, deposit-taking among non-prot organizations seems to lower Operational
Self-Suciency and Return on Assets, through the negative coecient on Deposits to Assets and
82
the deposits indicator, respectively.
INSERT Table 2.11A
INSERT Table 2.11B
In Tables 2.12A and 2.12B, I examine whether the eect diers in for-prot and non-prot
organizations that scale up their operations at the same time, by adding in the control for deposit-
taking by organizations that scale up. In Table 12B, the negative coecients on Deposits to assets
and the deposit taking indicator for non-prots hold in Models 1 and 2, but there is a positive
coecient for the organizations that scale up. The magnitudes imply that the net eect for non-
prot organizations that scale up is positive, so non-prots that scale up their operations see an
improvement in Operational Self-Suciency and Return on Assets. In addition, they also improve
in Prot Margin. However, I nd no such complementarities in for-prot organizations in Table
2.12A, so Hypothesis 2a holds only for non-prot organizations. These two results together, how-
ever, are supportive of Hypothesis 2b.
INSERT Table 2.12A
INSERT Table 2.12B
Finally, in Tables 2.13 and 2.14, I analyze whether this eect of scaling up is moderated by com-
petition with or augmented by legitimacy from for-prots by including controls for the average loan
dierence as described in the data section. In other words, if the competitive eect dominates the
legitimacy eect, I expect that scaling up may lead to lower performance gains if the organization
has more overlap in terms of borrowers targeted with for-prot organizations in the same country
and year. In Table 2.13B, the positive coecient on deposit-taking by scaling up organizations
remains in Model 1. However, I also nd that deposit-taking non-prot institutions that scale up
do worse the larger the percentage of loans made by for-prot organizations in the country and
year. In other words, the complementarities still hold for non-prot organizations, however, the
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performance eect may be mitigated by competitive concerns. Thus, I nd support for Hypotheses
3 in non-prot organizations, in terms of the moderation of the positive performance eect due
to loss of dierentiation from for-prot competitors. In Table 2.14b, I nd a similar result with a
positive coecient on the interaction of deposit-taking and scaling up, but a negative coecient
on deposit-taking and penetration. Thus, the gains to deposit-taking are smaller the more the
country's poor borrowers are already served by the micronance market.
INSERT Table 2.13A
INSERT Table 2.13B
INSERT Table 2.14A
INSERT Table 2.14B
4 Discussion and Conclusion
4.1 Robustness and Limitations
This study provides a look at how prot status plays a role in the business models and product
market characteristics that an organization pursues. As a result of these dierences, the perfor-
mance implications from adopting business tools may dier. In particular, I nd complementarities
between adopting deposits and scaling up loan size in non-prot organizations, but do not nd
them in for-prot organizations. In addition, this complementarity is moderated by competition
with for-prot organizations. Deposit-taking requires more change in the non-prot business model,
and thus attempting to utilize this for-prot business tool without making simultaneous product
market changes is ineective at improving nancial performance.
There are a number of alternative explanations, a few of which are examined below, as well as
limitations which present valuable avenues for future research. First, because of data limitations, I
focus on a purposefully selected subsample of data. However, acquiring better data would assuage
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concerns of sample selection. Some recent work in micronance has utilized data from ratings agency
(Baquero et al., 2012), and verifying these results with alternate sources would be a useful endeavor.
My data is also limited in that I cannot look at changes in prot status, and understanding how
organizations that transform their legal status dier in the use of deposit-taking, as well as the
resulting performance implications, would provide an additional layer of depth. Finally, while I
control for country dierences and use rm xed eects, one mechanism through which deposit-
taking changes the business model of non-prot organizations is through additional regulation.
This eect would then dier by how onerous the regulation is and the type of regulation that the
non-prot becomes subject to by taking deposits. Thus, one potential avenue for future research is
to examine whether the ndings presented dier according to the regulatory regime in the country,
or to examine the eect of regulatory changes.
4.1.1 Adverse Selection
While my results look at xed eects at the rm level and should to some extent control for prior
performance, there is still concern that there is adverse selection in the organizations that take de-
posits, as perhaps non-prots only begin accepting deposits if they are struggling to get donations.
I thus consider the determinants of deposit-taking by prot status in Table 2.9. I only consider the
rst year that an organization took deposits as I am investigating the decision to take deposits as a
long-term choice and not a year-by-year decision. Thus, I drop all observations after the rst-year
that an organization took deposits and regress the deposit-taking indicator on rm and country
variables with a one year lag. Table 2.9 presents the results with year indicators and estimated with
a Probit model as the dependent variable is an indicator. Model 1 presents the results for for-prot
organizations and Model 2 presents the results for non-prot organizations. I nd that a larger
average loan size in the prior year is positively and signicantly associated with deposit-taking for
for-prots but negatively, although not statistically signicant, associated with deposit-taking for
non-prots. However, I do not nd evidence that non-prots that accept deposits were performing
worse prior to accepting deposits, although I do nd evidence that better performing for-prots in
terms of operational self-suciency are more likely to accept deposits in the following year. Thus,
while there are dierences between for-prots and non-prots in the decision to accept deposits
which merit further consideration, the concern about adverse selection among non-prots does not
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seem to explain my results.
INSERT Table 2.9
4.1.2 Alternative Performance Measures
While the results are supportive of the notion that non-prot organizations need to change borrow-
ers targeted in order to benet from adoption of deposit-taking in terms of nancial performance,
another possible explanation is that the objectives of organizations which scale up are dierent from
those that do not. In other words, perhaps those non-prots that scale up their operations have a
goal of improving nancial performance, whereas non-prots that do not scale up their operations
have a dierent objective and thus improvements may occur in dimensions besides nancial perfor-
mance. To address these concerns, I look at the number of borrowers reached and the average loan
balance per borrower as a function of whether the organization scaled up and whether the organi-
zation added deposits in just non-prot organizations in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. Figure 2.3 provides
further suggestive evidence of the complementarities found in my paper, as non-prots that scaled
up and took deposits saw growth in the number of borrowers, whereas those that did not scale up
and added deposits saw less growth in the number of borrowers as compared to those that also did
not scale up but did not add deposits. In other words, this graph supports the existence of comple-
mentarity between scaling up and accepting deposits as the two types of organizations that have the
most growth in the number of borrowers reached are those that made both changes and those that
made neither. In addition, it does not seem that non-prots that stayed small and added deposits
were able to reach lower income borrowers as compared to those that stayed small but did not add
deposits as the average loan balance of these two groups follows a similar path as seen in Figure 2.4.
INSERT Figure 2.3
INSERT Figure 2.4
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4.1.3 Type of Deposits
The prior discussion does not address the fact that non-prots may utilize deposits dierently.
However, in all regressions, I control for whether the organization only uses compulsory deposits
and the ratio of deposits to assets to control for the type of deposits and the extent to which
they are relied on. I do nd some evidence that dierent types of deposits have dierent eects.
For instance, in Table 2.10B, the use of solely compulsory deposits has a positive eect on return
on assets, but a signicantly negative eect on prot margin. This is likely due to the fact that
those organizations that use only compulsory deposits have a much smaller average loan balance,
and thus make less protable loans. The negative eect on prot margin is found in Tables 2.11B
and 2.12B as well. Thus, while I control for the use of deposits in this way, understanding the
mechanisms and eects of this type of deposit-taking is a useful area of future research.
4.2 Conclusion
\We provide a broader range of services than for-prots...What you have seen in micronance is
entities focusing on what they have been most successful at, not just in terms of protability but in
terms of growth...dene success as growth." (Source 1, Investment Ocer at Micronance Network)
Non-prot and for-prot micronance institutions on average target dierent populations and
utilize dierent business models. In this paper, I show that non-prots that begin taking deposits
only benet nancially from this adoption if they also begin making larger loans. This suggests
that changes in non-prots' activities may require change in positioning to improve nancial per-
formance. This may be coming from a number of dierent factors, including complementarity
in organizational structure, accountability to new stakeholders, and consistency in organizational
logic. More broadly, it supports the literature on the importance of t between product market
strategy and business model (Zott & Amit, 2008), which suggests extra managerial attention be
paid to whether and how to adopt activities which change the business model.
In addition, this result is moderated by the amount of competition in the same country and
year, particularly when that competition is with for-prot organizations. As a result, it is unclear
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whether there will be any benet to adoption of deposit-taking and scaling up loan size in the future
as non-prots face increasing competition from for-prot organizations and donations continue to
decline. In other words, my results are perhaps cause for concern in that they suggest non-prots
need to compete like a for-prot and with for-prots by making simultaneous nancing and loan
size changes, but that they will suer the more they overlap with for-prots. Importantly, both
for-prots and non-prots begin accepting deposits during this period, and in future work, I plan
to consider the diusion of this source of nancing. In particular, this paper can be thought of as
the rst step in analyzing a relevant and novel question: when a product or practice emerges which
is a better t with a competing business model, should it be adopted?
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Table 2.1A: Variable Descriptions for Firm-Level Variables 
Variable Source Description 
Non-Profit Indicator (0 or 
1) MIX Market 
An indicator capturing whether the firm identifies 
as a non-profit. 
Deposits (Millions of $s) MIX Market 
 
Total deposits, whether voluntary, compulsory, 
retail or institutional. 
Portfolio at risk - 30 days 
(%) MIX Market 
 
The value of all loans outstanding that are past due 
more than 30 days over the total loan portfolio.  
Gross loan portfolio 
(Millions of $s) MIX Market 
 
All outstanding principals due for all outstanding 
client loans.  
Percent of Female 
Borrowers (%) MIX Market 
 
Number of active borrowers who are female over 
total number of borrowers. 
Operational Self-Sufficiency MIX Market 
Financial Revenue over the sum of Financial 
Expense, Impairment Loss, and Operating 
Expense. 
Return on Assets MIX Market 
Net operating income, less taxes, over assets, where 
net operating income is defined as Financial 
Revenue less the sum of Financial Expense, 
Impairment Loss, and Operating Expense. 
Profit Margin MIX Market Net operating income over financial revenue. 
After Deposits 
MIX 
Market/Author 
An indicator which is defined to be 1 for a firm in 
all years after it first has a positive deposits amount.
Small to Big 
MIX 
Market/Author 
An indicator which is defined to be 1 for 
organizations that have a loan size less than $1,000 
in their first year and more than $1,000 in their last 
year. 
Loan Difference 
MIX 
Market/Author 
The difference between the average loan balance 
per borrower and the average value of this variable 
for for-profit organizations in the same country-
year. 
Deposits to Assets MIX Market The total amount of deposits over the total assets. 
Compulsory Deposits Only 
MIX 
Market/Author 
An indicator which is defined to be 1 for 
organizations that only use compulsory deposits. 
Number of Active 
Borrowers (thousands) MIX Market 
The number of individuals or entities who currently 
have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI. 
Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower (thousands) MIX Market 
Gross loan portfolio over number of active 
borrowers. 
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Table 2.1B: Variable Descriptions for Country-Level Variables 
Variable Source Description 
Sum of Gross Loan 
Portfolio ($) 
MIX Market/Author The sum of the gross loan portfolio of all firms in a 
given country and year. 
Percent of Total Loans by 
For-Profits (%) 
MIX Market/Author The percentage of the total loans in a given 
country-year which are accounted for by a firm 
classified as a for-profit. 
Borrowers as a percentage 
of the poor population (%) 
MIX 
Market/WDI/Author
Defined as the sum of the total number of 
borrowers served by all firms in a given country 
and year over the product of the population and 
the percentage of the population living on under 
$3.10 per day. 
Unemployment (%) WDI The percentage of the population in a country and 
year which are classified as unemployed. 
Urban (%) WDI The percentage of the population in a country and 
year which reside in an urban environment. 
Female (%) WDI The percentage of the population in a country and 
year which are female. 
Inflation Rate WDI Foreign direct investment in a given country and 
year, net inflows (% of GDP). 
GDP Growth WDI GDP growth in a given country and year (annual 
%) . 
FDI WDI Foreign direct investment in a given country and 
year, net inflows (% of GDP). 
 
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics, Differences by Profit Status 
For-Profit Non-Profit T-test T-stat 
Assets (Millions) 100.000 30.800 9.00*** 9.48*** 
Gross Loan Portfolio (Millions) 79.000 23.800 9.74*** 10.51*** 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower / GNI Per 
Capita 0.777 0.450 1.96* 2.55** 
Portfolio at Risk - 30 Days 0.064 0.073 2.88*** 5.05*** 
Number of Active Borrowers (Thousands) 64.797 16.966 11.57*** 8.67*** 
Percent of Female Borrowers 0.626 0.627 0.22 7.65*** 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 1.146 1.138 0.5 2.66*** 
Capital to Asset Ratio 0.308 0.382 7.88*** 10.02*** 
Debt to Equity 3.940 3.340 0.68 1.86* 
Yield on Gross Portfolio - Real 0.368 0.263 13.11*** 1.59
Personnel 478.269 123.489 13.78*** 10.91*** 
Administrative Expenses to Assets^ 0.104 0.096 1.06 2.95*** 
^ Sign of non-profit dummy is opposite from difference in summary statistics for this variable. 
Number of Observations 2306 1428 
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Table 2.3A - Summary Statistics: Differences by Deposit-Taking and Profit Status 
Non-profit 
No Deposits Deposit-taking T-test T-stat 
Assets (Millions) 18.14 72.34 9.54*** 9.66*** 
Gross Loan Portfolio (Millions) 14.11 55.91 9.70*** 9.84*** 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower / GNI Per 
Capita 0.41 0.57 3.35*** 5.38*** 
Portfolio at Risk - 30 Days 0.08 0.07 2.08** 0.11
Number of Active Borrowers (Thousands) 13.40 28.05 6.17*** 7.08*** 
Percent of Female of Borrowers 0.65 0.56 8.05*** 9.31*** 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 1.14 1.15 0.41 1.13
Capital to Asset Ratio 0.42 0.25 13.33*** 10.77*** 
Debt to Equity 3.03 4.29 1.89* 1.71* 
Yield on Gross Portfolio - Real 0.29 0.21 9.46*** 11.35*** 
Personnel 95.40 210.92 8.18*** 9.12*** 
Administrative Expenses to Assets^ 0.11 0.07 2.78*** 1.60
^ Sign of deposit-taking dummy is opposite from difference in summary statistics for this variable. 
Observations 1772 534 
 
Table 2.3B- Summary Statistics: Differences by Deposit-Taking and Profit Status 
For-profit 
No Deposits Deposit-taking T-test T-stat 
Assets (Millions) 46.94 208.31 8.68*** 6.22*** 
Gross Loan Portfolio (Millions) 39.47 160.91 8.91*** 6.84*** 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower / GNI Per 
Capita 0.74 0.84 0.22 0.36
Portfolio at Risk - 30 Days 0.07 0.06 1.16 0.12
Number of Active Borrowers (Thousands) 49.97 93.94 4.21*** 3.68*** 
Percent of Female of Borrowers 0.62 0.63 0.44 1.83* 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 1.15 1.13 0.84 1.14
Capital to Asset Ratio 0.35 0.22 9.09*** 8.44*** 
Debt to Equity 3.94 3.94 0.00 0.41
Yield on Gross Portfolio - Real 0.40 0.33 4.47*** 3.47*** 
Personnel 336.91 751.10 6.35*** 4.44*** 
Administrative Expenses to Assets^ 0.12 0.09 5.40*** 2.65*** 
Observations 963 465 
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Table 2.4: Number of Firms by Country 
Country Non-Profit For-Profit Percent Non-Profit 
Argentina 11 8 57.89% 
Bolivia 18 10 64.29% 
Brazil 33 16 67.35% 
Chile 4 3 57.14% 
Colombia 30 12 71.43% 
Costa Rica 17 1 94.44% 
Dominican 
Republic 9 5 64.29% 
Ecuador 54 5 91.53% 
El Salvador 11 7 61.11% 
Guatemala 22 1 95.65% 
Haiti 5 3 62.50% 
Honduras 15 12 55.56% 
Jamaica 3 3 50.00% 
Mexico 12 73 14.12% 
Nicaragua 23 12 65.71% 
Panama 2 4 33.33% 
Paraguay 3 4 42.86% 
Peru 45 26 63.38% 
Total 317 205 61.81% 
 
 
Table 2.5: Number of Firms by Time in Sample 
Years Non-Profit For-Profit Total 
10 67 43 110 
9 35 14 49 
8 36 18 54 
7 24 14 38 
6 33 19 52 
5 34 25 59 
4 31 23 54 
3 31 23 54 
2 20 14 34 
1 6 12 18 
Total 317 205 522 
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Table 2.7: Number of Firms by Loan Switch in Sub-Sample 
Non-Profit For-Profit Total 
Small to Big 
1 37 29 66 
0 101 46 147 
Total 138 75 213 
 
 
 
Table 2.8: Number of Firms by Deposit and Loan Switch in Sub-Sample 
Non-Profit For-Profit Total 
Small to Big Added Deposits 
1 1 18 19 36 
1 0 19 10 29 
0 1 41 30 72 
0 0 60 16 76 
Total 138 75 213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.6: Number of Firms by Deposit Switch in Sub-Sample 
Non-Profit For-Profit Total 
Added Deposits 
1 59 49 108 
0 79 26 105 
Total 138 75 213 
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Table 2.9: Determinants of Deposit-Taking by Profit Status 
Model 1 Model 2 
For-Profit Non-Profit 
-------------------- ---------------- --------------- 
Assets -1.44 48.96** 
(13.49) (19.16) 
Number of Borrowers -0.01 -0.04** 
(0.01) (0.02) 
Average Loan Balance 6.21** -0.40 
(2.73) (0.41) 
Portfolio at Risk - 30 days -30.51 0.20 
(20.24) (2.05) 
Operational Self Sufficiency 8.53* 0.02 
(4.37) (0.38) 
Debt to Assets 7.01* -0.50 
(3.61) (0.66) 
Constant 35.82 59.32* 
(41.20) (35.61) 
-------------------- --------------- --------------- 
Observations 143 334 
Year Indicators Yes Yes 
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.573 0.300 
-------------------- ---------------- --------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.10A: Expense Effects of Deposit-Taking in For-Profits 
Model 1 Model 2 
Operating Expenses/Loan 
Portfolio
Financial 
Expense/assets 
----------------- ------------------ ----------------- 
After Deposits 0.12 0.00 
(0.11) (0.01) 
Deposits to Assets -0.15 -0.02 
(0.26) (0.01) 
Compulsory Deposits 
Only -0.12 0.00 
(0.15) (0.01) 
Number of Borrowers  0.00 -0.00*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Average Loan Balance 0.03 0.00 
(0.03) (0.00) 
% by For-Profits -0.80*** 0.00 
(0.22) (0.01) 
Penetration 0.01** 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -27.73 -2.41*** 
(17.28) (0.92) 
----------------- ------------------ ----------------- 
Observations 574 574 
Number of Firms 72 72 
Year Indicators Yes Yes 
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.079 0.081 
----------------- ------------------ ----------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.10B: Expense Effects of Deposit-Taking in Non-Profits 
Model 1 Model 2 
Operating Expenses/Loan 
Portfolio
Financial 
Expense/assets 
----------------- ------------------ ----------------- 
After Deposits 0.06** 0.00 
(0.02) (0.01) 
Deposits to Assets -0.03 -0.02* 
(0.05) (0.01) 
Compulsory Deposits 
Only -0.03 0.01* 
(0.02) (0.00) 
Number of Borrowers  0.00 -0.00* 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Average Loan Balance 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) 
% by For-Profits 0.02 0.01 
(0.04) (0.01) 
Penetration 0.00 0.00** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 3.78 -0.51 
(3.96) (0.84) 
----------------- ------------------ ----------------- 
Observations 922 921 
Number of Firms 134 134 
Year Indicators Yes Yes 
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.113 0.089 
----------------- ------------------ ----------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.11A: Performance Effect of Deposit-Taking in For-Profits 
Model  1 Model 2 Model 3
Return on 
Assets
Operational Self 
Sufficiency
Number of Active 
Borrowers
------------------ ------------------ --------------- -----------------
After Deposits -0.01 -0.02 66.50***
(0.03) (0.04) (23.37)
Deposits to Assets 0.05 0.00 -112.68**
(0.06) (0.08) (49.86)
Compulsory Deposits 
Only 0.00 -0.05 -27.92
(0.03) (0.05) (30.90)
Number of Borrowers  -0.00* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Loan Balance -0.01 0.00 -14.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (6.82)
% by For-Profits 0.17*** 0.20***     101.97**
(0.05) (0.07) (49.58)
Penetration 0.00 0.00 -0.15
(0.00) (0.00) (1.03)
Constant 4.18 0.39 9720.38**
(4.03) (5.55) (3771.33)
------------------ ------------------ --------------- -----------------
Observations 574 581 616
Number of Firms 72 72 72
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.062 0.108 0.201
------------------ ------------------ --------------- -----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.11B: Performance Effect of Deposit-Taking in Non-Profits 
Model  1 Model 2 Model 3
Return on 
Assets
Operational Self 
Sufficiency
Number of Active 
Borrowers
------------------ ------------------ --------------- -----------------
After Deposits -0.03** -0.07 -7.91*
(0.02) (0.07) (4.71)
Deposits to Assets 0.03 -0.16 16.62*
(0.03) (0.14) (8.76)
Compulsory Deposits 
Only 0.03** 0.06 3.80
(0.01) (0.06) (4.57)
Number of Borrowers  0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Loan Balance 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.00) (0.01) (0.46)
% by For-Profits 0.03 -0.11 29.72***
(0.03) (0.12) (8.78)
Penetration 0.00 0.00 -1.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.20)
Constant 0.37 1.56 2731.51***
(2.50) (10.92) (760.63)
------------------ ------------------ --------------- -----------------
Observations 921 953 1006
Number of Firms 134 134 134
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.057 0.041 0.252
------------------ ------------------ --------------- -----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.12A: Synergies with Deposit-Taking in For-Profits 
Model  1 Model 2 Model 3
Return on 
Assets
Operational Self 
Sufficiency
Number of Active 
Borrowers
----------------- ------------------- ---------------- ----------------
After Deposits -0.01 0.01 106.69***
(0.03) (0.05) (28.55)
Small to Big*After 
Deposits         -0.01 -0.06 -84.86**
(0.05) (0.06) (34.96)
Deposits to Assets 0.04 -0.02 -134.50***
(0.06) (0.09) (50.43)
Compulsory Deposits Only 0.00 -0.06 -41.72
(0.03) (0.05) (31.27)
Number of Borrowers  -0.00* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Loan Balance -0.01 0.00 -13.41**
(0.01) (0.01) (6.79)
% by For-Profits 0.17*** 0.20*** 96.09*
(0.05) (0.07) (49.41)
Penetration 0.00 0.00 -0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (1.03)
Constant 4.05 -0.49 8638.08**
(4.09) (5.63) (3780.17)
----------------- ------------------- ---------------- ----------------
Observations 574 581 616
Number of Firms 72 72 72
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.062 0.11 0.21
----------------- ------------------- ---------------- ----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.12B: Synergies with Deposit-Taking in Non-Profits 
Model  1 Model 2 Model 3
Return on 
Assets
Operational Self 
Sufficiency
Number of Active 
Borrowers
------------------ ------------------ --------------- -----------------
After Deposits -0.03** -0.07 -8.32*
(0.01) (0.07) (4.72)
Small to Big*After 
Deposits     0.13*** 0.22 8.71
(0.04) (0.15) (6.52)
Deposits to Assets 0.01 -0.21 11.97
(0.03) (0.15) (9.42)
Compulsory Deposits Only 0.03** 0.05 3.72
(0.01) (0.06) (4.57)
Number of Borrowers  0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Loan Balance 0.00 0.00 0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.46)
% by For-Profits 0.03 -0.12 29.66***
(0.03) (0.12) (8.77)
Penetration 0.00 0.00 -1.17***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.20)
Constant 2.64 6.40 2857.58***
(2.57) (11.42) (766.10)
------------------ ------------------ --------------- -----------------
Observations 921 953 1006
Number of Firms 134 134 134
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.072 0.043 0.253
------------------ ------------------ --------------- -----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.13A: For-Profit Competition from Deposit-Taking in For-Profits 
Model  1 Model 2 Model 3
Return on 
Assets
Operational Self 
Sufficiency
Number of Active 
Borrowers
-------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
After Deposits 0.32*** 0.28*** 191.84***
(0.07) (0.09) (58.71)
Small to Big*After Deposits -0.01 0.03 -70.87
(0.08) (0.12) (82.77)
After Deposits*% For-Profit -0.56*** -0.48*** -147.60*
(0.10) (0.14) (84.82)
After Deposits*Small to Big*% 
For-Profit 0.05 -0.10 -6.19
(0.12) (0.16) (115.13)
Deposits to Assets 0.02 -0.04 -126.04**
(0.06) (0.09) (51.06)
Compulsory Deposits Only -0.02 -0.07 -48.52
(0.03) (0.05) (31.51)
Number of Borrowers  -0.00*** -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Loan Balance -0.01 0.00 -12.14*
(0.01) (0.01) (6.81)
% by For-Profits 0.54*** 0.53*** 181.65***
-0.08 -0.11 -65.78
Penetration 0.00 0.00 0.09
(0.00) (0.00) -1.03
Constant 8.05** 2.63 9827.94**
(4.00) (5.60) (3821.56)
-------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Observations 574 581 616
Number of Firms 72 72 72
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.13 0.142 0.215
-------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.13B: For-Profit Competition from Deposit-Taking in Non-Profits 
Model  1 Model 2 Model 3
Return on 
Assets
Operational Self 
Sufficiency
Number of Active 
Borrowers
-------------------- ---------------- --------------- -----------------
After Deposits -0.03 -0.19 -1.17
(0.04) (0.18) (12.28)
Small to Big*After Deposits 0.24*** 0.34 -18.14
(0.05) (0.24) (13.62)
After Deposits*% For-Profit 0.00 0.18 -12.77
(0.05) (0.24) (16.82)
After Deposits*Small to Big*% 
For-Profit -0.20*** -0.22 49.70**
(0.07) (0.33) (22.11)
Deposits to Assets 0.01 -0.19 11.40
(0.03) (0.15) (9.57)
Compulsory Deposits Only 0.02 0.05 5.47
(0.01) (0.06) (4.63)
Number of Borrowers  0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Loan Balance 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.46)
% by For-Profits 0.04 -0.16 30.39***
(0.03) (0.14) (9.94)
Penetration 0.00 0.00 -1.17***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.20)
Constant 1.45 5.23 3183.84***
(2.59) (11.61) (779.40)
-------------------- ---------------- --------------- -----------------
Observations 921 953 1006
Number of Firms 134 134 134
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.083 0.044 0.258
-------------------- ---------------- --------------- -----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2.14A: Competition from Deposit-Taking in For-Profits 
Model  1 Model 2 Model 3
Return on 
Assets
Operational Self 
Sufficiency
Number of Active 
Borrowers
-------------------- --------------- ----------------- ----------------
After Deposits 0.03 0.06 116.15***
(0.04) (0.06) (35.06)
Small to Big*After Deposits -0.05 -0.18** -153.39***
(0.06) (0.08) (46.64)
After Deposits*Penetration 0.00 0.00 -0.13
(0.00) (0.00) (1.04)
After Deposits*Small to 
Big*Penetration 0.00 0.00** 2.03**
(0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
Deposits to Assets 0.08 0.03 -119.09**
(0.07) (0.09) (52.68)
Compulsory Deposits Only 0.00 -0.07 -42.91
(0.03) (0.05) (31.72)
Number of Borrowers  -0.00* -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Loan Balance -0.01 0.00 -13.48**
(0.01) (0.01) (6.78)
% by For-Profits 0.18***       0.20*** 92.17*
-0.05 -0.07 -49.26
Penetration 0.00 0.00 -0.81
(0.00) (0.00) -1.24
Constant 4.06 -0.61 8698.69**
(4.09) (5.62) (3771.43)
-------------------- --------------- ----------------- ----------------
Observations 574 581 616
Number of Firms 72 72 72
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.065 0.119 0.218
-------------------- --------------- ----------------- ----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
Table 2.14B: Competition from Deposit-Taking in Non-Profits 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Return on 
Assets
Operational Self 
Sufficiency
Number of Active 
Borrowers
-------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
After Deposits -0.02 0.02 -14.95***
(0.02) (0.08) (5.26)
Small to Big*After Deposits 0.12*** 0.16 16.80**
(0.04) (0.16) (7.36)
After Deposits*Penetration -0.00** -0.01*** 0.38***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.14)
After Deposits*Small to 
Big*Penetration 0.00 0.00 -0.35**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.16)
Deposits to Assets 0.03 -0.06 8.85
(0.03) (0.15) (9.66)
Compulsory Deposits Only 0.03** 0.05 3.56
(0.01) (0.06) (4.55)
Number of Borrowers  0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Average Loan Balance 0.00 0.00 -0.05
(0.00) (0.01) (0.46)
% by For-Profits 0.02 -0.16 31.50***
(0.03) (0.12) (8.79)
Penetration 0.00** 0.00 -1.31***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.21)
Constant 2.31 3.85 3053.61***
(2.56) (11.36) (766.63)
-------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Observations 921 953 1006
Number of Firms 134 134 134
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.081 0.059 0.26
-------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Chapter 3 
 
Employee Incentives in Microfinance Institutions:  
Examining the Importance of Diversification and Profit Status  
 
ABSTRACT 
Non-profits across the economy are being pressured to take on the human resource management practices of 
for-profits, including the use of pay-for-performance.  However, the use of pay-for-performance and 
competitive salaries is often thought to conflict with the non-profit business model, due to multidimensional 
organizational objectives and the effect of monetary incentives on intrinsically motivated employees.  In this 
paper, I argue that performance-based pay can actually be effective if non-profit employees are driven by 
both the intrinsic value of the mission and a relational contract with the firm, wherein performance-based pay 
serves as a signal of organizational mission, rather than an effort-inducing financial incentive.  The context of 
this paper is the microfinance industry, with data that includes observations on both for-profit and non-profit 
firms and variables that capture both financial and social goals.  This data allows me to examine the ways in 
which non-profits utilize employee incentives and how they compare with for-profits in the same industry.  I 
find that non-profit organizations, on average, pay employees less and utilize a lower level of performance-
based pay.  Further, non-profit organizations that target lower income borrowers reward employees on more 
dimensions than other microfinance firms.  Even controlling for the products and services that firms offer, 
some differences in employee compensation between for-profit and non-profit organizations remain.  This 
result suggests that neither the explanation of intrinsic motivation of employees nor the distinct products and 
services offered completely explain the different salary structures in non-profit organizations; rather different 
incentive dimensions may be used to signal the non-profits’ goals.   
Keywords: non-profit strategy; pay-for-performance; microfinance 
1 Introduction
Performance-based pay is used much less often in practice than would be expected based on its
predicted advantages from agency theory (Zenger, 1992; Larkin et al., 2012). Two key reasons
that performance-based pay may be used less often is that it may crowd out employees' intrinsic
motivation (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) and the goals of the organization may not be able to be
precisely dened in advance (Baker, 1992). Both of these factors are frequently important in the
non-prot sector, where pay-for-performance is particularly scarce (Ben-Ner et al., 2011). However,
in this paper, I argue that these two factors can interact in a counter-intuitive manner and in fact
allow non-prot organizations to utilize employee incentives to eectively signal the goals of the
organization.
Classic results from the economics-based, agency theory view of pay-for-performance suggest
that explicit contracts can be made when there are performance metrics that are measurable and
can be specied in advance, as exemplied by the piece rate system studied in Lazear (2000).
However, this literature suggests that rewarding proxies for the desired outcome, rather than the
desired outcome itself, can backre as employees focus their attention on the rewarded outcome
(Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Gibbons, 1998). Hence, the alignment between the performance
metric and the organizational goal is key to evaluating the eects of pay-for-performance.1
Related papers argue that when the desired outcome cannot be specied in advance, subjec-
tive contracts based on repeated interactions can be utilized (Baker et al., 1994). The non-prot
setting is often characterized by such dicult to measure, and sometimes even contradictory, or-
ganizational goals (Jager & Mitterlechner, 2004). The non-distribution constraint that non-prots
must follow, prohibiting prot from being distributed to \owners", may facilitate a level of trust
that enables these organizations to obtain donations, from both external donors and employees
(Hansmann, 1980), including through relational contracts. By relational contract, I mean \collab-
oration sustained by the shadow of the future" (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). Because relational
1 Other distortions can occur, such as if the reward system is nonlinear, as shown in Oyer (1998) and Larkin
(2007), but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
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contracts are thus built on trust, the non-distribution constraint allows relational contracts to be
a key element of the non-prot human resource system. A greater reliance on relational contracts
is consistent with a lower prevalence or a weaker steepness of incentive of performance-based pay
(Grossberg & Sicilian, 2012).
Psychology literature suggests that when people are intrinsically motivated, extrinsic rewards
can actually backre by crowding out this intrinsic motivation, with the classic example coming
from the willingness to donate, rather than being paid for, blood (Titmuss, 1971). In particular,
the argument is that monetizing donated eorts diminishes the intrinsic motivation for donations.2
Empirical work has supported this eect, largely through lab (e.g., Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Ariely
et al., 2009), and eld (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a; 2000b) experiments, including one directly
testing Titmuss' original blood donation setting (Mellstrom & Johannesson, 2008).
There is still a debate about whether such crowd out eects apply in work settings (Gneezy
et al., 2011), even though some recent papers support crowding out in work environments. For
example, Hossain & Li (2014) nd that monetary rewards crowd out participation when a task
is described as prosocial but not when it is described as simply work, and Burbano (2016) nds
that employees are willing to accept a lower wage when working for a more socially responsible rm.
Non-prot organizations are frequently considered as having employees who are particularly
motivated by intrinsic motivation (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Francois, 2000). Hence, if non-prots
provide employees with nancial benets to \doing good", they may be particularly likely to re-
duce workers' motivation to support the organizations' goals. It is of particular interest to examine
employee compensation and such possible eects in a mixed industry, such as micronance, where
both non-prots and for-prots co-exist and compete.
In this paper, I argue that performance-based pay can actually be eective if non-prot em-
2 Note that this can reect either a reduction in motivation by the individuals or a change in who the individuals
are. Because my empirical work aggregates analysis from the individual to the rm level, I am not able to determine
to what extent each of these mechanisms is driving the results.
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ployees are driven by both the intrinsic value of the mission and a relational contract with the rm.
In this scenario, performance-based pay can serve as a signal of organizational mission, rather
than actually incentivizing employees to perform a given action. In other words, in a for-prot,
pay-for-performance can be successful, increasing protability, if the pay incentivizes employees to
increase hours (or intensity) of eort. However, in a non-prot, pay-for-performance can instead
be successful by simply guiding where that eort is focused, and thus the pay achieves alignment
with the non-prot's goals and actual rewards can be small. This idea importantly relies on both
the intrinsic motivation of employees and their shared purpose with the non-prot institution. The
shared purpose with the institution may help to prevent the gaming behavior as found in the award
systems described in Gubler et al. (2013). As a result, this mechanism may explain the conicting
prior ndings regarding eectiveness of employee awards, as quantitatively small incentives can
avoid crowding out of employees' intrinsic motivation (Frey & Meier, 2004), while still improving
employee performance (Besley & Ghatak, 2008; Blanes i Vidal & Nossol, 2011).
Allowing for employee incentives to have either a signaling or an intensity eect in dierent
contexts generates hypotheses regarding the relationship between the number of incentives and the
amount of performance-based pay in organizations with varying objectives or mission focus. The
context where I study these issues is micronance, where non-prot and for-prot rms co-exist,
thereby providing useful within-industry variance that I explore in my analysis. In addition, nearly
all rms in this industry, including non-prots, are using some amount of bonus payments (Mers-
land & Strom, 2009), so my analysis addresses an economically important practice in the industry.
In this paper, I use this \signaling theory" of employee incentives to understand the frequent, but
distinct, use of performance-based pay by for-prot and non-prot organizations in micronance.
I examine these issues using a novel dataset, combining a survey of the social performance of
micronance institutions with the commonly used balance sheet data from MIX Market. The social
performance survey, also run by the MIX, covers questions about incentives and benets oered to
employees, products and services the organization oers, and internal training and processes. Thus,
I can use this cross-sectional survey information to understand which types of rms oer employee
incentives and whether the relationship between rm characteristics and incentives diers by rm
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prot-status. In addition, I use the panel of balance sheet data to create a proxy for the amount
of performance-based pay. By looking at the correlation between the average total compensation
and the number of borrowers per employee, I create a metric that captures elements of both a
prot-maximizing or outreach-maximizing objective function.
I nd that non-prot organizations, on average, pay employees less and utilize a lower level of
performance-based pay, but do not motivate employees on fewer dimensions. Indeed, non-prot
organizations that target lower income borrowers actually reward employees on more dimensions.
Even controlling for the products and services that rms oer, there are some dierences between
for-prot and non-prot organizations, with employees of for-prots receiving higher compensation.
These results are supportive of the idea that non-prots use employee incentives to signal organiza-
tional objectives, as those rms that are more focused on lower income borrowers utilize a greater
number of dimensions but not a higher level of performance-based pay.
The rest of this section reviews the background literature on non-prots' human resources, and
strategic human resource theory more broadly. Section 2 develops the hypotheses, motivated by the
literature and industry context. Section 3 describes the data and presents the empirical analyses,
Section 4 discusses the results and limitations, and Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Literature Review
Two of the key dierences between non-prot and for-prot organizations are the products and
services they oer and the motivation of employees (Oster, 1995). The rst dierence stems from
the legal denition of a non-prot organization, which is that it must abide by the non-distribution
constraint, whereby prots cannot be redistributed to its \owners". As a result, donors can trust
that services will be rendered as charity for other customers (Hansmann, 1980). In other words,
the idea is that non-prots exist to utilize donations to provide goods and services that are not
privately protable to oer to its customers.
In addition, non-prots are often thought to hire a distinct type of person, motivated by per-
sonal social views (Rawls et al., 1975). This view implies that such employees may be attracted
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to the non-prot not only by its distinct goods and services but also by its distinct culture and
organizational structure. This view of non-prots is consistent with business model innovation,
wherein distinct employee relationships and sources of funding generate a distinct business model
and source of advantage for non-prots (Zott & Amit, 2007).
Consistent with this view, it is generally accepted that non-prot employees are motivated by
intrinsic motivation and thus non-prots pay employees less (Aubert et al., 2009). In fact, many
believe that paying employees more may actually undermine this intrinsic motivation (Delfgaauw &
Dur, 2007), partly due to selecting dierent types of employees (Weisbrod, 1998). While some em-
pirical work has documented that non-prot employees are indeed paid less (e.g., Mirvis & Hackett,
1983), and that non-prots utilize pay-for-performance less frequently, the empirical work is still
quite mixed on the relationship between prot status and employee pay (Mocan & Tekin, 2003;
Leete, 2001; Ruhm & Borkowski, 2003; Preston, 1989; Weisbrod, 1983). My paper addresses this
issue by not only looking within a mixed industry, as suggested by Mirvis & Hackett (1983), but
also examining the mix of products and services oered by the individual rms to get a sense of
how rm \scope" and its incentives to employees interact.
There is conicting literature on how non-prots should structure and organize their internal
human resource processes to best retain their competitive advantage in the increasingly common
situations where they face competition from for-prot and hybrid organizations (Dees & Ander-
son, 2003).3 On one hand, the human resource policies and employee relationships of non-prots
are often cited as one of the key distinguishing elements of the non-prot business model, with
volunteers and lower-paid employees constituting a large proportion of the non-prot's workforce
(Ridder & McCandless, 2010). On the other hand, non-prots are being encouraged by donors
and external stakeholders to be more \business-like" in their internal processes, including in their
hiring and compensation decisions (Eisenberg, 1997; Erus & Weisbrod, 2003). One form of becom-
ing more \business-like" is to increasingly rely upon formalized, performance-based contracts and
hiring processes for employees.
3 By hybrid organization, I mean \one that combines dierent institutional logics in unprecedented ways" (Bat-
tilana & Dorado, 2010).
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More generally, the existing theoretical literature acknowledges that the t between the strategy
of the organization and the human resource (HR) system is important and dierences in t should
lead to performance heterogeneity (Schuler & Jackson, 1987; Wright & Snell, 1998). However,
this common wisdom has often not been supported by the results of empirical research (Becker &
Huselid, 1998; Delery & Doty, 1996). Becker and Huselid (2006) argue that the work examining
the t between HR systems and rm strategy should consider more carefully how the strategy
generates competitive advantage relative to other rms. Along those lines, this paper suggests
that pay-for-performance can either be used for signaling or to provide employee motivation. This
indicates that dierent types and levels of bonuses can be used to provide competitive advantage
for non-prot and for-prot rms, despite their distinct business models.
Two recent papers are most relevant to this study. The rst covers non-prot human resource
management, while the second focuses specically on some aspects of HR systems in micronance
organizations. Non-prot human resource management is a fairly new eld of academic study, so
that the paper by Ridder and McCandless (2010) is one of the rst that specically investigates
the use of human resource management in the non-prot sector.4 These authors discuss three
important strategic characteristics that aect the way human resource management is utilized in
non-prots: the importance of mission, its external stakeholders, and its internal stakeholders.
The rst characteristic is the importance of its value-driven orientation: i.e., the extent that
the non-prot's mission and social goals are embedded in it (Ridder & McCandless, p. 127). This
factor means that the conventional \eciency" (or protability) strategy goal may be sacriced
in order to pursue a social objective. This point is consistent with the arguments made in Oster
(1995). My paper addresses this idea by controlling for the extent to which the organization targets
very low income borrowers and considers other social goals (e.g., oering legal services to women).
4 There is a growing, but relatively new, literature for managers about how to reward volunteers and to structure
organizations in the non-prot sector. For instance, a 2011 New York Times article discusses how donors are now
directly providing HR services and consulting support to non-prots, as human resources are cited as the most
challenging part of managing a non-prot (Strom, 2011).
113
Second, non-prots also dier in the importance of external stakeholders. Of course, the donors
are of key importance as non-prots are donation- based, but the recipients can also be integral as
the over-arching goal of the non-prot is to fulll the needs of these recipients.
Thirdly, the importance of internal stakeholders is distinct from that in for-prot organizations.
Ban et al. (2003) nd that 77 percent of interviewed employees from community development and
human service non-prots cite the mission of the organization as a primary draw for them working
there. This supports the idea that factors other than compensation primarily motivate non-prot
employees.
These basic characteristics indicate that dierent human resource practices may be preferable
for and more commonly used in non-prot organizations. Further, these dierences may continue
to be relevant for non-prots even in mixed industries like the one examined in this paper.
The importance of human resource processes in the mixed micronance industry is examined in
Battilana and Dorado (2010). These authors use a comparative case analysis of two micronance
rms in Bolivia. Both rms were originally non-prots that began transitioning to become more
commercialized organizations, with hybrid goals of both social and nancial performance. The two
rms took dierent approaches and were dierentially \successful". The authors nd that the more
successful rm had two key ingredients. First, the successful rm hired new graduates without a
previous imprint from either social work or the nance sector. The less successful rm instead hired
a mix from these two industries and tried to train them to work together, which lead to a clash
between the logics from these two dierent backgrounds. Second, the successful rm focused on
motivating employees through bonuses and an emphasis on \eciency", rather than stressing its
mission as the less successful rm did. This suggests that pay-for-performance can be successfully
used in rms with hybrid missions, but that the eect of HR policies in mission-focused rms will
depend on how the policies are structured.
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2 Hypotheses Development
The underlying theory that will motivate my hypotheses is that of the importance of t and adap-
tation of business and HR practices to rm characteristics.5 In other words, non-prots can use
employee incentives, but the relevant performance metric and the level of steepness of bonus pay
will have to reect the mission and business model of the organization. In particular, non-prots
will reward employees on dierent dimensions to reect the dierent services that are part of their
missions. In addition, they will utilize these employee rewards as a signal, rather than to directly
motivate employee's eort, and thus the amount of employee pay due to bonuses will be lower.
Pay-for-performance employee incentive plans that work well in for-prots (Lazear, 2000) may
be thought of as counter to a social mission, leading to an employee interpretation that some nan-
cial measure now takes precedent over social goals (Frey et al., 2013). In addition, the existence
of a social mission allows the non-prot rm to use relational contracts as a form of reward for
employees with utility functions that value the rms mission (Murdock, 2002). In other words,
non-prots harness their employee's intrinsic motivation from performing a social mission. Thus,
I expect that because the non-prot status can be thought of as a commitment to serve a social
mission, the following hypotheses will hold:
Hypothesis 1: (H1) For-prot micronance employees will be paid more than non-prot mi-
cronance employees.
Hypothesis 2: (H2) For-prot micronance employees will have a larger share of their com-
pensation come from pay-for-performance relative to the pay-for-performance compensation share
of non-prot employees.
However, there can also be dierences within rms of a given prot status, in the extent that
the organizations are mission-oriented. In micronance, this translates to variance in whether the
5 The contingency approach, that the eect of HR practices will depend on other rm or environmental charac-
teristics, is widely discussed, and key papers in human resource management have also used this lens (e.g., Fombrun
et al., 1984; Wright & Snell, 1998).
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organization serves the marginally poor versus the very poor (Navajas et al., 2000). Thus, besides
variance based on prot status, I predict that more mission-based rms, dened here as targeting
lower-income borrowers, will have a lower average total compensation and use less bonus pay based
on performance outcomes:6
Hypothesis 3: (H3) Total compensation will be increasing in the average wealth of the bor-
rowers served.
Hypothesis 4: (H4) The share of compensation that comes from pay-for-performance will be
increasing in the average wealth of the borrowers served.
Whether the eect of targeting lower-income borrowers on the level of compensation and amount
of performance-based pay should matter more in for-prots or non-prots could go either way. On
one hand, perhaps in an attempt to attract intrinsically motivated employees, if for-prots are
even more cognizant of crowding out of intrinsic motivation, then the eect will be stronger in
for-prot organizations. However, if the for-prot status eliminates the ability to rely on intrinsic
motivation, then for-prots will not alter their HR systems in order to reect borrowers' wealth.7
Thus, I generate the two possible conicting hypotheses below:
Hypothesis 5: (H5) H3 and H4 will be stronger in for-prot rms than in non-prot rms.
Alternative Hypothesis 5: (AH5) H3 and H4 will be less strong in for-prot rms than in
non-prot rms.
The prior literature also suggests that, when they do use incentives, mission-oriented rms will
6 Note that while these hypotheses are presented in terms of micronance employees, the same idea could be
translated into other mixed industries, where \targeting wealthier borrowers" is replaced with the appropriate measure
of being less social mission-oriented.
7 However, to the extent that targeting wealthier borrowers also means relying on more skilled employees, whose
going wage is higher, then the eect of paying employees targeting wealthier borrowers more could reect this selection
eect.
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reward based on dierent dimensions than more prot-oriented peers, as rms need to reward on
dimensions which are aligned with their objectives. Non-prot rms balance dual objectives of
their nancial sustainability and their social mission objectives (Horwitz & Nichols, 2009). If the
objectives and dimensions can be clearly specied and contracted upon, I expect even non-prot
or mission-oriented rms to use employee incentives (Ballou & Weisbrod, 2003). In fact, I might
expect that organizations that focus more on the social objectives, as a nancial objective will
underlie all organizations through either protability or sustainability, will base performance pay
on a higher number of dimensions:
Hypothesis 6: (H6) Employees' pay-for-performance contracts will be based on more dimen-
sions the more the organization targets the lower income population.
However, adding additional metrics into the employee performance contracts of non-prot and
more mission-based rms conicts with the classic results from psychology, where nancially re-
warding socially-motivated behavior can actually undermine that behavior (Deci & Ryan, 1985).
Thus, despite potentially having a higher number of distinct objectives, I might expect mission-
oriented rms to utilize weaker and fewer incentives. If incentivizing social dimensions is particu-
larly dicult, then organizations that are targeting the lower income population will rely on fewer
dimensions to incentivize employees, leading to the following alternative hypothesis:
Alternative Hypothesis 6: (AH6) Employees' pay-for-performance contracts will be based
on fewer dimensions the more the organization targets the lower income population.
Thus, these hypotheses come together to form a general theory wherein non-prots, as well
as more mission-oriented rms within a given prot status, use weaker incentives. However, they
may still reward on more dimensions to capture the dual nature of their objective functions and
more diverse service oerings. The testing of H6 and AH6 will provide useful insight into whether
non-prots are using incentives as a signal of mission objectives, or whether even weak incentives
are avoided due to concerns about crowding out of intrinsic motivation in mission-oriented rms.
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3 Data and Analysis
3.1 Data
In order to test the above hypotheses, I utilize two datasets created by the Micronance Infor-
mation Exchange, hereafter MIX Market. The Social Performance survey contains cross-sectional
information on the range of products and services oered by the micronance rm, including train-
ing and education services to borrowers, as well as the incentives and benets for its employees.8
Firms voluntarily chose whether to respond to the survey, and those that do tend to be larger
and more nancially transparent, so it still contains a substantial proportion of the gross loan
portfolio in the industry (Cull et al., 2011; Bogan, 2012).9 I merge the Social Performance survey
with the Basic MIX MFI Data, which is available for free from the MIX and includes nancial
and organizational characteristics, such as average loan size, amounts and sources of funding, and
prot status.10 I focus on Latin America to limit the variance between regions of the world (Ahlin
et al., 2011). The sample used in my cross-sectional analysis covers 252 rms in 19 countries in 2010.
The MIX market data does not include a direct measure of the proportion of pay which comes
from pay-for-performance or bonuses. Thus, I use a novel estimation technique to generate a
rm-level proxy by examining how strongly nancial performance correlates with personnel expen-
ditures. Specically, I use the correlation between the average total compensation per employee, as
a ratio over the gross national income (GNI), and the average number of borrowers per employee
for a given rm between 2003 and 2010, using the MIX Market Balance Sheet panel data.
8 This data can be purchased through the MIX Market portal, by selecting to access the Premium MIX MFI
Data Sets and then selecting the Social Performance Results Data Set: http://www.mixmarket.org/proles-reports.
9 The voluntary nature of lling out the MIX Market survey leads to selection bias in the rms analyzed. As
mentioned, it tends to be the larger and more nancially transparent rms that le; the rms omitted tend to be
small, rural non-prot organizations. Thus, any dierences I nd between for-prots and non-prots are conservative
estimates of the average dierence. Hence, the ndings regarding the eectiveness of human resource policies may
not apply to these smaller non-prots. Nonetheless, the ndings are still helpful in analyzing the policies for those
non-prots that are more similar to for-prots in size and transparency, and thus apply to the rms facing pressure
to converge, which is a key motivation of the paper.
10 This data can be accessed through the MIX Market portal, by selecting to download the Basic MIX MFI Data
Set.
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The idea behind this proxy is that rms that pay employees with a higher percentage of
performance-based pay will see average total compensation go up and down with changes in this
measure of performance. While performance-based pay could be based on a number of metrics,
as is indicated in my data on the dimensions of incentives rewarded, the number of borrowers per
employee has been suggested as a key metric for both for-prots and non-prots. An interview with
a portfolio manager at an impact investor that funds micronance organizations in Latin America
indicated that an organization that uses a lot of pay-for-performance for their loan ocers would
see a high correlation between borrowers per employee and average total compensation.11 Then,
I use this correlation and dene rms with values above (below) the mean correlation to be High
(Low) Correlation rms, suggesting a relatively high (low) level of performance-based pay.
The proxy variable suggests that the level of performance-based pay diers between for-prots
and non-prots, in a way that is consistent with prior literature. In particular, the value of the
high-correlation indicator variable is larger in for-prots than in non-prots, with 56% of for-prots
and 47% of non-prots being classied as having a high correlation in 2010.12 There are a couple
of alternative explanations to consider besides performance-based pay that could explain the cor-
relation between the number of borrowers per employee and the average total compensation. First,
suppose the amount of money brought in goes up and so more employees are brought in. This
would not be a sucient alternate explanation because I am looking at average total compensation
per employee, and thus changes just in the number of employees would not aect the estimation.
However, suppose that the additional employees brought in are of better quality then the cur-
rent employees and thus demand a higher wage. This is a possible way in which changes in average
total compensation could be driven by changes in rm performance without indicating the use of
performance-based pay.13 If I can show that when the number of borrowers per employee goes
11 This manager suggested this as a key performance metric and when asked about the correlation approach, he
responded, \you should see this eect comparing the same organization's average total compensation through time."
12 This dierence is statistically signicant at the 10% level, for both the dierence across the whole sample and
for the dierence when controlling for country indicator variables.
13 A positive relationship between the number of employees and the average compensation can also arise if the
rm (due to imperfect information) needs to attract more workers from a limited labor pool. However, this would be
less likely if average total compensation also goes down when performance suers in subsequent years, as described
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down, average total compensation also goes down, then this explanation is less likely as hiring
lower quality workers and ring the higher quality workers is implausible as a short-term response
to declining performance.
Below in Tables 3.1a and 3.1b, I consider the data from two representative MFIs with high
correlation values, and two with low correlation values. Note that both of the high-correlation
rms have a generally declining number of borrowers per employee, but the rst rm is increasing
its personnel numbers whereas the second rm's are decreasing or staying constant. Thus, there
does not seem to be a consistent relationship between the number of employees and the number of
borrowers per employee. In addition, both rms have increases and decreases in the borrowers per
employee variable that are mirrored by changes in the average total compensation. For instance,
the rst rm has a 2005 decline in the borrowers per employee as well as a decline in average total
compensation, and both rebound in 2006. On the other hand, the two rms in Table 3.1b do not
have a clear relationship between these variables, with the second rm seeing a generally declining
average total compensation and the rst rm with slight changes in total compensation that do
not reect changes in the borrowers per employee.14
INSERT Table 3.1a
INSERT Table 3.1b
In addition, rms with both at performance, in borrowers per employee, and at compensation
will have a low value of this correlation. If the variance of performance is signicantly dierent
between for-prots and non-prots, this might systematically misestimate the level of performance-
based pay in one prot status as compared to another. To address this concern, I rst examine
below. See Mortensen (1986) or Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) for a review on the role of search in determining
wage levels.
14 Note that the ups and downs of the rst rm might suggest use of performance-based pay based on another
metric, and thus I could instead develop a proxy which is based on whether the average total compensation follows
a at trend or has many changes. My current method is clearer in what is captures and omits, in that it captures
performance-based pay based on the borrowers per employee, but will potentially miss performance-based pay based
on other metrics. I choose this approach due to its transparency, despite being a simplication of reality.
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the time-series of the number of borrowers per employee, as well as the rm-level variance of this
variable, by prot status. Figure 3.1 shows that for-prot organizations have an average total
compensation that declines more over the sample period, but both types have similar movement
in the borrowers per employee. When I then calculate the variance of each of these variables by
MFI, I nd that there is no statistically signicant dierence between the variance of the number
of borrowers per employee. But, there is a dierence in the variance of average total compensation,
with a higher value for for-prot organizations at the 1% signicance level. Thus, there seems to
be a comparable amount of variance in the performance metric I use, and more variance of the
compensation variable for for-prots, which is consistent with a higher level of performance-based
pay in for-prot organizations.
INSERT Figure 3.1
3.1.1 Dependent Variables.
The dependent variables I focus on encompass three key dimensions of the compensation system
employed by micronance organizations: the level of pay, the number of incentive dimensions, and
the amount of performance-based pay.
Average Total Compensation per Employee over GNI is dened by MIX Market as the person-
nel expense over the number of employees as a percentage of the gross national income. Thus, it
captures the average amount paid out to employees, benchmarked by average income dierences
by country.
Number of Incentives is a variable I dene that sums the number of dimensions along which
the organization rewards employees. The variables on which employee incentives can be based are:
portfolio quality, borrower retention, outreach to female borrowers, obtaining new borrowers from
the target market, outreach to rural borrowers, the quality of client interaction, and providing
social services. I also separately characterize these goals in terms of the number of incentives for
nancial goals and the number of incentives for social goals, where the social goals include outreach
to female borrowers, outreach to rural borrowers, the quality of client interaction, and providing
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social services and nancial goals include the other three stated dimensions.15
High Correlation Indicator is the indicator variable created through the correlation analysis
described above. Thus, it is a proxy for the level of performance-based pay, with 1 meaning that
the rm has a value of the correlation between the number of borrowers per employee and the
average total compensation above the mean correlation of 0:325 and a 0 indicating the rm has a
correlation value below this mean.
When I examine the eectiveness of performance-based pay and incentives, I use ve dierent
dependent variables to reect the incentive dimensions being analyzed. These variables are:
 Borrower Retention Rate is the number of active borrowers at the end of the reporting period
divided by the sum of active borrowers at the beginning of the reporting period and new
borrowers during the reporting period. In other words, it shows the percentage of total
borrowers which carry over to the next year.
 Percent - Female Borrowers is the number of active borrowers who are women divided by the
total number of active borrowers.
 Percent - Rural Borrowers is the number of active borrowers who are located in rural areas (as
dened by the MFI submitting the survey) divided by the total number of active borrowers.
 Portfolio at Risk - 30 days is the value of all loans outstanding that have one or more
installments of principal past due more than 30 days over the total value of all loans.
 Borrowers per Employee is the number of active borrowers over personnel.16
15 The nancial incentives are thus meant to capture the incentives which directly aect prot: the number of
borrowers who obtain loans and the rate at which they repay. Thus, this requires reaching and retaining borrowers
and having borrowers not go into default.
16 Note that while this variable is used to create the proxy for the amount of performance-based pay, the proxy
is based on the correlation between this variable and the average total compensation and does not necessarily mean
the rm has a relatively high or low level of borrowers per employee.
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3.1.2 Independent Variables.
The most important independent variables are whether or not the organization is a for-prot and
the average loan balance as a proxy for the wealth of the borrowers served. In addition, I utilize
the types of products and services oered to perform cluster analysis and capture diversication,
as discussed in the next section. Finally, I use the number of incentives, described earlier, as a
dependent variable in exploring pay-for-performance.
For-Prot Indicator is an indicator variable that captures whether the organization is classied
as a for-prot as of its latest ling.
Average Loan Balance per Borrower is the average loan balance for a given borrower in US
Dollars. This is a widely used proxy for the wealth of the borrower in the micronance literature
(Cull et al., 2011).
3.1.3 Controls
Gross Loan Portfolio controls for the size of the organization, and thus for scale eects that may
aect the compensation or incentive structure. Borrowers per employee reects how much prot
or value they are generating, as reaching more borrowers assists in both prot-maximization and
borrower outreach. In addition, reaching female or rural customers may be more dicult given
that they are less traditional borrowers, and thus I control for Percent of Loan Portfolio to Rural
Borrowers and Percent of Loan Portfolio to Female Borrowers.17 Finally, I utilize country indicator
(\dummy") variables, so my results examine dierences within a country.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.2 contains the data on incentives and compensation, broken out by prot status for the
year 2010. This subset of data contains 132 non-prot organizations and 84 for-prot organizations
17 I consider models with and without these two variables as they are only available for a subsample of rms and
thus decrease the sample size.
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in Latin America.18 The T-test column tests whether these means are statistically signicantly
dierent, whereas the T-stat column contains the t-statistic from the regression of the variable of
interest on the for-prot indicator variable with country controls. In other words, the T-test looks
at whether the values dier by prot-status across Latin America whereas the T-stat investigates
the dierence within a country.19 For-prot organizations have higher values of all incentives, other
than outreach to women and social outreach. However, the only dierence that is statistically sig-
nicant is that for-prot organizations are more likely to provide incentives based on obtaining new
borrowers from the target market. I also compare the total number of dimensions incentivized and
see that for-prots have a higher, but not statistically signicant, value of this variable. Finally, the
average total compensation per employee is higher in for-prot organizations and this dierence is
statistically signicant.
INSERT Table 3.2
Table 3.3 contains the data on indicator variables for the credit products oered by the orga-
nizations, again broken out by prot status. This table indicates that for-prots are more likely
to oer small-medium enterprise loans, and less likely to oer loans for education, when I control
for country xed eects. Table 3.4 then contains comparable data regarding the percentage of the
MFI's total loans by product type. While for-prot organizations make (statistically signicantly)
more corporate loans, otherwise they have a comparable breakdown of loan types.
INSERT Table 3.3
INSERT Table 3.4
There are more signicant dierences between non-prots and for-prots in the targeting of
18 Not all rms ll out the incentive portion of the Social Performance Prole which is why this number is less
than the 252 rms in the larger sample.
19 Countries have dierent proportions of for-prot and non-prot organizations, and thus comparing across coun-
tries as opposed to within a country may lead to dierent levels of statistical signicance.
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borrowers, as well as in the other products and services that they oer. Table 3.5 presents data
on the borrower populations targeted by for-prots as compared to non-prots, and the observed
dierence in average loan size and the amount of loans made to the rural population and to female
borrowers. Non-prots are more likely to indicate that they target the female population, the rural
population, and very poor and poor clients, with the dierence for female population and poor
borrowers being statistically signicant. In terms of the actual loans made, non-prots have a
statistically signicantly higher share of loans made to the rural and female subpopulations, and
have a smaller average loan size, further suggesting a focus on the lower income population.
INSERT Table 3.5
In addition to focusing on dierent populations, non-prots oer dierent products and services.
In particular, for-prot institutions are signicantly more likely to oer many nancial products,
including voluntary and xed term deposits, checking accounts, and credit or debit cards as seen
in Table 3.6. On the other hand, non-prots are signicantly more likely to oer related and unre-
lated educational and other support services as seen in Table 3.7. These include skills and business
development, various education services, and services to support females, including legal services
for victims of violence.
INSERT Table 3.6
INSERT Table 3.7
Table 3.8 contains summary statistics of the average balance sheet variables to show the dier-
ences by prot status, where for-prots are, on average, much larger measured by both nancial
and organizational size. In addition, for-prots tend to charge higher interest rates and are more
protable. These dierences are suggestive of dierent organizational objectives between for-prot
and non-prot institutions.
INSERT Table 3.8
125
Overall, these summary statistics suggest a few things relevant for this paper. First, there are
dierences on average between for-prots and non-prots, particularly in terms of the services and
products that are oered and the borrowers that are targeted. This suggests that even though for-
prots and non-prots co-exist in this industry, they are still diversied and somewhat segmented.
Thus, my empirical approach importantly captures this product diversication in order to examine
the eect of the product oerings as separate from the eect of prot status. Second, while there are
some dierences in the dimensions along which employees are incentivized, the average dierences
in the dimensions considered are largely statistically insignicant. This is somewhat surprising and
thus merits further consideration in my analysis below to understand what elements are important
in determining these dimensions and also whether they have a dierential eect on compensation
by prot status.
3.3 Analysis
Because there are a large number of products and services, I use cluster analysis to understand
the relationships between these products and services and to examine whether there are observable
patterns in oerings, as well as to classify the organizations based on the sets of products and
services they oer (or do not oer). The idea of this approach is that it is a solution to the issue
of the high collinearity between the products and services oered. For instance, not surprisingly,
there is a high (and statistically signicant at the 1% level) correlation of 0:60 between oering
women's leadership training and supporting women's rights awareness. However, there is also a
very high and signicant correlation between women's rights awareness and education on nutrition
and health. Thus, rather than regressing on each individual indicator variable, the cluster analysis
allows me to group rms based on the sets of products and services they oer, while also providing
insight into their clustering behavior.20
When I perform clustering with kmeans on the products and services described in Tables 3.6
and 3.7 to partition rms into three non-overlapping groups, I get a breakdown of product and
20 This approach has been used widely in the strategic groups literature and Harrigan (1985) provides a summary
and example of how clustering can be used to understand the behavior of rms in an industry.
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service types as seen in Table 3.9. The groups are roughly characterized in the following way:
Cluster 1 has a much higher prevalence of credit cards, more savings products of all types, and
more nancing of small-medium enterprises and consumption loans. As a result, I call Cluster 1
the Financial Products Cluster. Cluster 3 contains higher values for many of the services, including
skills and business development, all types of education services, and all types of women's services.
Cluster 3 is deemed the Borrower Services Cluster. Cluster 2 seems to be largely characterized by
not having the characteristics of Clusters 1 and 3, and instead makes largely microenterprise loans.
Thus, I call Cluster 2 the Focused Microlending Cluster.
INSERT Table 3.9
In terms of prot-status, 45% of Cluster 1 rms are for-prots, 47% of Cluster 2, and 7% of
Cluster 3.21 Cluster 2 also contains a higher percentage of rms which are classied as \New" or
\Young" with 26% as opposed to 12% and 10% for Clusters 1 and 3, respectively. Thus, it seems
that Cluster 1 is the more commercial cluster, Cluster 3 is the more socially-oriented cluster, and
Cluster 2 contains more transitioning organizations.22
If I then repeat the summary statistics by cluster breakdown, I nd that Cluster 3 rewards on
a larger number of dimensions, consistent with the larger number of services these organizations
oer their borrowers. In addition, Cluster 1 pays employees the most, which aligns with the view
of this cluster as oering products most similar to a commercial bank. When examining the other
summary statistics, I nd that the clusters target borrowers in a way that is not surprising based
on the dierent products and services oered. Namely, Cluster 1 targets fewer women and fewer
Very Poor or Poor Customers, whereas Cluster 3 targets higher along both of these dimensions.
Cluster 1 has a larger average loan balance than Cluster 3, which again supports the use of average
loan balance as a proxy for the wealth of the customers served. Cluster 2 seems to focus on the
urban poor, based on average loan size and percent of loans made to the rural population. Finally,
21 Because for-prots account for about 40% of the sample, non-prots are eight times more likely to be in Cluster
3 than for-prots.
22 This is also reected by the relatively worse performance of rms in Cluster 2, and merits further investigation.
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I also nd that Cluster 1 rms tend to be larger and more protable than either Cluster 2 or 3
rms, which is consistent with theoretical and empirical work that larger loans are more protable
(McIntosh & Wydick, 2005). Thus, I will control for the rm's cluster value in my analysis, so that
I can examine the eect of prot-status while controlling for the mix of products and services being
oered. This helps narrow down the mechanisms at work, because even within a mixed industry,
non-prots and for-prots may oer distinct products and services.
Next, I move onto testing the hypotheses by considering the use of HR systems by prot
status and the wealth of borrowers served. Tables 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 run the same analysis with
dependent variables of average total compensation, the number of dimensions incentivized, or the
indicator variable for high value of the pay-for-performance proxy, respectively. The basic empirical
model run for the average total compensation of rm j in country c is then:
AverageCompensationj;c = 0+1ForProfitj;c+2LoanBalancej;c+3LoanBalancejForProfitj;c
+(4   6)Zj;c + (7   25)Countryc (1)
where Zj;c is the set of controls, including the Borrowers per Employee, the Borrowers per Employee
interacted with the for-prot indicator variable, and the Gross Loan Portfolio. I run the models
with and without controls for the percent of female borrowers and the percent of rural borrowers
and the results are consistent across both models. In addition, I run the analysis including controls
for cluster and thus the full model for rm j in country c and cluster l is:
AverageCompensationj;c;l = 0+1ForProfitj;c;l+2LoanBalancej;c;l+3LoanBalancejForProfitj;c;l
+(4 6)Clusterl + (7 9)Clusterl ForProfitj;c + (10 12)Zj;c + (13 31)Countryc (2)
Because I am controlling for both cluster and country in this full model, the identication for
the coecients on the loan balance and for-prot indicator variable comes from dierences within
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a country and within a given cluster. The models for the number of dimensions and the pay proxy
follow the same specication. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used to estimate the rst two,
whereas a Probit model is used to estimate the pay proxy as the dependent variable is an indicator.
Model 1 of Table 3.10 shows that within a given country, for-prots pay their employees more
on average, as I run average total compensation on the for-prot indicator variable and country
dummies. This result holds when I add in the controls in Model 2, as specied in Equation 1
above. Thus, I nd support for Hypothesis 1 that for-prots pay their employees higher average
total compensation.
INSERT Table 3.10
To test Hypotheses 3 and 5, I examine the coecient of the average loan balance per borrower
in Models 2 and 4 of Table 3.10. As mentioned earlier, this variable serves as a good proxy for
the average wealth of the borrowers being served. The coecient on average loan balance per
borrower is positive and signicant in both of these models, providing support for Hypothesis 3
that employees in rms targeting wealthier borrowers get paid more. To examine Hypothesis 5,
I then consider the coecient on the interaction of average loan size with the for-prot indicator
variable. The coecient is negative and signicant and it mostly o-sets the positive and signicant
coecient on the non-interacted average loan balance. Thus, for-prots do not lower the average
total compensation if they have an increased mission focus on targeting lower income borrowers,
supporting Alternative Hypothesis 5.
Models 3 and 4 also control for the dierent products and services being oered by adding
indicator variables for the rm's cluster, as shown in Equation 2 above. Non-prots that are in
the Borrower Services Cluster (Cluster 3) are paid less, whereas employees of for-prots in this
cluster are paid more, relative to employees in the Financial Products Cluster. However, the posi-
tive and signicant coecient on the For-Prot indicator variable remains, although with a lower
magnitude, indicating that the higher total compensation of employees in for-prot rms is partly,
but not completely, captured by the dierent sets of products and services oered in for-prots.
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Model 4 uses the controls for both the rm characteristics from Model 2 and the clusters from
Model 3, and the for-prot indicator variable continues to be statistically signicant and positive.
Thus, non-prot status, targeting lower income borrowers, and focusing on delivery of services are
complementary in their relationship with lower average total compensation for employees.
Table 3.11 follows the same format as Table 3.10, but examines the dependent variable of the
number of dimensions along which the rms incentivize employees in order to test Hypothesis 6.
Across all four models, the coecient on the For-Prot indicator variable is not statistically signi-
cant. However, Models 2 and 4 show that, among non-prot organizations, higher average loan size
is associated with a fewer number of dimensions being incentivized, but this eect does not hold
for for-prot organizations in Model 4. This suggests that the issue with using pay-for-performance
among non-prots is not that it is dicult to nd metrics to incentivize when focusing more on
mission, as rms that make loans to a relatively lower income population actually use more dimen-
sions to incentivize employees. Thus, I nd support for the rst specication of Hypothesis 6 in
non-prot organizations, but not in for-prot organizations.
INSERT Table 3.11
Table 3.12 follows the same format as the preceding tables but uses as the dependent variable
the indicator variable for a high level of pay-for-performance, as created by the proxy described
earlier, and performs a Probit analysis. Across all four models, the coecient on the For-Prot
indicator variable is positive, but only statistically signicant in Model 1. Thus, I nd mild support
for H2 that for-prot organizations utilize a higher level of pay-for-performance. In addition, across
all organizations, high average loan size is associated with an increased likelihood of having a high
value of the pay-for-performance indicator variable. Thus, I nd support for H4 that organizations
targeting wealthier borrowers utilize higher levels of pay-for-performance. However, I do not nd
support for Alternative H5 that this eect is weaker in for-prot organizations, as the coecient of
the interaction of loan size with prot status is positive and insignicant.
INSERT Table 3.12
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4 Discussion
Before concluding, I consider some limitations and ideas for future research. An alternative expla-
nation for the dierent pay in non-prots is that non-prot employees are simply less skilled, and
thus they are being paid less because their work is less valuable. However, given that I control
for the number of borrowers per employee and the size of the loan, which could be thought of as
performance metrics for the employees, this seems less plausible. In addition, the results are robust
to controlling for the yield, as obtaining higher yield is another way that dierences in skill could
manifest themselves. Another alternative explanation is that for-prots hire more administrative
personnel, as opposed to loan ocers, and that the former get paid more. This is possible, but
given that for-prots have, if anything, lower administrative expenses as a ratio of assets as seen in
Table 3.8, this explanation is unlikely.
While causal analysis of the eectiveness of HR systems requires variation at the rm-level
over time in terms of the HR processes that are utilized, I begin to explore whether incentives
and pay-for-performance interact dierently across prot status in Table 3.13. This table looks
at ve performance variables and the related incentives, as well as the incentive interacted with
the indicator variable for a high level of pay-for-performance. In particular, Models 1 through 5
consider the dependent rm performance metrics of borrower retention rate, the percent of female
borrowers, the percent of rural borrowers, the ratio of portfolio at risk of default within 30 days,
and the borrowers per employee and analyze the eects of a corresponding employee (nancial)
incentive.23 Thus, the model I run for borrower retention, for instance, for rm j in country c is:
BorrowerRetentionj;c = 0+1ForProfitj;c+2HighProxyj;c+3HighProxyForProfitj;c (3)
+4RetentionIncentivej;c + 5RetentionIncentive  ForProfitj;c
+6RetentionIncentive HighProxyj;c + 7RetentionIncentive  ForProfit HighProxyj;c
23 The corresponding employee incentives for these performance measures are: borrower retention, female outreach,
rural outreach, portfolio quality, and acquiring new borrowers, respectively.
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Model 1 in Table 3.13 shows that having an incentive for borrower retention is associated with
higher borrower retention for for-prots, but lower borrower retention for non-prots unless the
rm also has a high level of pay-for-performance. Model 2 shows a dierent result for the percent
of female borrowers, where an employee incentive is associated with a higher percentage of female
borrowers for non-prots, but only associated with a higher percent in for-prots if the organi-
zation does not utilize high pay-for-performance. These two results together suggest that for a
social-mission oriented dimension, namely the percent of female borrowers, the steepness of incen-
tives might detract from for-prots' ability to eectively pursue this social goal. On the other hand,
steep pay-for-performance seems useful for non-prots in pursuing more nancial goals, since the
borrower retention incentive is only associated with higher borrower retention when the non-prot
also has a high value of the pay-for-performance indicator variable. This suggests that perhaps the
dimensions of incentives and the level of pay-for-performance interact to help non-prots pursue
nancial goals but detract from for-prots eort to pursue social goals. Examining dierent di-
mensions of performance, both nancial and social, and how they interact with both the existence
and steepness of rewards is an important avenue of future research to try to better understand the
contingencies and mechanisms that determine the use and eectiveness of HR systems for dierent
prot statuses and other rm characteristics.
INSERT Table 3.13
In addition to the limitation posed by the cross-sectional nature of the incentive data, the setting
of micronance may limit generalizability. On one hand, because a vast majority of rms use some
type of incentives,24 it means that there is sucient variation to explore the eects of dierent
types and levels of incentives. However, to the extent that this high usage of performance-based
pay is unusual, especially in non-prots, the results might be less generalizable. This high usage
of incentives may come from the hybrid nature of the industry, where there is a long history of
commercial banking where employee incentives are common and the data to use for performance
24 84% of non-prots and 91% of for-prots identify at least one incentive dimension utilized for their employees.
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metrics is widely available. To the extent that in other mixed industries it is more dicult to
come up with metrics for performance-based pay for social goals, I expect the dierences between
for-prots and non-prots to be greater, as non-prots will be less able to explicitly reward social
objective achievements. In other words, I expect my estimates to be conservative regarding the
dierences between HR systems employed by for-prots and non-prots in other mixed industries.
5 Conclusion
The results in Tables 3.10 through 3.12 suggest that the level and bonus structure of pay and the
number of dimensions being incentivized have dierent relationships depending on the type of bor-
rower being targeted. The results seemingly contradict the idea that more mission-oriented rms
have a harder time using incentive pay, but are not surprising given that my clustering analysis
shows that the mission-oriented rms also oer more services. In other words, because these rms
value more services being provided, they are more likely to use multiple incentives. In many ways,
incentive pay may be more productive in these more socially-oriented rms to clarify the expecta-
tions and desires for employee behavior, whereas this type of clarication may not be necessary in
a rm with a simpler objective function.
Using weaker incentives per dimension, but the same amount of total performance-based pay,
would be consistent with a model based purely on agency theory, like the multitask model in
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). However, the lower variance of average total compensation in
non-prots suggests that non-prots use weaker incentives overall. Thus, I suggest that non-prots
are not just incentivizing more eort along a higher number of dimensions, but are instead using
incentives to signal where intrinsically motivated employees should focus their eorts. While this
signal might be achievable simply though the mission statement of the organization, explicitly tying
at least some level of employee pay to the information adds credibility to the signal. In addition,
as non-prots experiment with oering new products and services in an increasingly competitive
environment, employee incentives are perhaps easier to alter than the overall rm mission. In par-
ticular, as relational contracts are dicult to build and to change (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012), it
is important to understand if weak performance incentives can be used to signal the multidimen-
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sional and imprecisely delineated organizational goals of such non-prots.
This research importantly addresses a key issue in the prior literature. While there is substan-
tial existing work that argues for the importance of the t between strategy and human resource
systems (Delery & Shaw, 2001), in practice, determining t has generally focused on dierences in
such aspects as \training, sophisticated selection, nancial incentives, and other practices" (Shaw
et al., 2013). In this paper, I use prot status and the products and services oered by the rm
to address the call for \more theoretical work on the `black box' between the HR architecture and
rm performance" (Becker & Huselid, 2006). While my nding of distinct incentives in non-prots
does not necessarily rebut the prior literature, it does suggest that the conicting ndings in prior
research may reect the diculty in capturing what constitutes a high performance system. In
particular, in non-prots, a lower compensation, reecting the hiring and retention of employees
motivated by the organization's mission, may actually be a \high investment" human resource
practice. The cost here is not in the level of the compensation but rather in maintaining the rm's
mission and its alignment with employees' social goals and avoiding the pull of products and prac-
tices which would violate this relational contract. Thus, employee incentives are used as signals
to help guide the relational contract, rather than to provide extrinsic motivation for employee eort.
One way to view the role of human resource systems is that HR systems can be used to help
implement a rm's strategy (Becker & Huselid, 2006). Using a self-reported survey is actually an
advantage in this regard as I can see what products and services the organization intends to oer,
the HR incentives used by the organization, and the actual composition of the products and services.
In future work, considering how HR incentives may interact with the intended products to predict
the actual composition of products could help to further the understanding of the contingencies
under which HR systems can be used to implement strategy. In addition, this positioning of the
HR system as a means to implement a strategy helps to address concerns in the literature regarding
the omission of implementation from the resource-based view (Barney, 2001; Priem & Butler, 2001).
By looking at the use of performance incentives in both for-prot and non-prot rms of varying
levels of social mission as captured by the products and services oered and the borrowers targeted,
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I respond to the call in Co and Kryscynski (2011) to separate out bundles of practices that create
a competitive advantage. Specically, I have rms in each of the possible combinations of prot
status, mission orientation, and employee incentives. By looking at the variety of products and
services used and oered in non-prot organizations as compared to for-prot organizations, this
paper suggests that the ndings comparing non-prot and for-prot organizations are comparable to
the research regarding the use of incentives in innovation examined in Ederer and Manso (2013). In
other words, the prior literature recognizes that non-prot employees dier in their commitment to
the mission and thus a proportion of their utility is derived from providing the services rather than
simply from their compensation. In addition, the prior literature observes that non-prots have
dierent objective functions and thus employee incentives need to reect these dierent objectives.
However, it might also be that non-prots are in fact more innovative and creative, and that the
use of strong nancial incentives may undermine such creativity. Thus, while non-prots oering
dierent products and services within the same industry as for-prots is certainly not a new idea
(e.g. Duggan, 2000), examining the interaction of prot status, employee incentives, and products
and services is a fruitful area for future research.
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Table 3.1a: Two High-Correlation Firms 
Year 
 
Number of 
Borrowers 
Borrowers per 
Employee Personnel
Total 
Compensation/GNI 
2003 14,519 108 134 20.07 
2004 22,130 91 244 16.14 
2005 29,561 79 372 12.48 
2006 38,044 81 471 12.8 
2007 39,329 68 575 12.62 
2008 35,423 58 616 9.72 
Year 
Number of 
Borrowers 
Borrowers per 
Employee Personnel
Total 
Compensation/GNI 
2006 3,257 93 35 2.52 
2007 3,122 87 36 2.34 
2008 2,875 90 32 2.55 
2009 2,159 80 27 2.23 
2010 1,603 50 32 2.21 
2012 871 41 21 1.69 
Table 3.1b: Two Low-Correlation Firms 
Year 
 
Number of 
Borrowers 
Borrowers per 
Employee Personnel
Total 
Compensation/GNI 
2006 10,909 303 36 4.55 
2007 13,128 313 42 4.78 
2008 14,146 289 49 4.84 
2009 12,079 252 48 5.06 
2010 13,015 303 43 4.83 
2011 11,133 247 45 5.16 
2012 8,509 167 51 4.48 
Year 
Number of 
Borrowers 
Borrowers per 
Employee Personnel
Total 
Compensation/GNI 
2004 3,893 75 52 11.63 
2005 5,968 80 75 9.01 
2006 9,219 90 103 8.35 
2007 12,921 96 135 8.16 
2008 17,970 99 181 7.72 
2009 14,166 84 168 7.39 
2010 10,349 67 155 6.86 
2011 8,097 70 116 5.23 
2012 4,924 54 91 5.6 
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Table 3.2: Use of Incentives  
Variable Non-Profit For-Profit T-test T-stat 
------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
Incentive Dimensions 
Portfolio Quality 0.97 0.98 0.28 1.21
Borrower Retention 0.50 0.60 1.37 1.26
Women Outreach 0.17 0.11 1.21 0.69
New Borrowers 0.75 0.94 3.68*** 2.90***
Rural Outreach 0.14 0.21 1.5 1.45
Quality of Client Interaction 0.18 0.21 0.59 0.07
Social Outreach 0.13 0.08 1.03 1.24
Number of Incentives 2.83 3.13 1.54 1.28
Total Compensation/GNI 2.96 3.59 2.06** 1.15***
------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
Observations 132 84
 
 
 
Table 3.3:  Credit Products Offered 
Variable Non-Profit For-Profit T-test T-stat 
------------- ----------- ----------- -------------- ----------- 
Credit Product Type 
Small-Medium Enterprise 0.33 0.42 1.47 1.95* 
Agricultural 0.57 0.44 1.93* 0.12 
Household Finance 0.61 0.57 0.62 1.01 
Consumer Finance 0.55 0.56 0.18 1.35 
Education 0.33 0.18 2.50** 1.99** 
Microenterprise 0.99 0.95 1.93* 1.2 
Number of Credit Products 3.36 3.12 1.21 0.69 
------------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Observations 159 93
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Table 3.4: Credit Product Breakdown 
Variable Non-Profit For-Profit T-test T-stat 
------------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Credit Product Type 
(%) 
Microenterprise 0.28 0.27 1.16 1.02 
Household Finance 0.05 0.05 0.79 0.5 
Consumer Finance 0.03 0.03 1 0.2 
Education 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.38 
Corporate Loan 0.01 0.02 2.16** 2.90*** 
------------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Observations 138 85 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: Borrower Targets and Amounts  
Variable Non-Profit For-Profit T-test T-stat 
------------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Subgroup Targeted 
Women 0.43 0.26 2.83*** 3.98*** 
Rural Population 0.35 0.29 0.91 0.15 
Poverty Target 
Very Poor 0.27 0.20 1.2 0.13 
Poor 0.70 0.53 2.66*** 1.17 
Avg. Loan 
Balance/GNI 0.34 0.42 1.48 3.21*** 
% of Loans to Rural 
Pop. 0.42 0.30 2.26** 1.66* 
% of Loans to Females 0.59 0.54 1.85* 1.99** 
------------- ------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Observations 159 93
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Table 3.6: Other Products Offered 
Variable Non-Profit For-Profit T-test T-stat 
------------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Savings Product Type 
Compulsory Deposits 0.16 0.09 1.74* 1.22 
Voluntary Deposits 0.08 0.17 2.47** 3.12*** 
Fixed Term Deposits 0.25 0.33 1.51 3.13*** 
Checking Account 0.04 0.15 2.99*** 2.39** 
Finance Product Type 
Credit/Debit Card 0.14 0.27 2.59** 4.46*** 
Mobile Payment 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.15 
Remittance Services 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.43 
------------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Observations 159 93
 
Table 3.7: Other Services Offered 
Variable Non-Profit For-Profit T-test T-stat 
------------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Enterprise Services 0.40 0.17 3.79*** 3.24***
Skills Development 0.28 0.15 2.41** 1.79*
Business Development 0.28 0.10 3.55*** 3.06***
Education Services 0.55 0.34 3.17*** 2.61**
Financial Literacy 0.47 0.33 2.14** 1.99**
Children and Youth 0.07 0.03 1.23 0.93
Health Nutrition 0.21 0.05 3.46*** 3.58***
Occupational Safety 0.07 0.03 1.23 1.66*
Women's Services 0.47 0.17 4.89*** 5.13***
Leadership Training 0.43 0.12 5.37*** 5.29***
Rights Education 0.30 0.06 4.50*** 4.08***
Legal Services for Violence Victims 0.08 0.04 1.02 0.33
Environmental Services 0.52 0.43 1.41 0.26
Raise Awareness 0.38 0.29 1.4 0.87
Identify Enterprises with Env. Risk 0.04 0.08 1.04 1.71*
Lending Linked to Env. Friendly Products 0.03 0.01 0.79 0.43
Lending Linked to Alternate Energy 0.01 0.05 1.93* 1.99**
Train Clients 0.06 0.00 2.49** 1.94*
Health Services 0.21 0.10 2.29** 1.37
------------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Observations 159 93
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Table 3.8: Balance Sheet Variables by Profit Status 
Variable Non-Profit For-Profit 
------------- ------------- ------------- 
Size Variables 
Assets (Millions of USD) 33.00 178.00 
Gross Loan Portfolio (Millions of USD) 25.90 140.00 
Deposits (Millions of USD) 15.80 84.20 
Number of Offices 11.87 46.43 
Personnel 144.31 768.45 
Number of Active Borrowers 
(Thousands) 18.50 112.36 
Performance Variables 
Debt/Equity Ratio 3.54 5.79 
Return on Assets -0.01 0.02 
Yield on Gross Portfolio 0.27 0.40 
Operating Expenses/Assets 0.21 0.24 
Cost per Borrower 210.66 275.48 
Borrowers per Employee 121.40 133.42 
Portfolio at Risk - 30 Days 0.08 0.06 
Administrative Expenses/Assets 0.09 0.10 
Profit Margin -0.06 0.04 
------------ ------------ ------------ 
Observations 158 92 
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Table 3.9: Products and Services by Cluster 
Variable Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- 
Credit Product Type 
Small-Medium Enterprise 0.55 0.11 0.41 
Agricultural 0.69 0.22 0.70 
Household Finance 0.83 0.21 0.79 
Consumer Finance 0.90 0.16 0.54 
Education 0.31 0.07 0.54 
Microenterprise 0.97 0.97 0.98 
Savings Product Type 
Compulsory Deposits 0.21 0.05 0.13 
Voluntary Deposits 0.22 0.03 0.04 
Fixed Term Deposits 0.55 0.05 0.13 
Checking Account 0.15 0.02 0.05 
Finance Product Type 
Credit/Debit Card 0.32 0.08 0.11 
Mobile Payment 0.01 0.00 0.04 
Enterprise Services 
Skills Development 0.09 0.21 0.55 
Business Development 0.10 0.13 0.55 
Education Services 
Financial Literacy 0.26 0.36 0.82 
Children and Youth 0.04 0.02 0.14 
Health Nutrition 0.01 0.15 0.43 
Occupational Safety 0.00 0.04 0.18 
Women's Services 
Leadership Training 0.11 0.20 0.88 
Rights Education 0.06 0.10 0.68 
Legal Services for Violence Victims 0.00 0.05 0.20 
Environmental Services 
Raise Awareness 0.31 0.21 0.63 
Identify Enterprises with Env. Risk 0.05 0.10 0.00 
Lending Linked to Env. Friendly 
Products 0.04 0.01 0.00 
Lending Linked to Alternate Energy 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Train Clients 0.01 0.03 0.11 
------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- 
Observations 105 91 56 
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Table 3.10: Average Total Compensation/GNI by Profit Status, Cluster 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
------------------ ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
For-Profit 1.15*** 1.65*** 0.87*** 1.51***
(0.17) (0.32) (0.21) (0.35)
Average Loan Balance per Borrower                           
(Thousands of USDs) 0.39*** 0.37***
(0.09) (0.09)
Average Loan Balance*For-Profit -0.30*** -0.26**
(0.10) (0.11)
Borrowers per Employee (Hundreds) 0.29** 0.28**
(0.13) (0.13)
Borrowers per Employee*For-Profit -0.28* -0.27
(0.17) (0.17)
Gross Loan Portfolio (Billions of USDs) 0.47 0.11
(0.33) (0.34)
3rd Cluster Indicator -0.52*** -0.22
(0.20) (0.22)
2nd Cluster Indicator -0.25 0.05
(0.21) (0.22)
3rd Cluster Indicator*For-Profit 2.17*** 1.83***
(0.54) (0.55)
2nd Cluster Indicator*For-Profit -0.07 -0.23
(0.33) (0.34)
Constant 0.90*** 0.44 1.22*** 0.51
(0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.40)
------------------ ------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Observations 228 228 228 228
R-squared 0.812 0.835 0.83 0.846
Country Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
------------------ ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 3.11: Number of Incentives by Loan Size, Profit Status 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
-----------------              ------------------- ------------------ --------------- --------------- 
For-Profit 0.28 0.29 0.32 -0.15
(0.22) (0.60) (0.31) (0.68)
Average Loan Balance per Borrower                    
(Thousands of USDs) -0.46** -0.41**
(0.19) (0.19)
Average Loan Balance*For-Profit 0.35 0.57*
(0.26) (0.29)
Borrowers per Employee (Hundreds) -0.04 -0.06
(0.22) (0.22)
Borrowers per Employee*For-Profit -0.18 -0.01
(0.31) (0.31)
Gross Loan Portfolio (Billions of USDs) 0.57 -0.99
(0.95) (1.13)
Rural % of Borrowers 0.22 0.1
(0.47) (0.47)
Female % of Borrowers -0.92 -0.87
(0.81) (0.82)
3rd Cluster Indicator 0.44 0.38
(0.31) (0.38)
2nd Cluster Indicator 0.01 -0.12
(0.31) (0.38)
3rd Cluster Indicator*For-Profit 0.88 1.70*
(0.74) (0.93)
2nd Cluster Indicator*For-Profit 0.07 0.09
(0.45) (0.61)
Constant 3.52*** 4.46*** 3.41*** 4.37***
(0.56) (0.99) (0.61) (0.99)
------------------ -------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------
Observations 216 146 216 146
R-squared 0.128 0.277 0.156 0.328
Country Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
------------------ ------------------ ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 3.12: High Pay-for-Performance by Loan Size, Profit Status 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
----------------- ---------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
For-Profit 0.35* 0.08 0.32 0.09
(0.20) (0.33) (0.27) (0.45)
Average Loan Balance per Borrower                                 
(Thousands of USDs) 0.25** 0.27**
(0.11) (0.13)
Average Loan Balance*For-Profit 0.08 0.05
(0.19) (0.21)
Gross Loan Portfolio (Billions of USDs) -0.03 1.79
(0.55) (1.18)
3rd Cluster Indicator -0.21 0.16
(0.27) (0.30)
2nd Cluster Indicator -0.02 0.36
(0.27) (0.31)
3rd Cluster Indicator*For-Profit 0.00  0.00 
(0.00) (0.00)
2nd Cluster Indicator*For-Profit 0.02 -0.07
(0.41) (0.45)
Constant 0.85* 0.73* 0.88* 0.46
(0.43) (0.44) (0.48) (0.53)
----------------- ---------------- -------------- -------------- ---------------
Observations 242 240 239 237
Pseudo R-squared 0.070 0.103 0.075 0.119
Country Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
------------------ ---------------- -------------- --------------- ---------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 3.13: Performance Effects of High Correlation and Incentives 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Borrower 
Retention  
% Female 
Borrowers 
% Rural 
Borrowers 
Portfolio at 
Risk - 30 days 
Borrowers per 
Employee 
-------------------- ----------------- ---------------- -------------- ---------------- ---------------- 
For-Profit -0.07 -0.03 -0.18** -0.16** -70.95
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (57.02)
High Correlation 
Indicator -0.04 0 -0.15** 0.18** -49.73
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (32.45)
High Correlation*For-
Profit 0.07 -0.05 0.13 0.01 117.62
(0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.02) (91.11)
Incentive  -0.07* 0.11* -0.02 0.01 -6.46
(0.04) (0.06) -0.11 (0.05) (24.49)
Incentive*For-Profit 0.17** 0.36* 0.16 0.14* 105.97*
(0.07) (0.20) -0.19 (0.08) (58.66)
Incentive*High 
Correlation 0.10* 0.02 0.19 -0.17** 25.51
(0.06) (0.12) (0.18) (0.08) (36.88)
Incentive*High 
Correlation*For-Profit -0.14 -0.44* -0.05 0.00 -139.66
(0.10) (0.24) (0.28) (0.00) (95.96)
Constant 0.77*** 0.68*** 0.17 0.05 89.45**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.15) (0.06) (41.76)
-------------------- ----------------- --------------- -------------- ---------------- ----------------
Observations 132 165 158 208 213
R-squared 0.118 0.2 0.316 0.424 0.155
Country Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
------------------ ------------------ --------------- -------------- ---------------- ----------------
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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